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29. Thus the existence of a binding statutory provision makes the difference. This position in law is evident from the following authorities.

(1) In the case of P. R. Jodh v. A. L. Pande , on this aspect of the matter, the Supreme Court said thus :

"It is not disputed on behalf of the respondents that the 'College Code' has been made by the University the exercise of statutory power conferred by S. 32 and under S. 6(6) of the Act. It is also conceded on behalf of the respondents that the 'College Code' is intra vires the powers of the University contained in S. 32 r/w S. 6(6) of the Act. In our opinion, the provisions of Ordinance 20, otherwise called the 'College Code' have the force of law. In confers legal rights on the teachers of the affiliated colleges and it is not a correct proposition to say that the 'College Code' merely regulates the legal relationship between the affiliated colleges and the University alone. We do not agree with the High Court that the provisions of the 'College Code' constitute power of management. On the contrary we are of the view that the provisions of the 'College Code' relating to the pay scale of teachers and their security of tenure properly fall within the statutory power of affiliation granted to the University under the Act. It is true that Clause 7 of the Ordinance provides that all teachers of affiliated colleges shall be appointed on a written contract in the form prescribed in Schedule A, but that does not mean that teachers have merely a contractual remedy against the Governing Body of the College. On the other hand, we are of opinion that the provision of Clause 8 of the Ordinance relating to security of the tenure of teachers are part and parcel of the teachers' service conditions and, as we have already pointed out, the provisions of the 'College Code' in this regard are validly made by the University in exercise of the statutory power and have, therefore the force and effect of law. It follows, therefore, that the 'College Code' creates legal rights in favour of teachers of affiliated colleges and the view taken by the High Court is erroneous.

30. It was urged on behalf of the appellant in the next place that there was violation of the procedure prescribed in Clause 8(vi)(a) of the 'College Code' and the order of the Governing Body dated 30th June, 1960 terminating the appellant's service was illegal and ultra vires and must be quashed by grant of writ in the nature of certiorari. Counsel for the respondents contended that there was no violation of the procedure prescribed under Clause 8(vi)(a) of the 'College Code' and that the order of the Governing Body, dated 30th June, 1960 was not defective in Law. Since the question has not been investigated by the High Court, we consider that it is necessary that this case should go back on remand to the High Court for deciding the question whether there was a violation of the procedure prescribed under Clause 8(vi)(a) of the 'College Code' and whether the order of the Governing Body, dated 30th June, 1960 is consequently illegal and ultra vires and whether the appellant is entitled to the grant of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

We should like to add that counsel for the respondent raised two preliminary objections in the course of argument. The argument was stressed in the first place that the appellant had an alternative remedy under Clause 8(vi)(c) of the 'College Code' which provides that the aggrieved teacher may request for a reference of the dispute to a Tribunal of Arbitration consisting of the Vice-Chancellor and two other persons appointed by the Executive Council of the University. It was contended on behalf of the respondents in the second place that the Governing Body of the College was not a statutory body performing public duties and no writ in the nature of mandamus may, therefore, be issued to the Governing Body of the College. On behalf of the respondents it was conceded that these objections were not pressed before the High Court. We are therefore, unable to entertain these preliminary arguments at this stage and they must be overruled."

12. Whereas in the case of Prabhakar Ramakrishna Joth v. A. L. Pande (supra), the terms and conditions of service embodied in Clause 8(vi)(a) of the 'College Code' had the force of law apart from the contract and conferred rights on the appellant there, here the terms and conditions mentioned in Statute 151 have no efficacy, unless they are incorporated in a contract. Therefore, appellant cannot found a cause of action on any breach of the law but only on the breach of the contract. As already indicated, Statute 151 does not lay down any procedure for removal of a teacher to be incorporated in the contract so Clause 5 of the contract can, in no event, have even a statutory flavour and for its breach, the appellant's remedy lay elsewhere.