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As it has already been mentioned, the impugned Act replaced the 1939 Act which dealt only with prize competitions. Section 2(2) of the 1939 Act defined "prize competition" in the terms following:----

2(2) "Prize Competition " includes-

(a) crossword prize competition, missing words competition, picture prize competition, number prize competition, or any other competition, for which the solution is prepared beforehand by the promoters of the competition or for which the solution is determined by lot;

(iii)any other competition success in which does not depend to a substantial degree upon the exercise of skill, but does not include a prize competition contained in a newspaper printed and published outside the Province of Bombay; "

The collocation of words in the first category of the definitions in both the 1939 Act and the 1948 Act as originally enacted made it quite clear that the qualifying clause "for which the solution is prepared beforehand by the promoters of the competition or for which the solution is determined by lot " applied equally to each of the five kinds of prize competitions included in that category and set out one after another in a continuous sentence. It should also be noted that the qualifying clause consisted of two parts separated from each other by the disjunctive word "or". Both parts of the qualifying clause indicated that each of the five kinds of prize competitions which they qualified were of a gambling nature. Thus a prize competition for which a solution was prepared beforehand was clearly a gambling prize competition, for the competitors were only invited to guess what the solution prepared beforehand by the promoters might be, or in other words, as Lord Hewart C. J. observed in Coles v. Odhams Press Ltd. (1), " the competitors are invited to pay certain number of pence to have the opportunity of taking blind shots at a hidden target." Prize competitions to which the second part of the qualifying clause applied, that is to say, the prize competitions for which the solution was determined by lot, was necessarily a gambling adventure. On the language used in the definition section of the 1939 Act as well as in the 1948 Act, as originally enacted, there could be no doubt that each of the five kinds of prize competitions included in the first category to each of which the qualifying clause applied was of a gambling nature. Nor has it been questioned that the third category, which comprised " any other competition success in which does not depend to a substantial degree upon the exercise of skill constituted a (1) L.R. (1936) 1 K.B. 416.

Accepting that the qualifying clause applies to each of the five kinds of prize competitions included in the first category, it is urged that the qualifying clause as amended indicates that the Legislature intended to include innocent prize competitions within the definition so as to bring all prize competitions, legitimate or otherwise, within the operation of the regulatory provisions of the Act including the taxing sections. The argument is thus formulated. As a result of the amendment the qualifying clause has been broken up into three parts separated from each other by the disjunctive word " or ". The, three parts are (1) for which the solution is prepared beforehand by the promoters, (2) for which the solution is not prepared beforehand by the promoters and (3) for which the solution is determined by lot or chance. The first and the third parts of the qualifying clause, it is conceded, will, when applied to the preceding five kinds of prize cometitions, make each of them gambling a ventures; gut it is contended that prize competitions to which the second part of the qualifying clause may apply, that is to say prize competitions for which the solution is not prepared beforehand, need not be of a gambling nature at all and at any rate many of them may well be of an innocent type. This argument hangs on the frail peg of unskilful draftsmanship. It has been seen that in the old -definitions all the five kinds of prize competitions included in the first categorv were of a gambling nature. We find no cogent reason-and none has been suggested-why the Legislature_which treated lotteries and prize competitions on the same footing should suddenly enlarge the first category so as to include innocent prize competitions. To hold that the first category of prize competitions include innocent prize competitions will go against the obvious tenor of the impugned Act. The 1939 Act dealt with prize competitions only and the first category in the definition given there comprised only gambling competitions. The 1948 Act clubbed together lotteries and prize competitions and the first category of the prize competitions included in the definition 'as originally enacted was purely gambling as both parts of the qualifying clause clearly indicated. Section 3 of the Act declared all lotteries and all prize competitions unlawful. There could be no reason for declaring innocent prize competitions unlawful. The regulatory provisions for licensing and taxing apply to all prize competitions. If it were intended to include. innocent prize competitions in the first category, one would have expected the Legislature to have made separate provisions for the legitimate prize competitions imposing less rigorous regulations than what had been imposed on illegitimate prize competitions. It will become difficult to apply the same taxing sections to legitimate as well as to illegitimate competitions. Tax on legitimate competitions may well be a tax under Entry 60 on the trader who carries on the trade of innocent and legitimate competition. It may be and indeed it has been the subject of serious controversy whether an illegitimate competition can be regarded A a trade at all and in one view of the matter the tax may have to be justified as a tax on betting and gambling under Entry 62. Considering the nature, scope and effect of the impugned Act we entertain no doubt whatever that the first category of prizecompetitions does not include any innocent prize competition. Such is what we conceive to be the clear intention of the Legislature as expressed in the impugned Act read as a whole and to give effect to this obvious intention, as we are bound to do, we have perforce to read the word "or" appearing in the qualifying clause after the word "promoter" and before the word "for" as "and". Well known canons of construction of Statutes permit us to do so. (See Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 10th edition, page 238). A similar argument was sought to be raised on a construction of cl. (ii) of s. 2(1) (d). As already stated, in between the first and the third categories of prize competitions which, as already seen, are of a gambling nature the definition has included a second category of competitions in which prizes are offered for forecasts of the results either of a future event or of a past event the result of which is not yet ascertained or not yet generally known. It is said that forecasts of such events as are specified in the section need not necessarily depend on chance, for it may be accurately done by the exercise of knowledge and skill derived from a close study of the statistics of similar events of the past. It may be that expert statisticians may form some idea of the result of an uncertain future event but it is difficult to treat the invitation to the general public to participate in these competitions as an invitation to a game of skill. The ordinary common people who usually join in these competitions can hardly be credited with such abundance of statistical skill as will enable them, by the application of their skill, to attain success. For most, if not all, of them the forecast is nothing better than a shot at a hidden target. Apart from the unlikelihood that the Legislature in enacting a statute tarring both lotteries and prize competitions with the same brush as indicated by s' 3 would squeeze in innocent prize competitions in between two categories of purely gambling varieties of them, all the considerations and difficulties we have adverted to in connection with the construction of the ,first category and the qualifying clause therein will apply mutatis mutandis to the interpretation of this second clause.

