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30. On these facts, the question is whether the abovenamed Constable can be held to be guilty of contempt of Court. We have already noted and quoted the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Prem Shankar Shukla, (AIR 1980 SC 1535), wherein it has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court as law that irons can be used against an undertrial under conditions of judicial supervision and such restraints can be justified before or after. It is also directed by the Supreme Court to all the Magistrates and Judges to question the personnel and escort party with regard to the observance of rules of handcuffing. From the observations of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Prem Shankar Shukla (supra), the requirement on behalf of the escort party is that it has not to make use of handcuffs in an indiscriminate and casual manner. It can use handcuffs if the necessity so demands for safe custody of the accused and with a view to not to allow him to escape from police custody. If the escort party resorts to handcuffing during transit, it has to justify its action before the concerned Court. There is no complete restraint on the police escort party not to use handcuffs in all circumstances. In the instant case, the Constable has given an explanation that although there were two Constable, but the accused was charged for a serious offence and his conduct and demeanour was such that they considered it proper to handcuff him during transit so that he might not escape. In these circumstances, it is not possible for us to hold that the Constable, namely, Samantbhai Lakhabhai Chudasama, deliberately intended to defy the orders of the Supreme Court or committed any contempt of the subordinate Court before whom he produced the undertrial.

6.2 It may be noted here that, in the Jail Manual, it is provided in Rule 1290 that, "No prisoner (Undertrial or convicted) shall be handcuffed by the police while being taken from jail to a Court and vice versa or from one jail to another unless a definite direction has been given in writing by the Court or the Senior Jailor directing that the prisoner be handcuffed". In Rule 1293, it is laid down that, "Handcuffs may be imposed, either separately or in addition to fetters, upon any male prisoner who is refractory, violent or dangerous". Rules 1291 and 1292 deal with the power of the Superintendent to place any convict, who has escaped or who is attempting to escape, in fetters. In Rule 1294 of the Jail Manual, it is provided that, "In cases of urgent necessity, the Senior Jailor may on his own authority impose fetters and handcuffs on a prisoner, reporting at once the fact in Register No. 13". There are also restrictions against imposing fetters upon female prisoners, juvenile prisoners, civil prisoners or on any convict when appearing before the Court under the Prisoners Act as mentioned in Rule 1289 of the Jail Manual. There is a special provision in Rule 1295 in respect of handcuffs that may be imposed upon any female who is violent or dangerous. It will, thus, be seen that there is no unguided power given under the Act or the Manual to the jail authorities to impose handcuffs or fetters.

8. The question of handcuffing of undertrial prisoners was considered in context of Articles 21, 14 and 19 by three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration (supra). Justice Krishna Iyer and Justice Chinnappa Reddy held that, "The minimal freedom of movement, which even a detainee is entitled to under Article 19 (See : Sunil Batra), cannot be cut down cruelly by application of handcuffs or other hooks". (See : Para 23 of the judgment).

The Court held that to be consistent with Articles 14 and 19, handcuffs must be the last refuge as there are other ways for ensuring security. No prisoner shall be handcuffed or fettered routinely or merely for the convenience of the custodian or escort. "Functional compulsions of security must reach that dismal degree where no alternative will work except manacles" (See : Para 26 ibid. There must be material, sufficiently stringent, to satisfy a reasonable mind that there is clear and present danger of escape of the prisoner who is being transported by breaking out of the police control and further that by adding to the escort party or other strategy, he cannot be kept under control (See : Para 27 ibid). The onus of proof in this regard is on him who puts the person under irons. It was further held that even where in extreme circumstances, handcuffs have to be put on the prisoner, the escorting authority must record contemporaneously the reasons for doing so. The escort officer, whenever he handcuffs a prisoner produced in Court, must show the reasons so recorded to the Presiding Judge and get his approval, (See : Para 30 of the judgment).

10.2 From the ratio of the decisions of the Constitution Bench in Sunil Batra case (supra) and the three-Judge Bench in Prem Shukla case (supra), it clearly follows that there may be extreme cases where the power to impose handcuffs can be exercised by the concerned authority and that the discretion to impose irons is conferred on the Superintendent of Prison under Section 56. This discretion can also be exercised within the bounds of the directions in Batra and Shukla cases even in relation to the undertrial prisoners who are brought to the Court, in view of the provisions of Section 55 of the Prisons Act. In cases of 'credible tendency for violence and escape', such iron restraint is permissible if other alternatives are unworkable, but the escorting authority must record contemporaneously, reasons for doing so and whenever he handcuffs a prisoner produced in Court must show the reasons so recorded to the presiding Judge and get his approval as directed by the Supreme Court. The handcuffs cannot be imposed arbitrarily or at the whim or caprice of the escort. The authority should consider the case of each prisoner individually and decide whether the prisoner is a person who having regard to the circumstances, general conduct, behaviour and character will attempt to escape or disturb peace by becoming violent. Whether handcuffs or other restraint should be imposed on a prisoner is primarily a matter for the decision of the authority responsible for his custody, as held by Justice Pathak in Prem Shukla case (supra). There may be cases where the decision may have to be taken by the escorting authority midway on imposing a restraint on the prisoner who is being escorted, as held in Prem Shukla case (supra). However, in such event, the Court must be informed of the circumstances in which and the justification for imposing a restraint on the body of the accused. Therefore, there can be cases where there may not be time enough to obtain prior permission and such extreme circumstances may warrant handcuffing the prisoner and in such cases, it cannot be said that such authority has undermined the dignity of the trial Court whose permission could not be obtained earlier. In such cases, which are not cases of lowering or tending to lower the authority of the Court by not getting prior permission for handcuffing, it cannot be said mat the act of handcuffing of the prisoner to the extent that it is justified on the ratio of the Prem Shukla case and Sunil Basra case would amount to 'criminal contempt' of the subordinate Court so as to warrant initiation of the proceedings under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. However, any handcuffing which is not warranted on the ratio of the aforesaid decisions would create such liability on the part of the authority imposing handcuffs in wanton disregard of the requirement of obtaining prior permission of the magisterial Court for imposing handcuffs on the prisoners to be brought to the Court or taken back to the prison.