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7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that on 20.8.1996, A.K. Goel of M/s. Homestead executed sale deeds in favor of the present respondent No. 4 and got them registered at Bombay knowing fully well that the application for setting aside the withdrawal of the suit on the basis of the so called compromise was pending before the Court. On 21.3.1997 again an attempt was made to forcibly dispossess the petitioner. FIR No. 137/97 under Section 147, 148, 149, 452, 506, 323, 307, 511, 427 and Section 27 of the Arms Act was registered against the respondent No. 4 herein and 7 others. On 1.4.1997 DCP had given a report confirming petitioner's possession of the land in question. On 9.5.1997 Patwari had confirmed his possession and on 13.5.1997 the previous SDM Mr. K.K. Dahiya had also found the petitioner in possession of the land in question.

9. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4 on the other hand has argued that the order of attachment under Section 146(1) of the Code was absolutely justified and warranted under the facts and circumstances of the case. It is submitted that respondent No. 4 was the owner of the suit land and had been in possession thereof but the petitioner had forcibly dispossessed him and as such the learned SDM was fully justified in passing the attachment order. it is submitted that on the basis of the revenue entries which were never challenged the respondent No. 4 was legally entitled to remain in possession of the suit land till his dispossession there from in accordance with law. Five sale deeds executed in his favor by M/s. Homestead are filed upon to argue that he is the owner in possession of the land in question. It is also stated that he is not bound by any order of the Civil Court as he was not a party to any civil proceedings.

Provided that such Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute."

12. Before examining the pleas raised by the parties and the facts and circumstances of the case in hand it needs to be emphasised that proceedings under Section 145 of the Code provide a summary remedy to protect and safeguard the possession of those who are found in actual and physical possession of any land or property. The question of title can neither be determined nor allowed to be agitated in these proceedings except so far as it may have a bearing on the question of actual possession. the proceedings under Section 145 of Code are quasi-civil in nature and the scope of inquiry in these proceedings is limited to find out as to who was in possession on the date of order under Section 145(1) of the Code or was forcibly dispossessed within two month next preceding the date of the receipt the report of police officer or other information leading to teh institution of the proceedings. The party forcibly and unlawfully dispossessed, within two months as stated above, may be put back into possession so that the tendency to take law into one's own hands in curbed and the parties are made to agitate their property disputes before Civil Courts. The Magistrate exercising powers under Section 145 of the Code is not empowered to determine title or right of possession. He is to restrict the inquiry to the question of actual possession only.

According to Section 145(4) of the Code if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date of the report of the Police officer or other information received by the Magistrate or after that date and before the date of his order under Sub Section (1), he may treat the party so dispossessed is if his order under Sub-section (1). The underlying object of this provision is to narrow down the scope of inquiry to be conducted by the SDM so that the person forcibly dispossessed with two months preceding the date of the receipt of the report of police officer or other information or after the filing of the petition but before the passing of an order Sub-clause (1) of Section 145 may be put back in possession. If a person has been dispossessed earlier than two months preceding the report to the SDM the remedy lies in Civil Suit and not in proceedings under Section 145 of the Code. In the case in hand, the petition filed by respondent No. 4 under Section 145 of the Code, which was filed on 17.9.1997 itself, alleged that forcible dispossession had taken place on 24.6.1997. Therefore, there was clear admission that the dispossession was prior to two months preceding the filing of the petition and as such the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code and thereafter pass attachment order under section (1) of the code. In R.C. Poatuck Vs. Fatima A. Kindasa A . & Ors. Their Lordships of Apex Court had clearly held in paras ( and 10 of the Judgment that in case a party has lost possession prior to the period mentioned in proviso to sub-clause (4) of Section 145 of the Code, the SDM has no powers to restore Him possession in proceedings under Section 145 of the Code.