whether a company is a citizen within the meaning of Art' 19 and indeed the point has not been argued before us. The last point urged by the petitioners is that assuming that the impugned Act deals only with gambling and that gambling is not "trade" or "business" or "commerce" and is, therefore, not entitled to the protection of our Constitution, the prize competitions run by them are in fact not of a gambling nature. The trial court accepted this contention while the Court of Appeal rejected it. We have examined the scheme and the rules and the official solutions and the explanations in support thereof and we have come to the conclusion that the competition at present run by the petitioners under the name of R.M.D.C. Crosswords are of a gambling nature. Our view so closely accords with that of the Court of Appeal that we find it unnecessary to go into the details of the scheme. To start with, we find that the Board of Adjudicators pick up nine of the clues and -select only those competitors whose answers correspond with 'the official solution of those nine clues. Those nine clues may be from the top, may be from the bottom or may be selected at random. It is said that they-are like nine compulsory questions in a school examination but then in a school examination, the students are told which are the nine compulsory questions and they can take particular care with regard to those; but in this scheme there is no knowing which nine will be selected and those competitors whose answers do not accord with the official solution are debarred from being considered for the first prize. A competitor may have given correct answers to eight of the nine selected clues and may have given correct answers to the remaining eight so that he has sent in sixteen correct answers but he will, nevertheless, not be considered for the first prize because his answers to the nine selected questions did not agree with the official solutions of those nine clues. This is a chance element to start with. We have then seen that the competing words out of which one is to be selected are in some cases equally apt. We are not satisfied that the word selected by the Board is the more apt word in many. cases. The reasons given by them appear to us to be laboured and artificial and even arbitrary in some cases. On the whole, we have come to the conclusion that the Court of Appeal was right in its conclusion that in point of fact the prize competitions run by the petitioners partake of a gambling nature and, therefore, fall within the definition and are to be governed by the regulatory and taxing provisions of the Act. For the reasons stated above, we have come to the conclusion that the impugned law is a law with respect to betting and gambling under Entry 34 and the impugned taxing section is a law with respect to tax on betting and gambling under Entry 62 and that- it was within the legislative competence of the State Legislature to have enacted it. There is sufficient territorial nexus to entitle the State Legislature to collect the tax from the petitioners who carry on the prize competitions through the medium of a newspaper printed and published outside the State of Bombay. The prize competitions being of a gambling nature, they cannot be regarded as trade or commerce and as such the petitioners cannot claim any fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(g) in respect of such competitions, nor are they entitled to the protection of Art. 301. The result, therefore, is that this appeal must be allowed and the order of the lower court set aside and the petition dismissed and we do so with costs throughout.