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3. The facts of the case are as follows ; Senapathy Whitely Ltd., Achalu, Ramanagaram, which is respondent No. 1 in this petition is the owner of 2 acres of agricultural land (dry) in Sy. No. 35/1 of Achalu village, Kailancha Hobli, Ramanagaram Taluk. The said company purchased the land on 9-7-1968 from the Vendor Thimmaiah alias Gettaiah by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 27-6-68 and the Company has been in possession and enjoyment of the land ever since the date of purchase. The Special Deputy Commissioner Bangalore, initiated proceedings under Section 79-B(3) of the Act on receiving a declaration filed by the Company under the provisions of Section 79-B(2)(a) of the Act. Thereafter, the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore, proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 24-1-1984 declaring that the land in question shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Power was exercised by him under the provisions of Section 79-B(3) of the Act. The 1st respondent was aggrieved by the said order and preferred an appeal before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, in Appeal No. 120/1984 (LRF). After hearing the appellant and the respondents, therein, the Tribunal reversed the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner and held that the provisions of Section 79B are not retrospective and therefore inapplicable to the agricultural land held by the first respondent-Company. The petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order of respondent-2.

6. According to Sub-section (3) of Section 79B of the Act, on receipt of the declaration under Sub-section (2) and after such enquiry as may be prescribed, the Tahsildar shall send a statement containing the prescribed particulars relating to such land to the Deputy Commissioner who shall, by notification, declare that such land shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances and take possession thereof in the prescribed manner. Sub-section (4) of Section 79B contemplates payment of an amount as specified in Section 72 in lieu of the land vesting in the State Government.

8. It was contended by the learned High Court Government Pleader that as a result of the prohibition of holding of agricultural land by a Company, the statute provides unequivocally that the Tribunal was not justified in holding that the provisions are only of prospective nature. Such a conclusion is contrary to the letter and spirit of the law as embodied in the provisions of Subsection (1) and Sub-section (2) of Section 79B of the Act. In fact, the Government Pleader contended that the impugned order of the Tribunal runs counter to the object of the Act. The Act has been promulgated to have a uniform law in the State of Karnataka pertaining to agrarian relationship, conferment of ownership on tenants, ceiling of land, land holdings and other allied matters. Section 79B of the Act was introduced by virtue of the Amendment Act 1 of 1974. It is apparent that one of the intentions of the Legislature is to prevent and eliminate the monopoly of agricultural holdings in the hands of non-agriculturists under different names whether directly or indirectly which would frustrate the purpose of the welfare legislation.

9. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 contended that the words of Section 79B do not convey the meaning that the prohibition of holding of agricultural land by company is retrospective in nature. According to the learned Counsel, the prohibition is wholly prospective and does not apply to the land owned by the respondent-company. I am in entire agreement with the arguments advanced by the learned High Court Government Pleader and hold that the prohibition applies with equal force to agricultural lands undisputedly held by the Company as on 1-3-1974. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the first respondent that the impugned order of the Tribunal is sound and consistent with law. I have to be guided by the plain meaning of the language of the relevant provisions of this Act. It must be presumed that when the provisions of law do not admit of any ambiguity and points to only one meaning, the question of interpretation does not arise and only the ordinary and plain meaning is to be gathered from the wordings of the provisions through which the Legislature has manifested its intention. According to me, from a reading of the provisions of Section 79-B(1) read with Sub-section (2)(a) of Section 79B of the Act there can be no doubt about the rule of law that the prohibition of holding of agricultural land by a Company commenced from 1-3-1974 and applies to respondent No. 1-Company which has been holding the lands on the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act. A harmonious construction of the words in Sub-section (ii)(a) "which holds lands on the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act" read with the words contained in Subsection (1) of Section 79B "with effect on and from the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act" confirm the presumption that a Company which holds agricultural lands as on 1-3-1974 is prohibited from holding the land by operation of law and such a Company shall submit a declaration, as contemplated under Subsection 2(a) of the Act to the Tahsildar containing the particulars of such land as prescribed. The above provision applies not only to the agricultural land held by any company as on 1-3-1974 and also in respect of land if any held by the company subsequent to 1-3-1974. In the light of the clear and unmistakable wordings of the provisions of law, the question whether or not the provisions are retrospective becomes redundant when the meaning is as plain as a pike-staff. In the instant case, the relevant question is whether the first-respondent company held the agricultural land on the date of the commencement of the Amendment Act which is 1-3-1974. The learned Counsel for the 1st respondent does not dispute the fact that the respondent-company did hold the agricultural land in question as on 1-3-1974.