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2. Advocate Choube for respondent landlord has invited attention of this Court to Section 7 of C.P.C. to point out that Section 115 thereof is expressly excluded insofar as Small Causes Court is concerned. He contends that a remedy of appeal under Section 26-A of Provincial Act is provided against the judgment of Small Causes Court and the said appellate judgment is final in view of Section 27 thereof. Advocate for Revision applicant Shri Moharil argued that Section 27 has no application because it does not refer to the appellate order at all and the appeal Court namely the District Court is a Court subordinate to High Court and as such remedy of Revision under Section 115 C.P.C. is correctly availed of. In the alternative and by way of abundant precaution he also stated that if this Court ultimately finds that revision under Section 115 C.P.C. is not tenable, revision applicant should be permitted to file appropriate writ petition in High Court and till then interim orders operating in revision protecting his possession should be continued.

"The learned Counsel for the respondent has stated that scope of latter section is narrower than that of Section 115 of C.P.C. But I'm afraid his statement of this proposition of law is not correct. There is continuous series of authorities on the point that scope of Section 24 of Small Causes Court Act (Section 25 of the Indian Act) is wider than that of Section 115 C.P.C. These authorities begin from (Sher v. Mohan Singh)5, 66 Pun. 1895 up to date."

8. In Uttar Pradesh the powers of revision under Section 25 of Provincial Act were exercised by District Judge. Question arose whether revision under Section 115 of C.P.C was tenable against revisional order of District Judge.

What is to be noted here is that there is nothing in the section which says that the decision of the revisional authority under Section 20 shall be final and shall not be called in question in any higher Court."

20. The learned Judge referred to the decision of the JUDICIAL Committee in the case of (Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin) . The learned Judge also referred to a decision of this Court in (South Asia Industries (P.) Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh) (supra). The learned Judge concluded that so long as there was no specific provision in the statute making the determination by the District Court final and excluding the supervisory power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it had to be held that the decision rendered by the District Court under Section 20(1) of the Act being a decision of a Court subordinate to the High Court to which an appeal lay to the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that view of the matter, the Full Bench rejected the view of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in (Kurien v. Chacko), 1960 Ker.L.T. 1248. With respect, we are unable to sustain the view of the Full Bench of the High Court on this aspect of the matter. In our opinion the Full Bench misconstrued the provisions of Sub-section (5) of Section 18 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of Section 18 clearly states that such decision of the Appellate Authority as mentioned in Section 18 of the Act shall not be liable to be questioned except in the manner under Section 20 of the Act. There was thereby an implied prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court when a revision has been provided under Section 20 of the Act in question. When Section 18(5) of the Act specifically states that' shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law' except in the manner provided under Section 20, it cannot be said that the High Court which is a Civil Court under the Code of Civil procedure, under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure could revise again an order after revision under Section 20 of the Act. That would mean there would be a trial by four Courts, that would be repugnant to the scheme manifest in the different sections of the' Act in question. Public policy or Public interest demands curtailments of law's delay and justice demands finality within quick disposal of case. The language of the provisions of Section 18(5) read with Section 20 inhibits further revision. The courts must: so construe.

"15. Even without any discussion it may be seen from the narrative given above that there is really no conflict between the two decisions because the provisions in the two Acts are materially different. However, to clarify matters further we may point out the differences between the two Acts in greater detail and clarity. Under the Kerala Act, against an order passed by a Rent Control Court presided over by a District Munsif, the aggrieved party is conferred a right of appeal under Section 18. The Appellate Authority has to be a Judicial Officer not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge. The Appellate Authority has been conferred powers co-extensive with those of the Rent Control Court but having overriding effect. Having these factors in mind, the Legislature has declared that in so far as and order of a Rent Control Court is concerned it shall be final subject only to any modification or revision by an Appellate Authority; and in so far as an Appellate Authority is concerned, its decision shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of Law except as provided in Section 20. As regards Section 20, a division of the powers of revision exercisable thereunder has been made between the High Court and the District Court, in all those cases where a revision is preferred against a decision of an Appellate Authority of the rank of a Subordinate Judge under Section 18, the District Judge has been constituted the revisional authority. It is only in other cases i.e. where the decision sought to be revised is that of a Judicial Officer of a higher rank than a Subordinate Judge, the High Court has been constituted the Revisional Authority. The revisional powers conferred under Section 20, whether it be on the District Judge or the High Court as the case may be are of greater, amplitude than the power of revision exercisable by a High Court under Section 115, C.P.C. under Section 20 the Revisional Authority is entitled to satisfy itself about the legality, regularity or propriety of the orders sought to be revised. Not only that, the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority have been expressly conferred powers of remand under Section 20-A of the Act. Therefore, a party is afforded an opportunity to put forth his case before the Rent control Court and then before the Appellate Authority and thereafter if need be before the Court of Revision viz. the District Court if the Appellate Authority is of the rank of a Subordinate Judge. The Legislature in its wisdom has thought that on account of the ample opportunity given to a party to put forth his case before three courts viz. The trial Court, the Appellate Court and the revisional Court, there was no need to make the revisional order of the District Court subject to further scrutiny by the High Court by means of a second revision either under the Act or under the Civil Procedure Code. It has been pointed out in Aundal Ammals case, (supra) that the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court had failed to construe the terms of Section 20 read with Section 18(5), in their proper perspective and this failing had affected its conclusion. According to the Full Bench, a revisional order of a District Court under Section 20 laid itself open for further challenge to the High Court under Section 115, C.P.C. because of two factors viz, (1) there was no mention in the Act that the order would be final, and (2) that there was no provision in the Act for an appeal being filed against a revisional order under Section 20. The Full Bench failed to notice certain crucial factors. In the first place, Section 20 is a composite section and refers to the powers of revisional exercisable under that section by a District Judge as well as by the High Court. Such being the case if it is to be taken that an order passed by a District Court under Section 20 will not have finality because the section does not specifically say so, then it will follow that a revisional order passed by the High Court under Section 20(1) also will not have finality. Surely it cannot be contended by anyone that an order passed by a High Court in exercise of its powers of revision under Section 20(1) can be subjected to further revision because Section 20(1) has not expressly conferred finality to an order passed under that section. Secondly, the terms of Section 20(1) have to be read in conjunction with Section 18(5). Section 18(5), as already seen, declares that an order of a rent Control Court shall be final subject to the decision of the Appellate Authority and an order of an appellate Authority shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law except as provided for in Section 20. When the Legislature has declared that even an order of the Rent Control Court and the decision of the Appellate Authority shall be final at their respective stages unless the order is modified by the Appellate Authority or the Revisional Authority as the case may be, there is no necessity for the legislature to declare once over again that an order passed in revision under Section 20(1) by the District Judge or the High Court as the case may be will also have the seal of finality. The third aspect is that the Legislature has not merely conferred finality to the decision of an Appellate Authority but has further laid down that the decision shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law except as provided for in Section 20. These additional words clearly spell out the prohibition or exclusion of a second revision under Section 115, C.P.C to the High Court against a revisional order passed by a District Court under Section 20 of the Act. This position has been succinctly set, out in para 20 of the judgment in Aundal Ammal's case, (supra). As was noticed in Vishesh Kumar's case, the intent behind the bifurcation of the jurisdiction is to reduce the number of revision petitions filed in the High Court and for determining the legislative intent, the Court must as far as possible construe a statute in such a manner as would advance the object of the legislation and suppress the mischief sought to be cured by it.