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4.The main argument on behalf of the petitioner as advanced by the learned counsel is that the provisions of Section 15(2)(d) and Rules 35 to 44 are impeding the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to deal with such issues and since the power of judicial review is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India, the said provisions should be declared as ultra virus. For this, reliance has been placed at paragraph No.105 of the Judgment in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India reported in 2014 (10) SCC

1. The said paragraph is reproduced hereunder:-

"105. Having recorded the determination rendered by this Court to the effect that “separation of powers”, “rule of law” and “judicial review” at the hands of an independent judiciary, constitute the “basic structure” of the Constitution, we are in a http://www.judis.nic.in position now to determine, how the aforesaid concepts came to be adopted by this Court, while adjudicating upon the validity of provisions similar to the ones, which are subject of consideration, in the case on hand. The first controversy arose with reference to the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which was enacted under Article 323 A of the Constitution. In S.P. Sampath Kumar case (supra), it was sought to be concluded, that the power of “judicial review” had been negated by the aforementioned enactment, inasmuch as, the avenue of redress under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the High Court, was no longer available. It was also sought to be asserted, that the tribunal constituted under the enactment, being a substitute of the High Court, ought to have been constituted in a manner, that it would be able to function in the same manner as the High Court itself. Since insulation of the judiciary from all forms of interference, even from the coordinate branches of the Government, was by now being perceived as a basic essential feature of the Constitution, it was felt that the same independence from possibility of executive pressure or influence, needed to be ensured for the Chairman, Vice Chairman and Members of the administrative tribunal. In recording its conclusions, even though it was maintained, that “judicial review” was an integral part of the “basic structure” of the Constitution, yet it was held, that Parliament was competent to amend the Constitution, and substitute in place of the High Court, another alternative http://www.judis.nic.in institutional mechanism or arrangement. This Court, however cautioned, that it was imperative to ensure, that the alternative arrangement, was no less independent, and no less judicious, than the High Court (which was sought to be replaced) itself. This was conveyed by observing: (SCC p. 130, para 3) “3. .......if any constitutional amendment made by the Parliament takes away from the High Court the power of “judicial review” in any particular area, and vests it in any other institutional mechanism or authority, it would not be violative of the basic structure doctrine so long as the essential condition is fulfilled, namely, that the alternative institutional mechanism or authority set up by the Parliament by amendment is no less effective than the High Court”.