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(iii) Reliance is also placed, by Mrs. Ahlawat, in this context, on an entry made in the respondent's service book, reading "not opted". Though she is unable to inform the Court regarding the person who made the said entry, she submits that the entry would also indicate that the respondent was not a pension optee.

(iv) There was no averment, in the OA filed by the respondent, asserting that he was a deemed pension optee under the 1992 Office Order. He, in fact, claimed to be a pension optee in terms of the 2002 Office Order, which itself belies his case that he was a deemed pension optee under the 1992 Office Order. The 2002 Office Order was merely provisional and was never implemented. As such, the respondent had no enforceable right in law to be treated as a deemed pension optee.

29. Cumulative impact of S.L. Verma and Shashi Kiran

29.1 Thus, after S.L. Verma and Shashi Kiran, there can be no doubt about the legal position that, if an employee does not exercise any option to continue under the CPF scheme within the time stipulated in that regard, whether it was under the 1987 OM or the 1992 Office Order of the DTC, he would ipso facto be a deemed pension optee. The availment of CPF benefits by him, thereafter, is irrelevant and he can, at the highest, be directed to return the CPF benefits, if necessary with interest. Further, even if he were to refer to himself as a CPF beneficiary thereafter, or even if he were to state, in a written communication, that he was not a pension optee, it would make no difference, as the character of the employee as a deemed pension optee is by operation of law, in terms of para 9 of the 1992 DTC Office Order. A consequence which arises by inexorable operation of law cannot be wished away by assertions to the contrary.

32.2 The submission merely requires submission to merit rejection. In the first place, the respondent had specifically pleaded, in para 4.4 of the OA, that the 1992 Office Order had been issued, and that he had not exercised any option in terms of para 3 thereof. This was admitted by the DTC by its assertion, in the correspondent paragraph of its counter-affidavit before the Tribunal, that the contents of para 4.4 were a matter of record, and did not need any reply. There is, therefore, no dispute about the fact that the respondent had not exercised any option pursuant to the 1992 Office Order. Once this fact stood pleaded, the legal consequence, in terms of para 9 of the Office Order, inexorably followed. Facts are required to be pleaded, not the law. Once the fact that the respondent had not submitted any option following the 1992 Office Order was admitted, para 9 straightaway applied, and the respondent became, ipso facto, a deemed pension optee. He did not have to plead so, and his status as a deemed pension optee being a consequence of application of the law, was not dependent on any pleading. The facts, which gave rise to the legal consequence, were not only specifically pleaded by the respondent, but also admitted by the DTC. Ms Ahlawat is not correct in her submission, therefore, that the Tribunal decided the OA beyond the case pleaded by the respondent.

The Sequitur

35. The sequitur is obvious. Following S.L. Verma and Shashi Kiran, the law is that, if the employee does not exercise any option for continuing with the CPF scheme, he ipso facto switches over to the Pension Scheme. No amount of insistence, by him that he is not a pension optee or that he continues to be a CPF beneficiary, would make any difference. Nor is it permissible for the employee, once he has thus become a deemed pension optee, to switch back to the CPF scheme. Equally, it is not permissible for the establishment - the DTC in the present case - to deny, to the employee, the benefits of being a deemed pension optee. The availment, by the employee, of CPF benefits, is also irrelevant. All that can be required of the employee, in such a situation, would be to return the benefits obtained by him under the CPF scheme, with interest.