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8. Mr. Sethi submits that in a large number of other cases under Section 304A, where the accusation was that the accused had caused the death of a person by doing any rash or negligent act - not amounting to culpable homicide, the Courts have quashed the criminal proceedings on the basis of settlement reached with the LRs of the deceased. In this regard, he places reliance on Lalit Gupta Vs. State & Ors., 2009(2) JCC 890 - which was a case under Section 288/304A IPC; Vishal Arora Vs. State & Ors. 2014(4) JCC 2867-which was a case under Section 279/ 337 and 304A IPC; Ram Karan Vs. State & Ors., 2015(3) JCC 1685-which was a case under Section 279/304A IPC, Saheb Mandal Vs. State of National Capital Territory of Delhi & Anr., 2015(4) JCC 2600-which was a case under Section 288/304A; and Manjeet Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2016 (1) JCC 574-which was a case under Section 279, 337 and 304A IPC, wherein the Court quashed the FIR and the proceedings arising thereunder, on account of the settlement reached between the accused and the complainants/heirs of the deceased-victim. Mr. Sethi submits that the stand taken by the respondent in the present case is discriminatory inasmuch, as, the State cannot raise an objection to the FIR and the proceedings there under being quashed in the present case-which also alleges commission of offences under Sections 288/337/304A IPC, when the State did not object to the FIRs being quashed in other similar cases, such as the aforesaid.

14. Mr. Singh also submits that the possibility of conviction in the present case cannot be said to be remote, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case. Mr. Singh submits that the draft charge-sheet has already been prepared in the matter.

15. He places reliance on Jacob Mathew Vs. State of Punjab & Another, (2005) 6 SCC 1, and in particular to conclusion drawn by the Court as contained in paragraph 48 (5), wherein the Supreme Court held that for negligence to amount to an offence, the element of mens rea must be shown to exist. For an act to amount to criminal negligence, the degree of negligence should be much higher, i.e. gross, or of a very high degree. Negligence which is neither gross, nor of a high degree, may provide a ground for action in civil law but cannot form the basis for prosecution. The Supreme Court held that the word "gross" has not been used in Section 304A IPC, yet it is settled that in criminal law, negligence or recklessness, to be so held, must be of such a high degree as to be "gross". The expression "rash or negligent act" as occurring in Section 304A IPC has to be read as qualified to be read "grossly".

20. Mr. Singh relies on State of Karnataka Vs. Sharanappa Basanagouda Aregoudar, (2002) 3 SCC 738, to submit that the aspect of deterrence, which goes into the prosecution and punishment for such offences would be completely lost, if all cases involving Section 304A IPC were permitted to be quashed on the basis of a compromise. This was also a case under Section 304A IPC. The respondent had been found guilty of offences under Section 279/ 337/ 338/ 304 A IPC. The appeal before the Supreme Court arose on account of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, while upholding the conviction, reducing the sentence to payment of fine of Rs.5,000/-, and in default thereof, to undergo simple imprisonment for 3 month for the offence under Section 304A. In respect of the offence under Section 337 IPC, the learned Single Judge imposed a sentence with a fine of Rs.500/-, and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days. Similarly, for the offence under Section 338 IPC, the sentence was fine of Rs.550/-, and in default, a simple imprisonment for 15 days. There was no separate sentence for the offence punishable under Section 279 IPC. The Supreme Court interfered with the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, insofar as the High Court had reduced the sentence. The Supreme Court observed that, in view of the serious nature of the accident, which resulted in death of four persons, the learned Single Judge should not have interfered with the sentence imposed by the Court below. The Supreme Court observed:

29. The submission of Mr. Sethi that the State cannot distinguish one case under Section 304A IPC from another, and that the State is bound to agree to the quashing of the FIR in the present case, since they have agreed to quashing of the FIR in other cases involving Section 288/ 337/ 304A IPC, has no merit. The State cannot be accused of discrimination merely because the State may chose to give its consent to quashing of the FIR in one case, and may not do so in another case, though the two cases may allege commission of offence under the same legal provision, as no two cases are comparable on facts. It would have to be decided on the facts of each case by the State, whether or not to consent to the quashing of the criminal proceedings on consent. Even if it were to be assumed that the State was remiss in consenting to quashing of FIR in any other case, the same would not afford a ground to raise a plea of discrimination and claim similar treatment by a petitioner/ accused in another case. Each case would have to be examined by the Court on its own merits, and the Court is not bound to quash the FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom, even if it has done so in other cases involving the same offences on consent by the State. The Court is also not dependent for its decision to quash the FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom, on the consent being granted by the State. In appropriate case, the State may not grant its consent, yet the Court may - for reasons to be recorded, and upon considerations which are germane and have been taken note of in Gian Singh (supra) and Narinder Singh (supra), quash the FIR and the proceedings arising therefrom.