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fore, a 'Dealer', within the meaning of section 2 (c) of the Bengal Finance, (Sales, Tax) Act, 1941 By its judgment dated November 26, 1964, the High Court answered the question in the affirmative and against the appellant.

The question to be considered in this appeal is whether the appellant is a 'dealer' within the meaning of s. 2(c) of the Act defining a 'dealer' as "any person who carries on the business of selling-goods in West Bengal and as including the Government. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the surplus material was left in India at the conclusion of the last war by the American Government to be dealt with by the Government of India just as it pleased. The Government could have used the goods itself or made a gift of them to others or thrown them away as scrap. As a matter of fact, it was pointed out that a considerable portion of the surplus material was used by the Government itself and the balance instead of being thrown away was sold to the public, and that selling of such material did not involve carrying on of a 'business' and the appellant was therefore not liable to be taxed as a 'dealer' under S. 2(c) of the Act. The opposite view-point was put forward on behalf of the respondent. It was submitted that surplus material was sold in a series of transactions and good of the value of several lakhs had been sold and there was a profit motive behind the transactions. It was contended that the sales were not casual but they were spread over a number of years and the surplus 'Lyood's were disposed of with the help, of a widespread organization It was also said that the goods which were offered for sale were advertised in the newspapers and auctions were also held from time to time. As pointed out by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. M/s Abdul Bakshi and Bros.(1) a person to be a dealer must be engaged in the business of buying or selling or supplying goods. The expression "business" though extensively used in taxing statutes, is a word of indefinite import. In tasking statutes, it is used in the sense of an occupation, or profession which occupies the time,, attention and labour of a person, normally with the object of making profit. To regard an activity as business there must be a course of dealings, either actually continued or contemplated. to be continued with a profit- motive; there must be some real and systematic or organised course of activity or conduct with a set purpose of making profit. To infer from a course of transactions that it is intended thereby to carry on business ordinarily there must exist the characteristics of volume, frequency, continuity and system indicating an intention to continue the activity of carrying on the transactions for a profit. But no single, test or,- group of tests is' decisive of the intention to carry on the business. It must be decided in the circumstances of (1) 15 S.T.c. 644.

the inference that business is intended to be carried on in selling those goods. "

Having examined the facts found by the High Court in the present case, we are satisfied that the appellant was not carrying on the business of buying or selling goods within the meaning of S. 2 (c) of the Act. It is not disputed that large quantities of war material were handed over to the Government of India under the provisions of the Indo-U.S. agreement for the prosecution of the war. A part of the war material was used by the Government for defence and military activities and there was a huge surplus left with the Government of India which was either no longer useful or had become obsolete. We are of the opinion that in disposing ,of this surplus war material the appellant was not carrying on the ,business of selling goods and the transactions of sale were not liable to be taxed under the provisions of the Act. In our opinion, the appellant was not selling surplus goods for profit but he was merely disposing of the surplus material by way of realisation and the transactions were therefore not taxable as sales falling within the provisions of the Act. The view that we have expressed is borne out by the decision of the Judicial Committee in Commissioner of Taxes v. British Australian Wool Realization Association Limited(1) in which the respondent-company was incorporated in 1920 in Victoria pursuant to an agreement between the Imperial and Commonwealth Governments, for the purpose of selling the undisposed of surplus of wool acquired for the war, and dis- tributing the proceeds. The Commonwealth Government trans- ferred to the company its undivided half of the Australian wool and in cash its share of profits already realized, in consideration of the issue of priority wool certificates and fully-paid shares to its nominees, the wool suppliers. The company also agreed with the Imperial Government to sell on its behalf for a commission all the rest of the wool, whether Australian or not. The wool was :all sold during the,years 1921 to 1924; the company had no other dealings in wool. The proceeds of the half share of the Australian wool largely exceeded the sum at which it had been taken into the books of the company. The priority wool certificates were redeemed, and the whole of the capital credited as paid on the shares was paid off under successive schemes sanctioned by the Court; there remained a large surplus in the hands of the liquidator of the company. Assessments were made upon the company under the Income Tax Act, 1915, of Victoria, in respect of proportions of the surplus proceeds of sale and of the commission ,earned. The company raised objections thereto, and a special ,case was stated for the opinion of the Supreme Court of Victoria which held that the surplus proceeds of sale were not a result of the trade but realization of capital assets and were therefore not (1) [1931] A.C. 224.