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5. In order to appreciate the question of law which has been referred to us and the arguments advanced at the bar, it is necessary now to set out the relevant provisions of the said Act. The said Act came into force on December 21, 1956. As its long title show, it was an Act to amend and codify the law relating to adoptions and maintenance among Hindus. Section 3 is the interpretation clause. Clause (a) of Section 3 defines the expressions "custom" and "usage". The said clause provided as follows:--

(iii) he or she has not been married, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who are married being taken in adoption;
(iv) he or she has not completed the age of fifteen years, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who have completed the age of fifteen years being taken in adoption."

It will be noticed that under Section 10 of the said Act, before a person can be taken in adoption four conditions prescribed by that section have to be fulfilled, namely, (1) the person who is desired to be taken in adoption must be a Hindu whether such person is a male or female, (2) the said person should not have been already adopted, (3) the said person should not have been married unless there was a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who are married being taking in adoption, and (4) the said person must not have completed the age of 15 years unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who have completed the age of 15 years being taken in adoption. It will be noticed that out of these four conditions the first two are absolute and admit of no exception while the other two are subject to any contrary rule being prevalent by reason of custom or usage applicable to the parties concerned. It may be mentioned that Clauses (iii) and (iv) of Section 10 which contain these conditions with respect to the marital status and the age of the person to be taken in adoption are the only provisions in the said Act in which an exception has been carved out in favour of custom or usage and that by reason of the provisions of Section 4 all other provisions of the said Act, apart from those contained in Clauses (iii) and (iv) of Section 10, override all texts, rules or interpretations of Hindu law and all customs and usages as part of that law in force immediately before the coming into operation of the said Act. The intention of Parliament in making exceptions in the case of custom and usage relating to the marital status and age of the person to be taken in adoption was to preserve any custom or usage contrary to the conditions prescribed by Clauses (iii) and (iv) of the said Section 10 intact provided it was applicable to the parties concerned and was in force prior to the date of the coming into force of the said Act, namely, prior to December 21, 1956. As stated earlier, the expressions "custom" and "usage" have been defined in Clause (a) of Section 3. The question which falls for our consideration is whether the definition of the terms "custom and "usage" given in the said Clause (a) is that same which these expressions hear in ordinary law or whether it would include within its scope any text or rule of the Bombay School of Hindu Law known as Mayukha. Unlike statutory definitions which we generally find in statutes, the words used for defining the expressions "custom and "usage" is not "mean" or "include" nut is "signify". The meaning of the word "signify" as given in the Oxford English Dictionary is: "To be a sign or symbol of ; to represent, betoken, mean." A further meaning given in the said Dictionary is : "Of words, etc,: To have the import or meaning of; to mean denote." A yet further meaning given is. To make known, intimate, announce, declare." Thus the word "signify" as used in the said Clause (a) of Section 3 means very much the same as it would have meant had the word "mean" been used. Clause (a) of Section 3 must, therefore, be held to be an exhaustive definition. In Butterworths's Words and Phrases Legally Defined, Second Edition, Volume I, at page 392 under the heading "Custom" it is' inter alia, stated:

