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4. The law requires that the Collector should sanction the filing of the suit. He has done so. The fact that at one time he was not satisfied as to the propriety of giving sanction is immaterial. It was quite open to him to change his mind on further consideration. Then Mr. Thakor has referred to Prem Narain v. Ram Charan 136 Ind. Cas. 461 : AIR (sic) PC 51. 59 IA 121 : 53 A 990 : 9 OWN 53 : 36 CWN 25 : 35 LW 224 : 55 OLJ 54 : (1932) ALJ 182 : 62 MLJ 249 : 34 Bom. LR 494 : Ind. Rul. (1932) PC 125 : (1932) MWN 685 (PC), where the Privy Council has held that the sanction of Government under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code must be given specifically in the case of each particular suit and pointed out that it does not appear that this was done in this case. This point, however, was not and could not be pressed in view of Act II of 1932 which validated all pending suits. The third preliminary point and the only one seriously argued is this : it has been held by the Privy Council in Abdur Rahim v. Muhamwad Barkat Ali 108 Ind. Cas. 361 : AIR 1928 PC 16 551 A 66 : 55 C 519 : 9 PLT 65 : 1 LT 40 Cal. 19 : 27 LW 339 : 32 CWN 482 : 26 ALJ 464 : 54 MLJ 609 : 30 Bom. LR 774(P.C.) that only suits claiming reliefs specified in Section 92 must be instituted in conformity with the provisions of that section and that a prayer for a declaration thai the property in suit is uakf property is a prayer for a relief not covered by the section, The point arose in this way. There was a suit properly filed in the Court of the District Judge with the sanction of the Advocate General under Section 92 claiming reliefs specified in that section. Subsequently an application was made for amendment of the plaint by adding strangers to the trust as parties and a prayer for a declaration that the property was wakf, and this was done. The sanction of the Advocate-General was not obtained for the amendment, and the question arose whether it was necessary.

16. One or two minor points may be mentioned. The plaintiffs' witness (Ex. 150), who is a Bombay Victoria driver, has deposed that his grandfather was buried near the Roza. Another witness (Ex. 152) says that his sister's son was buried there. Witness (Ex. 151) who is a contractor says that he presented stones for the construction of a pavement in front of the Roza. All these statements are denied by the defendant. But, I think, they are probably true. In 1914, it appears that the Roza required certain repairs and an appeal for contributions was issued by the pir (see Ex. 54). Plaintiff No. 1 says that he subscribed Rs. 250 and witness (Ex. 155) claims to have subscribed Rs. 200. Witness (Ex. 159) says that he sold some cotton and gave the proceeds (Rs. 100 to Rs. 150) to the mujawar. The defendant says that the appeal fell upon deaf ears and the repairs which cost over Rs. 3,000 were paid for out of his own pocket. There is little doubt that the bulk of the money came from the pir himself. But probably a certain amount was contributed by the devotees, and in any case the fact that a public appeal was issued is not without significance. These are the facts from which it has to be determined whether the suit properties are wakf. In the course of the very thorough and learned arguments in this case, we have been referred to numerous authorities as to the manner in which a wakf can be constituted under the Muhammadan Law. It is not necessary however to refer to these authorities in any detail for this reason. Although it was asserted in the plaint that the properties were dedicated to Pir Mushayak and were by him dedicated to God, there is, not unnaturally having regard to the lapse of time, no direct evidence of any dedication at all. These properties could not possibly have been dedicated to God by Pir Mushayak for, with the exception of a small part of Survey No. 136, they were all acquired after his death--some of them centuries after his death. If it is to be held that there has been any dedication at any time, it can only be by presumption from long use for public purposes, and the presumption, if it can be made at all, presupposes due compliance with the legal forms whatever they may be. I shall therefore deal very briefly with the law. The authorities cited show that there must be a declaration of dedication which should be made contemporaneously with the act of dedication: Banubi v. Narsingrao 31 B 250 : 9 Bom. LR 91. The wakif must divest himself of the ownership of the property: Muhammad Yunus v. Muhammad Ishaq Khan 62 Ind. Cas. 896 : AIR 1921 All. 103 : 43 A 487 : 19 ALJ 380. Physical delivery is not essential, but such possession as is possible must be given: Abadi Begum v. Kaniz Zainab . There are special rules in the case of mosques: Wilson's Anglo-Muhammadan Law, Section 320; Amir Ali's Muhammadan Law, Vol. 1, page 39; and Tyabji's Principles of Muhammadan Law, Section 514. When once a building has been set apart as a mosque it is enough to make it wakf if public prayers are once said there with the permission of the owner. But though a declaration of dedication and completion by some act giving practical effect to it are essential, it was not always necessary that there should be any direct evidence of these things. Dedication may be inferred from long user as wakf property: see Court of Wards v. Ilahi Bakhsh 17 Ind. Cas. 744 : 40 C 297 : 40 IA 18 : 1 PWR 1913 : 11 ALJ 265 : 13 MLT 318 : (1913) MWN 270 : 17 CLJ 360, 27 PR 1913 : 83 PLR 1913 : 15 Bom. LR 436 : 25MLJ 61 (PC) and Muhammad Hamid v. Mian Muhammad 77 Ind. Cas. 1009 : AIR 1922 PC 384 : 50 IA 92 : 4 L 15 : 44 MLJ 149 : 32 MLT 52 : 27 CWN 701 : 25 Bom. LR 660 : 33 CLJ 231 : 1 PWR 1923 (PC); and other cases cited in Tyabji's Principles, Section 458. There can be no doubt as to this principle which is recognized in all the text books.