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In the case of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav, 2005(2) SCC 42, wherein the High Court allowed the ninth bail application of the accused even after it has been dismissed earlier even by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court had held as under:

"16. The principles of res judicata and such analogous principles although are not applicable in a criminal proceeding, but the courts are bound by the doctrine of judicial discipline having regard to the hierarchical system prevailing in our country. The findings of a higher court or a coordinate Bench must receive serious consideration at the hands of the court entertaining a bail application at a later stage when the same had been rejected earlier. In such an event, the courts must give due weight to the grounds which weighed with the former or higher court in rejecting the bail application. Ordinarily, the issues which had been canvassed earlier would not be permitted to be re-agitated on the same grounds, as the same it would lead to a speculation and uncertainty in the administration of justice and may lead to forum hunting.

In the case of Smt. Bimla Devi v. State of Bihar, 1994(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 509, the Magistrate granted provisional bail after the High Court had rejected the successive bail applications, the conduct of the Magistrate was found to be against judicial discipline and the Chief Justice had asked to take action against the Magistrate on administrative side.

In the case of State of West Bengal v. Nebulal Shaw, 1997 (3) R.C.R. (Criminal) 39, it was held by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that "it is trite saying that a person when admitted to bail by the High Court could be committed to custody only by the High Court. Therefore, person suffered rejection of bail could only agitate his claim to the very Court which rejected the prayer for bail".

case this question was raised before the Judge concerned who observed that there is no bar in the Code of Criminal Procedure and, therefore, he has a right to pass orders of bail on the third bail application, in spite of the fact that a bail application of the accused is pending and is being heard by the High Court. The Additional Judge did not consider the prevalent practice and the long standing convention on which basis an endorsement was asked for on every bail application that no bail application is pending in any other court. As pointed out above, the long standing convention has also the binding effect in order to maintain judicial discipline and decorum and, therefore, in my opinion these long standing convention and judicial discipline cannot be ignored. The purpose behind this convention is to maintain public faith in judicial system as well as the orders passed by the courts. Whenever there is violation of this convention, litigants in general used to raise their voice and if these conventions will be allowed to be violated then in my opinion it will involve judicial anarchy. If the subordinate courts are permitted to grant bail in cases where bail applications are being heard by this Court and are pending, then conflicting and contrary orders can be passed and it would be very difficult to maintain consistency and in my opinion if there will be inconsistency then it will result in judicial anarchy."
This Court also, in the case of Pinder Singh v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-44923-2007 decided on 24.03.2008, has held that if the bail applicant has concealed the fact of decision of the earlier bail application, then he does not deserve the concession of bail.
In the case of Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan and another, 1987(2) SCC 684, it was held by the Supreme Court that "longstanding convention and judicial discipline required that respondent's bail application should have been placed before Justice Kamleshwar Nath who had passed earlier orders, who was available as Vacation Judge. The convention that subsequent bail application should be placed before the same Judge who may have passed earlier orders has its roots in principle. It prevents abuse of process of court inasmuch as an impression is not created that a litigant is shunning or selecting a court depending on whether the court is to his liking or not, and is encouraged to file successive applications without any new factor having cropped up. If successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges there would be conflicting orders and a litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of courts' time. Judicial discipline requires that such matters must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available for orders".