7. For the first time, a discordant note about the interpretation of Clause (a) of Section 3 of the said Act was struck by Malvankar, J., in Second Appeal No. 1444 of 1965 Bhimrao Vithy Khandagale v. Chandru Savala Khandagale decided on April 24, 1972 (unreported). In that case, Malvankar, J., held that the expression "custom" as defined in Clause (a) of Section 3 did not include any text or interpretation of Hindu law. He opined that the argument advanced by the appellant that the definition included also the text or rule or interpretation of Hindu law would render meaningless S. 4 of the said Act inasmuch as every text or rule of Hindu law can be interpreted to mean congeries of custom and, therefore, would be saved wherever there was an express provision to that effect in the said Act, included in Clause (iv) of Section 10. There are certain points which require to be noticed with respect to the judgment of Malvankar, J. The judgment of Nain, J., in Housabai v. Jijabai referred to above, was not brought to his notice nor was the judgment of V. S. Desai, J. in Second Appeal No. 713 of 1964 also referred to above. Further, the interpretation that Malvankar, J., gave to Clause (a) of Section 3 was based upon a concession made by the Advocate for the appellant. In that case the appellant had not specifically pleaded any custom in the plaint nor was any issued framed regarding the existence of a custom. Some evidence, however, was led on the point, but that evidence was not sufficient to prove any custom. What was, therefore, argued on behalf of the appellant before Malvankar, J., was that there were a number of decisions of the Bombay High Court recognizing the custom permitting persons of more than 15 years of age to be taken in adoption and it was not necessary either to plead such custom specifically or to lead any evidence to prove the same. The advocate for the appellant, however, conceded that if the adoption of a person more than 15 years of age was permissible under any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law before the said Act came into force and was not in accordance with any custom, then the appellant would be out of Court. Malvankar, J., therefore, proceeded to consider the earlier decisions of this High Court and opined that none of them was based upon any custom but all were based upon the rule as laid down in Vyavahara Mayukha. There was thus no discussion before Malvankar, J., whether the definition in Clause (a) of S. 3 would also include any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law. What Malvankar, J., did, was to accept the concession made by the appellant's advocate. He opined that that concession was fairly made. He further went on to say that if clause (a) of Section 3 were to include any text; rule or interpretation of Hindu Law, it would render meaningless the provisions of Section 4 inasmuch as every text or rule of Hindu Law could be interpreted to mean congeries of custom and therefore, would be saved wherever there was any express provision in the said Act as in clause (iv) of S. 10. It was, however, not brought to the notice of Malvankar, J., that apart from clauses (iii) and (iv) of Section 10 there was no other provision in the said Act where there was a saving in respect of custom and usage and the question of rendering meaningless S. 4 of the said Act in the sense that Malvankar, J., opined did not, therefore, arise. So far as the conclusion reached by Malvankar, J., with respect to the earlier decisions of the High Court is concerned, we will deal with it later.

12. We have already set out earlier the provisions of clause (a) of S. 3 and s. 4 of the said Act. The definition of the expressions "custom" and "usage" contained in clause (a) of S. 3 refers to a rule which, having been continuously and uniformly observed for a long time, has obtained the force of law among Hindus in any local area, tribe, community, group or family. The words used are "any rule which ...................... has obtained the force of law among Hindus". The first question which strikes one is, why was this definition enacted in the said Act? The answer is, because the expressions "custom" and "usage" occur in three other places in the said Act, namely, in clause (a) of S. 4 and in clauses (iii) and (iv) of Section 10. Section 4 was enacted to abrogate all conflicts prevailing in different parts of India with respect to the texts, rules and interpretation of Hindu Law as also any custom or usage as part of that law which were in force immediately before the commencement of the said Act as also all other laws immediately before the said date in so far as they were inconsistent with any of the provisions contained in the said Act. As mentioned earlier, the only matters in respect which a saving has been made with respect of custom or usage are those specified in clauses (iii) and (iv) of S. 10. But for the saving provisions of clauses (iii) and (iv) there would have been no necessity for Parliament to define the expressions "custom" and "usage". Further, the definition given in clause (a) of Section 3 speaks of a rule which by having been continuously and uniformly observed for a long time has obtained the force of law amongst Hindus, that is, it has become a rule of Hindu Law. The word "rule" used in the said clause (a) per se cannot and does not draw a distinction between a rule which as obtained the force of law amongst Hindus by continuous and uniform observance either because that course of conduct was founded upon custom or usage as understood in the ordinary sense or where such course of conduct was founded upon any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law. What is also pertinent to note is that even under clause (a) of Section 4 what is abrogated is, apart from any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law, "any custom or usage as part of that law", namely, of Hindu Law. Therefore, the custom or usage which is saved by Section 4 wherever it is so provided in the said Act, that is, in clauses (iii) and (iv) of Section 10, is a custom or usage which has become a part of Hindu Law and it is that expression "custom" and "usage" in S. 4(a) which Clause. (a) of Section 3 has defined. The intention of Parliament was to preserve custom or usage where such express provision in that behalf was made in the said Act. Section 4 opens with the words "Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act". These words govern both the expressions occurring in clause (a) of S. 4, namely, "any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law" as also "any custom or usage as part of that law". If the expression "custom or usage" was used in contradistinction to the expression "any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law", since nowhere in the whole of the said Act is there any express saving provision with respect to any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law, it was meaningless for Parliament to have made the opening words of Section 4 apply to both the said expressions in clause (a) of Section 4. On well settled principles of interpretation of statutes a legislative intent to enact a redundancy cannot be attributed to Parliament or any other legislative body. By deliberately saving not only all custom and usage but also all texts, rule and interpretation of Hindu Law wherever so provided in the said Act and by defining the expressions "custom" and "usage" in clause (a) of S. 3 in the manner in which Parliament has done, it must be held that the word "rule" in clause (a) of S. 3 refers to what is set out in clause (a) of S. 4, namely, to any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any custom or usage as part of that law.