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However, Mr. Partha Pratim Roy, learned counsel appearing for the respondent first submitted that in the instant case the appellant no. 1 executed the sale deed in favour of the predecessor of the appellant no. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 on July 5, 1988, the respondent filed the suit for specific performance on July 7, 1988 and the said deed of sale dated July 5, 1988 was registered on July 7, 1988. According to him, when the sale deed dated July 5, 1988 was registered after filing of the suit by the respondent, the transfer of a portion of the said properties in favour of the appellant nos. 3 and 4 and the predecessor of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d), is hit by the principle of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. In support of such contention, Mr. Roy relied on the decision of the Supreme court in the case of Har Narain vs. Mam Chand reported in (2010) 13 SCC 128. He further contended that since the transfer of a portion of the said properties in favour of the appellant nos. 3 and 4 and the predecessor of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d), by the appellant no. 1 was during pendency of the suit filed by the respondent, sub-Section (2) of Section 21 of the Limitation Ac, 1963 comes into play and the suit against the appellant nos. 3 and 4 and the said predecessor of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) was not barred by the laws of limitation. He further contended that in any event, even if it is accepted for the sake of argument that the suit filed against the said subsequent purchasers is barred by limitation the entire suit shall not fail and it is only the claim of the respondent against the portion of the suit properties against the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 shall not be maintainable.

199. Mr. Ghosh urged that as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Awadh vs. Achhaibar Dubey (supra) it is not only the transferor defendant, but also the subsequent purchaser of the property as the defendant in a suit for specific performance can contend and establish that the plaintiff has not fulfilled the mandatory requirement of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act with regard to his readiness and willingness to perform the agreement for sale. According to him, in the present case, the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 not being parties to Title Appeal No. 138 of 1989, can contend and establish in this second appeal that the respondent was not ready and willing to perform his part of the said agreement and that the finding of the learned Courts below, in the previous judgment of the learned trial Court dated November 15, 1989 as well as the judgment of the learned first appellate Court in the said Title Appeal No 138 of 1989 and the judgement and decree passed by dated January 22, 2004 the learned trial court after remand are all, on the grounds already urged by him vitiated by perversity, After conclusion of the hearing of the appeal while the decision of the appeal was awaiting, I came across a decision of the Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Hamda Ammal vs. Avadiappa Pathar reported in (1991)1 SCC 715. In the said decision of the Supreme Court held that in case of sale of an immovable property of the value of more than Rs. 100/-, in view of Section 47 of the Registration Act a deed of conveyance of sale after its registration relates back to the date of its execution and an order of attachment passed in a suit filed subsequent to the execution of the conveyance but before the date of registration of the conveyance shall not affect the transfer of the property. Thus, I directed the matter to appear in my list on June 21, 2016 under the heading "To Be Mentioned" for drawing the attention of the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties to the said decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hamda Ammal vs. Avadiappa Pathar (supra). On June 21, 2016 when the appeal appeared under the heading "To be Mentioned," the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hamda Ammal (supra) was brought to the notice of Mr. Roy and Mr. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and both of them agreed that the said decision of the Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court was not considered Two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court while deciding the case of Har Narain Vs. Mam Chand (supra). Even in Division Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case Sudama Devi (supra), cited by Mr. Ghosh, Untwalia, J. (as His Lordship then was) also held that when a sale deed is executed prior to, but the same was registered during the pendency of the suit, in view of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 merely because it is registered subsequent to the filing of suit, the transfer cannot be said to be hit by the principle of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. I am in respectful agreement with the said decision.

It is well settled law that if there are two Supreme Court decisions of varying import on the same point of law and when the latter judgement did not notice the previous view of a larger Bench, a Division Bench or a Single Judge of the High Court should follow the previous judgment. Authorities for this view can be found in the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Mattulal -Vs.- Radhe Lal reported in AIR 1974 SC 1596 and Laxman Thamappa Kotgiri -Vs.- G.M. Central Railway & ors reported in (2007)4 SCC 596. Thus, applying the ratio of the judgement of the three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Hamda Ammal Vs. Abadiappa Pathar (supra), I find that in the present case, though the deed of conveyance by the appellant no. 1 in favour of the predecessor of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 was executed before the respondent filed the suit for specific performance and the registration of the said conveyance was completed after filing of the said suit, by virtue of the provisions in Section 47 of the Registration Act 1908, the transfer of a portion of the suit properties by the appellant no.1 to the predecessor of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3 and 4 was not a transfer during pendency of the suit, nor hit by the principle of lis pendens under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Therefore , the submission made on behalf of the respondent that transfer of a portion of the said properties by the appellant no. 1 to that said predecessor of the appellant nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant nos. 3, and 4 was hit by the principle of lis pendens cannot be accepted. Consequently, in view of the provisions in sub-Section (1) of Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the impleadment of the predecessor of the appellant Nos. 2(a) to 2(d) and the appellant Nos. 3 and 4, being the subsequent purchasers, as added defendants in the said suit for specific performance was barred by the law of limitation. Accordingly, the aforementioned first substantial question of law framed in the present appeal is answered in the affirmative. Now, by the judgement dated February 5, 1994 in Title Appeal No. 138 of 1989 the learned first appellate Court had held that the said subsequent purchasers were necessary parties to said suit and in their absence the suit was bad for non joinder of necessary parties. Therefore, since I have already held that impleadment of the subsequent purchasers as the defendant in the suit was barred by the laws of limitation, the entire suit filed the respondent fails. This view is fortified by the decision of the Five Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Kanakarathanammal - Vs.- V.S. Loganatha Mudaliar & another reported in AIR 1965 SC 271.