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8. Mr. M.R. Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel appearing for the private school, would advance a proposition that, assuming the matter could be brought within the ambit of the set of expressions otherwise terminated', occurring in Section 22 of the Act, on the ground that there was no proper resignation in the eye of law, and on that account prior approval, as contemplated therein, being required was not obtained yet, the Forums under the Act, as well as this Court having found that the Headmaster resigned voluntarily, that position on merits must be maintained and it will not be proper to countenance the technical plea of the Headmaster built on the aspect of want of approval. Learned counsel for the private school wants us to draw inspiration from the Industrial Law and in particular from the provisions of Sections 33 and 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The said provisions contemplate that the employer shall not alter the conditions of service of a workman on specified contingencies without the express permission of the specified authority, and if there is a contravention, the employee could complain and the complaint could be enquired into and the entire controversy could be adjudicated as if it were an industrial dispute. Learned counsel for the private school would also submit that as under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the scope of enquiry by the Forums under the Act, and consequentially by this Court, must be construed as wide enough to investigate the merits of the case and pass appropriate orders depending on the same, instead of maintaining only a technical plea. The scope of industrial adjudication is entirely different as found in the said provisions and as expatiated by pronouncements. It is not possible to draw any parity between the scope of the provisions of the Act and the scope of the concerned provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It has always been recognised that no guidance need be taken with regard to conferment of powers, incurring of obligations and consequences of breach of prescriptions from the Statutes, other than the relevant one dealt with by the Court. Significantly in the Act there is no provision empowering any of the Forums under it to ameliorate the mischief of the breach of Section 22 of the Act, by finding a justification on merits, for the dismissal. Nor could this Court assume such a jurisdiction to set at naught the mandate of law. We do not propose to act in derogation of well accepted principles. In fact, in Mani Higher Secondary School, Coimbatore v. The Joint Director (Secondary) School Education, Madras and Ors. 1989-I-LLJ-34, Sathiadev, J., while dealing with a case of termination of service on medical grounds under the Act, held that it will come within the purview of Section 22 of the Act and lack of prior approval will vitiate the termination. Of course, the learned Judge relied on the following decisions arising under statutes regulating education:

9. Mr M.R. Narayanaswamy, learned Counsel appearing for the private school, not only in this matter, but also for the private schools in the other matters, would submit that this contention never found expression at any point of time earlier before the forums below, who adjudicated the controversy and it will not be in order for this Court to permit the Headmaster to raise this plea for the first time before this Court. Facts not disputed having emerged in favour of the Headmaster, the application of the law need not be stultified on the technical plea that this was not advanced specifically before the forums, who adjudicated the controversy earlier. In fact, the other side would say that this point was raised on one way or the other in some of the cases before the forums below. The whole controversy revolved and revolves on the question as to the necessity to obtain an approval, as per Section 22 of the Act. The propriety or otherwise of the resignation in the eye of law was the matter in issue from the inception of the controversy. A ground purely one of the law on the admitted facts of the case can be allowed to be raised for the first time before this Court in appropriate cases, though the normal rule is that this Court, while exercising its highly prerogative writ jurisdiction, should not allow a party to raise a new ground, not raised earlier before the forums below. The objection, in our view, is one going to the very root of the matter and vitiates the action of the private school. We cannot shut our eyes to the legal lacuna and reject the case of the Headmaster inspite of it. This Court should not disengage itself from consideration of a legal point emerging on admitted facts and decline to exercise its jurisdiction, if the facts of the case do warrant the same. In Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and Ors AIR) 1980 SC 1896, the traditional limitations woven around the highly prerogative jurisdiction sought to be put forth before the Supreme Court, were disregarded by it and it was opined that "our Constitution framers have felt the need for a pervasive reserve power in the higher judiciary to right wrongs under our conditions."