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7. We have pointed out that one at least of the objects of the trust is certainly a non-charitable one. Learned Counsel for the assessee claims however that the manufacture, sale and distribution of medicinal, chemical and other preparations must be deemed to come within the scope of the expression " charitable purpose" in view of the Explanation to Section 4 as falling within the scope of the expression " advancement of any other object of general public utility ". It is true that this expression is of very wide import. But we are certainly unable to see how the manufacture, purchase, sale and distribution of pharmaceutical, medicinal, chemical or other preparations and such similar articles would advance any object of general public utility. This object of the trust is obviously linked up with the power vested in the trustee to conduct or carry on any business or undertaking for the benefit of the trust, that is to say, to engage in such enterprises as would yield income to the trust and enable the trust to expend the income for purposes of the trusts It must not be forgotten that the manufacture, purchase, sale and distribution of these articles is indicated as one of the objects of the trust, disassociated with any other charitable purposes that also formed part of the objects of the trust. The trust would accordingly be in a position to utilise the income which it derives from the properties placed under trust for the purpose of a business, viz., the manufacture, sale, etc., of medicinal, chemical and other preparations. The most important of the powers given to the trustees is contained in clause 5 (i) which reads:

The trustees shall have power to apply the whole or any part of the trust property or fund whether capital or income in or towards payment of the expenses of the trust or for or towards all or any of the purposes of the trust provided any property or money held in special trust shall be applied only for that purpose and not otherwise.
In the present case, there is no special trust, that is to say, no particular, item of property has been burdened with the performance of any specific object of the of trust. It follows, therefore, from the above clause that it is open to the trustees to utilise the income for any one of the objects of the trust to the exclusion of all, others, that is to say, it would not be a violation of the trust if the trustees devoted the entire income to the carrying on of a business of manufacture, sale and distribution of pharmaceutical, medicinal and other preparations. If this object of the trust is neither charitable nor religious and if the trustees can expend the entire income of the trust on this non-charitable object, the question then would arise whether the property can be deemed to be held under trust or other legal obligation wholly for religious or charitable purposes.

8. This question has undergone judicial examination. In Md. Ibrahim v. Commissioner of Income-tax (1930) 59 M.L.J. 905 : L.R. 57 I.A. 260 : A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 226 (P.C.), it has been held that if there are several objects of the trust, some which are charitable and some non-charitable, and the trustees have unfettered discretion to apply the income to any of the objects, the whole trust would fail and no part of the income is exempt from tax. It has even been held that if there are several distributive objects, one of which is paramount and is of a charitable kind, the fact that the non-charitable nature of the other objects may be immaterial cannot be accepted as justifying the grant of exemption under Section 4 (3) (i). On this short ground alone, viz., that the property in the present case cannot be deemed to be held under a legal obligation wholly or in part for the performance of charitable objects and that the trustees in their discretion can apply the income even to non-charitable objects to the exclusion of charitable objects, it necessarily follows that the trust is not entitled to the exemption under Section 4 (3) (i).

9. Learned Counsel for the assessee however argues that this particular object which we have held to be of a non-charitable nature must not be read isolated from the rest of the objects but that having regard to the immediately preceding object which is to run hospitals and dispensaries, the impugned object, viz., the manufacture of pharamaceutical and medicinal preparations must be deemed to be for the purpose of carrying out the earlier object, viz., running of hospitals and dispensaries. We are unable to spell out any connection between the two objects and indeed on the terms of the deed of trust it is impossible to predicate that one is a dominant object which alone should be had regard to in determining the object of the trust as charitable. This argument is against the tenor of the decisions which lay down that such a canon of construction is a dangerous one and cannot as a general rule be accepted.