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9. We shall now examine the scheme of Rr. 1. 2, 3, 3A and 4 in 0. 39 of the Code.

Rules 1 and 2 enable the trial court at its discretion to grant a temporary injunction until a specified time or until further orders on an application made in that behalf or until the disposal of the suit. Rule 3 enjoins that the Court should first direct notice to the opposite party on such an application before granting a temporary injunction. The only exception to this general rule being where it appears to the Court that the very purpose of the injunction would itself be defeated by delay involved in the notice, that Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it, grant an ex parte order. The proviso thereto refers to the measures to be taken by the Court for safeguarding the interest of the opposite party in the event of grant of such an ex parte injunction. Rule 3A enjoins that whenever an ex parte temporary injunction is granted by a Court, it shall endeavour to dispose of the main application within one month of the ex parte order. This rule corresponds to the English rule that an exparte temporary injunction should be until a certain day usually the next motion day a salutary rule, exceptions being known only in cases such as restraint of marriage with a ward of Court, where the injunction is granted until a further order (See Ex. P. Abrams (1884) 50 LT 184) R. 4 provides for the setting aside, varying or modifying an ex parte temporary injunction by the very court which granted it, upon a motion by the party affected even before the application for grant of injunction is finally disposed of the proviso to that rule enables the Court to vacate the ex parte temporary injunction where it finds that a party obtaining the ex parte injunction has knowingly made a false or misleading statement in relation to a material particular.

An ex parte order of injunction made on an application under Rr. 1 and 2 before its final disposal, is distinct from an order made on such application at the stage of its final disposal. This distinction is implicit in the scheme of the Rules. Strong and convincing grounds must be shown for grant of an ex parte interim injunction. An ex parte interim injunction is also qualitatively different from an order of temporary injunction made at the final disposal of the application in that behalf after both parties have an opportunity of being heard. An ex parte interim order if secured on insufficient or untenable grounds, is obviously short-lived and potentially evanescent, being liable to set aside, varied or modified by the very Court which granted it. At all events, from the policy of the law and the scheme of the rules, it should normally not have a life-span of more than a month. This ex parte order is, in that sense merely provisional and a step in the disposal of an application for interlocutory-injunction.

"Where a stranger to the action is affected by an injunction he -may apply to have the injunction set aside.,, To the same effect is the statement in Halbury's Laws of England (4th Edn, Vol. 24-para 1111):

"A stranger to the suit who is affected by an injunction may apply to dissolve it."

Hence, this argument fails.

11. We may now refer to the decisions relied on by either side.

The decision in Zilla Parishad, Budaun v. Brahma Rishi Sharma, (FB) relied upon by the petitioners, typifies the view in support of the availability of an appeal even from an ex parte interim order. In reaching the conclusion, the Full Bench took into consideration the circumstances, that the Rules (as they then stood) in themselves do not require issue of notice on the application on which an ex parte interim order of injunction is made, the court issued such notice as a matter of caution; that an application under Rule 4 can be made by an adversary party for discharging, varying or setting aside of both ex parte as well as other orders of injunction; and that Rules, as such, do not recognise a classification of orders of injunction as between ex parte orders and final orders. It was observed that the object of Rule 1 (r) of Order 43, being to provide a remedy against an improper exercise of injunctive power affecting the rights of a person, its scope ought not to be restricted to final orders. Such a restriction, it was thought, would detract from the object of the Rule. It was also said that the express language in Order 43 Rule 1 (r) would allow an appeal from an ex parte interim order. This was the first aspect of the reasoning of the Full Bench.

13. In Abdul Shukoor Sahib v. Umachander (AIR 1976 Mad 350) (supra), a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that no appeal lies under 0. 43 R. I (r) against an ex parte interim injunction made by a trial Court in an application under Rr. 1 or 2 of 0. 39. That decision relates to, and proceeds on, the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Code, as they stood prior to their amendment by Act 104 of 1976. A distinction is drawn between an unreasoned order made ex parte issuing interim injunction and a reasoned order made after notice to opposite party, finally disposing of an application under Rr. 1 and 2 of Order 39. An appeal under R. I (r) of Order 43,1 it is held, is confined- to a reasoned order. In our view, the right of appeal against, an order must depend upon the amplitude of the provisions creating that right. The permissibility and, right of appeal against an order ought not to depend upon whether an order gives reasons or not. A distinction resting merely on whether the order is a reasoned or unreasoned one, cannot be decisive on the question of appealability. Indeed, an unreasoned order of rejection of an application for injunction becomes appealable (See: ). However, we are in respectful agreement with the conclusion in Abdul Shukoor Sahib's case tho' on somewhat different reasoning.