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1. Is the rule of audi alteram partem attracted inflexibly to the exercise of the power of dissolution of an Improvement Trust under Section 103 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is the spinal issue which has come to the fore in this set of 8 writ petitions assiduously assailing the dissolution of as many as 21 Improvement Trusts at one stroke within the State of Punjab by a single notification?

2. Learned counsel for the parties are agreed that the issues of law are identical and the facts giving rise thereto are closely similar. It, therefore, suffices to advert briefly to those in Civil Writ Petition No. 2856 of 1980(Jagdish Rai Monga v. The State of Punjab). Petitioner No. 1 was the Chairman whilst the other three were the trustees of the recently dissolved Bhatinda Improvement Trust. Petitioner No. 1 was appointed Chairman initially for a period of one year vide notification dated 4th August, 1978 and was reappointed as such for a period of two years with effect from 10th of August, 1979 by a similar notification (Annexure P-2). Consequently, it is the claim of the petitioners that the Chairman of the Trust is entitled to remain in office till the 10th of August, 1981, while the tenure of petitioners Nos. 2 to 4, who had been selected by the Municipal Committee to the Bhatinda Improvement Trust (hereinafter referred to as 'the Trust') extends till 24th of May, 1982. It is averred that the Trust had got sanctioned from the Punjab government as many as four development and improvement schemes for the Bhatinda Town, which were at various stages of their execution and four other schemes were under process when the untimely dissolution of the Trust halted the same in their tracks. Petitioner No. 1 further avers that before his appointment as wholetime Chairman, he was carrying on flourishing private business, which he had abandoned on his appointment as a wholetime Chairman of the Trust, and further that he had been discharging his duties honestly, efficiently and zealously for the all-round development and improvement of the Bhatinda Town. On the 11th of August, 1980 the Punjab Government issue the impugned notification (Annexure P-3) under Section 103(1) of the Act, whereby 21 Improvement Trusts in the State of Punjab, including the one at Bhatinda, were dissolved with immediate effect. Further in exercise of the power conferred by sub-section 2(c) of the aforesaid section it was further directed that the respective Deputy Commissioners and Sub-Divisional Officers, specified in Column 2, shall perform the functions of the Trust and the Chairman under the Act. It is also the case that before the issuance of the aforesaid notification, the Governor of Punjab also issued the Punjab Town Improvement (Amendment) Ordinance, 1980(Ordinance No. 6 of 1980), copy whereof is Annexure P-5 of the petition.

13. Before proceeding further, a pointed reference is called for, first to Section 5 of the Act. The maximum period of the term of office of the Chairman for one appointment is not to exceed three years. However, what is significant is that the section itself provides that on the dissolution of the Trust the term of office of the Chairman shall be deemed to expire on that very date. Similarly, Section 6 pertaining to the term of office of the other trustees inter alia provides that when the Trust ceases to exist, their term of office shall be deemed to expire on the date of the dissolution of the Trust itself. These provisions make it manifest that the Act extends no hope of permanency or any long security of tenure to either the office of the Chairman or of the trustees. The statute itself makes the tenure conterminus with the existence of the First and its dissolution automatically, by the mandate of the law, terminates the term of the office-holders. Those who accept office under these well-known statutory terms, do so with the fullest knowledge thereof. It necessarily follows that in view of the provisions of Section 5 and 6 of the Act, neither the Chairman now the trustees have any legal right whatsoever to continue or lay claim to office on the dissolution of the Trust.

30. It would thus appear that the three eventualities upon which the dissolution of the Trust under S. 103 may be rested are either purely factual or based on the subjective purely factual or based on the subjective satisfaction of the State Government that it is expedient to do so. They are in no way connected with any misconduct, abuse of power, incompetence or corruption on the part of the Chairman or the Trustees. This is in sharp contract with S. 72-F which is squarely rested on the fault liability of the Trust as a body. Consequently a dissolution under Section 103 does not involve any stigmatic or even an innuendo of misconduct on the part of the Trust. Thus no penal, evil or stigmatic consequence flow from such dissolution. Therefore, the ration of S. L. Kapoor's case (AIR 1981 SC 136) would not be attracted nor that of Jathedar Jagdev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 Punj & Har 16. It bears repetition that by virtue of Ss. 5 and 6, the tenure of the trustees and the Chairman of the Trust being conterminous with its existence automatically comes to an end by its dissolution. Therefore, no legal claim survives to either of them to continue in office after the dissolution and the impugned action does not cut short any vested rights. In view of the clear-cut provisions aforesaid the Chairman and the trustees enter upon their offices with their eyes open to the transitory nature of their tenure in the context of its dissolution and with the clear knowledge that it may come to an end any moment under Section 103 to continue after dissolution nor any penal or stigmatic consequence flow therefrom then on the parity of reasoning with the cases of compulsory retirement, termination of temporary employees' services, non-confirmation of probationers etc. the principles of natural justice would not be attracted.

37. Lastly, what calls for notice is the contention of the learned counsel that the last eventuality for the dissolution of the Trust must be read ejusdem generis with the preceding ones. It was submitted that the earlier two visualised either the total or the substantial completion of the sanctioned schemes and, therefore, the opinion of the State Government that it was expedient to dissolve must also be related to the said schemes. I am unable to find any adequate basis for this argument on the language of Section 103 of the Act. As already noticed, the third eventuality is a residuary one. The language used for couching this power is a wide ranging one and is not hedged-in either expressly or by necessary implication to the sanctioned schemes. To my mind, the third and the last ground for dissolution of the Trust is an independent, extensive and distinct power which is in no way circumscribed by the limitation of the earlier ones.