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In view of above facts and circumstances, the second legal ground taken by the AR of the assessee is required to be rejected. Assessee's third legal ground: It has been argued that the assessment order u/s.153A was passed on 29.12.2017 but it was dispatched on 08.01.2018 and served on the assessee on 15.01.2018. Hence it was barred by limitation of time.

i.) This issue has been discussed at length by the CIT(A) in paras 7.2 to 7.9 on pages 6 to 13 of the appellate order for AY 2013-14. Strong reliance is placed on the discussion and findings of CIT(A). ii.) Further the Hon'ble Cuttack ITAT vide order dated 10.06.2013 in the case of Sophia Study Circle vs. ITO in ITA No.286/CTK/2012 has held that the Assessing Officer is required to make the assessment order before the time barring date and not required to serve the order before the time barring date. (Para 6) This decision was not placed before the Hon'ble Jurisdictional ITAT during the hearing in the case of M/s. Nidan. Therefore as such, the decision in the case of M/s. Nidan is Per incuriam.

7.6 Further, Hon'ble Jurisdictional Tribunal, in their order dtd. 10.06.2013 in the case of Sophia Study Circle Vs. ITO in ITA No.286/CTK/2012 has held that the Assessing Officer is required to make the assessment order before the time barring date and is not required to serve the order before the time barring date. The relevant portion of the decision is as below:

"We have considered the rival submissions. At the outset, a perusal of the provisions of section 153 of the Act shows that the word used in the said section 'make'. Similarly, a perusal of the proviso to section 147 of the Act shows that the word used as "no action shall be taken'. Similarly, in the provisions of section 148 of the Act, the words used are 'shall serve on the assessee'. Similarly, in the provisions of section 149 of the Act, the words used are 'issue to the assessee. Thus, each word used in IT(SS)A No.132/CTK/2018 ITA Nos.19&20/CTK/2019 each section has a different purpose and different meaning. 'Made' cannot be treated on the same footing as served. The fact that the word used is 'made' in section 153 shows that the assessment order should be made on or before the said date. It does not mean that it should be served. On this ground itself as we find that the decision of the Coordinate Bench has erroneously laid down the law on this issue if the word 'made' is given the meaning served then the section itself would become unworkable and it would make all assessment orders made on the last day illegal. In the circumstances, respectfully following the principles and the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Hi-Tech Aral Ltd. (2010) 321ITR 477, we differ from the decision taken by the Coordinate Bench in the case of Durga Condev Pvt. Ltd. (supra) as also the decision of Shanti Lai Godawat & Ors. Vs. ACIT (2009) 126 TTJ (Jodh) 135. Here, we may specifically mention that in the case of Durga Condev Pvt. Ltd. (supra), though one of us is co signatory in that order still we differ from the said order as there is no bravery in perpetuating an error in law. The fact that the assessment order is dated 31.12.2010 and there is no evidence available to show that this order was not passed on 31.12.2010 makes this order sustainable in law as under the provisions of the General Clauses Act a government document cannot be questioned unless and until substantial evidence has been produced to dislodge the veracity of the same. Under these circumstances, as it is noticed that the assessment order is dated 31.12.2010 and as no evidence has been produced to show or to prove the allegation that the order was back dated, the technical ground raised by the assessee stands rejected."

It appears that, the decision of Hon'ble Jurisdictional Tribunal in the case of Sophia Study Circle was not placed before the Hon'ble Tribunal, during the hearing in the case of M/s.Nidan. Therefore, as such, the decision in the case of M/s.Nidan is Per incuriam.

7.7 Further, the plain reading of section 153B of Income Tax Act, 1961 clearly indicates that the Assessing Office is required to make the order before the time barring date. When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the courts are to interpret the same in its literal sense and not to give a meaning which would cause violence to the provisions of the statute, as held in Britania Industries Ltd. vs. C.I.T. (2005) 278-ITR-546 at 547 (SC). It is a well settled principle of law that the court cannot read anything into a statutory provision or stipulate a condition, which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the determinative factor of legislative intention. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is incorrect, it is for the Legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. Legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. When the provisions of the act are clear and unambiguous, the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vegetable Products Ltd. will not apply, as held by Hon'ble Supreme IT(SS)A No.132/CTK/2018 ITA Nos.19&20/CTK/2019 Court in the case of Bimal Kishore Paliwal'Vs. CWT (2017) 87 taxmann.com 40 (SC). The relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced below: