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57. The piecemeal approach to a general problem permitted by under-inclusive classification appears justified when it is considered that legislative dealing with such problem is usually an experimental matter. It is impossible to tell how successful a particular approach may be, what dislocations might occur, what evasions might develop, what new evils might be generated in the attempt. Administrative expedients must be forged and tested. legislators, recognizing these factors, may which to proceed cautiously, and courts must allow them to do so. (37 California Rev. 341).

58. Administrative convenience in the collection of unpaid accumulations is a factor to be taken into account in adjudging whether the classification is reasonable. A legislation may take one step at a time addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. Therefore, a Legislature might select only one phase of one field application of a remedy. (See Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley ([1961] 366 US 582, 592)).

59. It may be remembered that article 14 does not require that every regulatory statute applies to all in the same business : where size is an index to the evil at which the law is directed, discriminations between the large and small are permissible, and it is also permissible for reform to take one step at a time addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.

64. The question whether, under article 14, a classification is reasonable or unreasonable must, in the ultimate analysis, depend upon the judicial approach to the problem. The great divide in this area lies in the difference between emphasizing the actualities or the abstraction of legislation. The more complicated the society becomes, the greater the diversity of its problems and the more does legislation direct itself to the diversities.

'Statutes are directed to less than universal situations. Law reflects distinction that exist in fact or at least appear or exist in the judgment of Legislators-those who have the responsibility for making law fit into fact. Legislation is essentially empiric. It addresses itself to the more or less crude outside would and not to the neat logical model of the mind. Classification is inherent is legislation. To recognise marked differences that exist in fact is living law; to disregard practical differences and concentrate on some abstract identities is lifeless". (See the observations of Justice Frankfurter in Morey v. Doud ([1957] 354 US 457, 472)).

65. That the legislation is directed to practical problems, that the economic mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many problem are singular and contingent, that laws are not abstract propositions and do not relate to abstract units and are not to be measured by abstract symmetry, that exact wisdom and nice adaption of remedies cannot be required that judgment is largely a prophecy based on meagre and uninterpreted experience, should stand as reminder that in this area the court does not take the equal protection requirement in a pedagogic manner (See Joseph Tussman and Jacobus ten Breck, 'The Equal Protection of the Laws', 37 California Rev. 341).