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1. The true termini for the determination of the limitation prescribed by Section 20 for proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is the significant and somewhat intricate question necessitating this reference to the Pull Bench.

2. The five petitioners had preferred an application under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971(hereinafter called 'the Act') before the Advocate General, Punjab on Feb. 27, 1981 for securing his consent in order to institute an action of criminal contempt against the three respondents-police officials. The alleged contempt inter alia was said to be committed by the filing of false affidavits by the three respondents on Dec 17, 1980 in an earlier habeas corpus matter in Criminal Writ No. 163 of 1980, (Manjit Singh v. Darshan Singh, D. S. P.) decided on January 19, 1981. However, it was not till July 2, 1982 that the learned Advocate General, Punjab accorded his consent to the filing of a contempt petition against the respondents. After securing a copy of the said order, the present petition for contempt was instituted in this Court on July 21, 1982. When the matter came up for hearing before the Division Bench, an objection was surprisingly raised by the Assistant Advocate: General, Punjab himself that the contempt petition was barred by time having been instituted in Court beyond a period of one year from the date of the filing of the false affidavits on Dec. 17, 1980 and was, therefore, hit by Section 20 of the Act. Primary reliance for this objection was placed on two Division Bench judgments in Hari Nandan Agrawal v. S. N. Pandita and Gulab Singh v. The Principal, Sri Ramji Das . Expressing some disagreement with the view in the said authorities and also because of the significance of the question, the matter was referred for a decision by the larger Bench.

(ii) the date on which the Advocate General moves the motion under Section 15(1)(a);

(iii) the date on which a subordinate Court makes a reference of criminal contempt under Section 15(2) of the Act and,

(iv) the date on which any other person prefers an application to the Advocate General, for his consent under Section 15(1)(b) of the Act.

One may straightway come to the core of the controversy. The learned Assistant Advocate General, basing himself on precedent, had canvassed that the sole terminus ad quem herein is the date of the actual issuance of notice of criminal contempt by the Court and the other three termini aforesaid are wholly irrelevant to the issue. Undoubtedly, this view has found favour in Hari Nandan Agrawal v. S.N. Pandita and Gulab Singh v. The Principal Sri Ramji Das ; Dineshbhai A. Parikh v. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel, Ahmedabad ; and State of Maharashtra v. J.V. Patil (1976) 78 Bom LR 116. However, an analysis of these judgments would show that this view is rested primarily, if not wholly, on an inference from a brief observation in Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, C.J. of the Orissa High Court , and not on any larger principle or independent rationale. With the deepest deference, it appears to me that Baradakanta Mishra's case (supra) does not lay down any such inflexible proposition and indeed a close analysis thereof may indicate a contrary result.

12. I, am therefore, inclined to hold that Baradakanta Mishra's case 1975 Cri LJ 1(SC) (supra) is no warrant for the proposition that the issuance of a notice of criminal contempt by the High Court is the sole terminus ad quern for determining limitation under Section 20 of the Act.

13. Once that is so, one must now proceed to analyse and construe Section 20 independently. A plain reading thereof would indicate that the legislature drew a clear line of distinction betwixt proceedings for contempt initiated by the Court on its own motion, and those not so done. Suo motu action by the High Court is thus clearly a class by itself. Consequently the statute in express terms refers to these two classes separately, namely, any proceedings for contempt on Court's own motion, and proceedings for contempt initiated "otherwise". The use of the word 'otherwise' is significant and indeed provides the clue to the true interpretation of Section 20. Therefore, initiation of contempt proceedings otherwise than on Court's own motion would include within its sweep a motion by the Advocate General, a reference by a subordinate Court to the High Court to take action for contempt and an application before the Advocate General seeking his consent by any other person under Section 15 and lastly in cases of civil contempt the motion by a private litigant directly in the Court.

16. With the aforesaid larger conspectus of Section 20 of the Act, one may now proceed to seek the true import of the word 'initiate' as employed therein. Its ordinary dictionary meanings are as under:

In Webster's Third New International Dictionary -

Initiate: To begin or set going; make a beginning of; perform or facilitate the first actions, steps or stages of.

In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary -

Initiate: To begin, commence, enter upon; to introduce, set going, originates.

That being the plain meaning of the word 'initiate' one has to necessarily construe the same in Section 20 in the light of Section 15 which prescribes the methodology of taking cognizance of criminal contempt apart from that in facie curiam in Section 14. Can it be said that when a dignitary of the level of the Advocate General files a motion in the High Court in accordance with the rules he still would not initiate, or begin, commence, or take the first step for the contempt proceedings ? To (hold that this would not amount to even initiation and it would be so only when the matter is heard and the Court after applying its mind actually directs the issuance of the notice, does not appear to me as sound either on principle or on the language employed in the statute. Similarly when a responsible District Judge makes a reference for criminal contempt of the subordinate Court expressly provided for under Section 15(2), can one still hold that he does not initiate the proceedings thereby? Similarly, where a litigant presents a petition before the Advocate General for getting his consent in writing which is a pre-condition for the High Court to take cognizance at his instance under Section 15(1)(b) would he not be initiating the proceedings for criminal contempt. Though we are focusing ourselves primarily on criminal contempt, the analogy of civil contempt is equally apt. If a litigant actually presents a petition in the High Court Registry under the rules for civil contempt, then the Court's action in entertaining such a petition would obviously be a beginning; a commencement or an entering upon and consequently initiating the proceedings of civil contempt. Whether such a petition later fails or succeeds is another matter but to hold that till a decision for issuing notice thereon is made there will not even be initiation of proceedings, appears to me as unwarranted. On a true meaning of the word 'initiate' it has to be held that beginning the action prescribed for taking cognizance for criminal contempt under Section 15 would be initiating the proceedings for contempt and the subsequent refusal or issuance of a notice or punishment thereafter are only steps following or succeeding to such initation.