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3. The plaintiffs base their title on two grounds : First, that the permanent lease under which they claim was created under circumstances that would ?rind not only the grantor but all his successors; and secondly, that even it the lease was not valid they had acquired a title under the Indian Limitation Act.

4. Their case throughout his been that Srinivasa was a "trustee" and that all his successors are "trustees," that the lands were granted on a "specific" trust, and that consequently under Article 134 of Schedule 1 of the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908) they have acquired a good title against the math. The matathipathi controverted both allegations. He denied that the alienation by Shrinivasa was of such a character as would bind the math; he further denied that he and his predecessors were "trustees" of the math or that the 2nd plaintiff or his assignee had acquired any right to the math lands by adverse possession. On these contentions, two points arose for determination which are embodied in the first two issues.

30. But the respondents rely on three decisions of the Indian Courts in support of their contention that persons holding properties generally for Hindu and Mahommedan religious purposes are to be treated as "trustees." The first is a decision of the Bombay High Court in Dattagiri v. Dattatraya. (1902) I.L.R. 27 Bom. 363 The facts of that case were peculiar. The math there was an old one and the dedication was recognized and confirmed by the Mahratta Government. The village was granted to a holy ascetic for the maintenance of a charity attached to the math; the governance went by succession to the disciples of the guru (the spiritual preceptor or head). In 1871 the village was divided between two disciples, Shivgiri and Shankargiri, in equal moieties, and each held his half separately from the other. In the same year one of them, Shankargiri, sold the lands in dispute to the defendant. In 1897 Shankargiri obtained a sanad from Government under Act II of 1863 declaring him to be the absolute owner of his share. He died in August, 1897, after appointing the plaintiff as his successor, who in 1898 brought an action to recover possession of the alienated lands on the ground that Shankargiri had no power to alienate them as they were dedicated property. The defence was first that the sanad had altered the character of the property, and secondly that the suit was barred. The lower appellate Court found that the lands in suit were private alienable property and that consequently the action was barred. The first finding was strongly challenged by the plaintiff's counsel on second appeal. He contended that as it was dedicated property its holders from time to time "could not allow the Government to treat it as private property," The learned judges of the High Court refrained from deciding that point; and confined their attention solely to the question of limitation. They proceeded to deal with the case, as they expressly say "on the hypothesis that the lands in suit were held by Shivgiri and Shankargiri as heads of the math and as trustees therefor." On that hypothesis the conclusion at which they arrived was inevitable. The position of the head of the math in relation to its property under the Hindu law, custom and practice, was not considered; he was simply assumed to be a trustee. The pith of the judgment consists in the following words : "We have then here a suit to recover possession of immoveable property conveyed in trust and afterwards purchased from the trustee for a valuable consideration." "Conveyed in trust" is hardly the right expression to apply to gifts of lands or other property for the general purposes of a Hindu religious or pious institution. The learned judges relied on the two decisions of the Allahabad and Calcutta High Courts to which their Lordships will presently refer. The case, however, was practically decided on the exposition of the law in the case of St. Mary Magdalen, Oxford v. Attorney-General. (1857) 6 H.L.C. 189 With respect to it they say as follows : "In further support of this conclusion we would also refer to the already cited case of St. Mary Magdalen Oxford v. Attorney-General (1857) 6 H.L.C. 189 for though it is a decision on the English statute, still it contains many points of resemblance to the present, and furnishes us with the clearest exposition of the law applicable to cases of this class. We propose to refer to that case in some detail, as it probably is not within the reach of most mofussil Courts in this Presidency." They set out the provisions of Sections 2, 24 and 25 of Will. IV. c. 27, and then add, "the section (Section 25), it will be seen, corresponds more or less with our Articles 134 and 144 and Section 10 of the Limitation Act." Speaking with respect, it seems to their Lordships that the distinction between a specific trust and a trust for general pious or religious purposes under the Hindu and Mahommedan law was overlooked, and the case was decided on analogies drawn from English law inapplicable in the main to Hindu and Mahommedan institutions. That case can hardly be treated as authority in the decision of the present controversy.

38. The question came up again for consideration by the Board in the case of Palaniappa Chetty v. Deivasikamony Pandara. (1917) L.R. 44 I.A. 147,155, 156 The suit was instituted by the head of a math to recover possession of certain land which formed part of the endowment of a Hindu temple attached to the math, and had been granted by his predecessor to the defendant by a perpetual rent-free lease in consideration of a small sum of money paid at the time. The contention in that case was that the alienation was for the benefit of the institution; that contention was overruled, and the decision proceeded on the basis that the shebait was only a manager. Lord Atkinson, delivering the judgment of the Board, further added: "Three authorities have been cited which establish that it is a breach of duty on the part of a shebait, unless constrained thereto by unavoidable necessity, to grant a lease in perpetuity of debottar lands at a fixed rent, however adequate that rent may be at the time of granting, by reason of the fact that by this means the debottar estate is deprived of the chance it would have, if the rent were variable, of deriving benefit from the enhancement in value in the future of the lands leased." In that case the leased lands were situated in the street of a village; here they are in the town of Madura.