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Showing contexts for: code of discipline in I.T.C. Employees Association And Ors. vs State Of Karnataka And Ors. on 23 July, 1980Matching Fragments
4. The company in its statement of objections, has denied all the averments of the petitioners save those admitted therein. Apart from questioning the maintainability of the petition against the action of respondent - 3, it has asserted that the petition should be dismissed in limine as the petitioners have raised complicated and disputed questions of fact which could not be gone into under Art. 226 of the Constitution On merits, it has stated inter alia, that the Association is a minority union and as such cannot raise an industrial dispute and even otherwise, under the Code of Discipline, it is only the majority union that has the right to be admitted in conciliation proceedings. The union being the majority union recognised under the Code of Discipline, the company, consequent on the termination of the 1976 settlement by the union on 21-3-1979, considered the charter of demands presented by it on 15-5-1979 and made its (company's) proposal on 27-7-1979. Discussions on theses proposals from August to November, 1979 yielded no results and consequently in the month of January, 1980, the workmen belonging to the union resorted to "gherao" of the company's officers, intimidation and violence. The company was forced to approach the civil Court for obtaining an order of injunction against the union. Thereafter, the dispute touching the charter of demands was admitted in conciliation on 1-2-1980 and normalcy was restored form 13-2-1980. The company made a fresh offer to the union as per Annexures-1 and 2 filed with the return and in order to test the acceptance of this offer which in terms of money saddled the company with the recurring annual liability of Rs. 32 lakhs and a lumpsum payment of Rs. 20 lakhs at the time of the settlement. The union conducted a secret ballot among its members on 6-3-1980 under the aegis of a local advocate. The secret ballot disclosed that a substantial majority of the workmen had voted in favour of accepting the final offer of the company. Respondent - 3, on being informed about the result of the secret ballot and the willingness of the company and the union to sign the settlement on the lines of the improved final offer, wanted to hear the Association's representatives as they had raised certain objections to the proposed settlement. Accordingly, on 15-3-1980, she discussed the terms with the Association's representatives and explained to them the benefits of the settlement but the said Association continued their opposition to the settlement and recorded their opposition to the settlement on the minutes of the proceedings before her. With a view to thwart the efforts of the company and the majority of the workmen from entering into the settlement, they wanted more time to consider the terms but both the company and the union opposed any further extension of time since the mandate given to the union on 6-3-1980 in the secret ballot was to sign the settlement forthwith as any postponement would have led to serious industrial unrest which had simmered down since 13-2-1980 after the initiation of conciliation proceedings by respondent - 3. The total average monthly gains per worker was Rs. 153-00 under the fresh offer made by the company and as could be seen from the proceedings of the conciliation filed by the petitioners as Annexure-E to the writ petition, 1612 workers out of 1800 attended the secret ballot and the number voting for the settlement was 1207 and against was 395. In theses circumstances, respondent - 3 was justified in the interests of the majority of the workmen and in the interest of maintaining peace, in agreeing to the execution of the settlement between the company and the union on 15-3-1980 and certifying the same as one under S. 12(3) of the Act by subscribing her signature to the settlement. The said settlement being in truth and substance executed with the advice, consent and concurrence of respondent - 3, the conciliation officer, it was binding on the petitioners and this is further demonstrated by the fact that 1840 workmen of the company have accepted the benefits under the settlement on 16-3-1980 and, therefore, a minority union like the Association cannot challenge the settlement. The allegation of collusion between respondent - 3 and the company was also refuted by the company.
6. The union, which is respondent - 5, in this petition, has substantially supported the averments of the company in its statement of objections. It has also complained of supression of material facts by the petitioners in their petition. According to the union, the Association has only about 100 employees as members thereof whereas the union's membership is 1800 and it is recongnised as the sole bargaining agent under the Code of Discipline and as such, has entered into a number of settlements with the company from time to time, Further, the Association has never claimed recognition under the Code of Discipline and has never challenged the union's claim as the recognised union for purposes of collective bargaining. The Association having no representative strength, is bent upon capturing power, through violence and intimidation and its object in wrecking the settlement is the manifestation of union rivalry and blow to collective bargaining. Regarding the fairness of the settlement, it has stated that in the history of the company, the monetary benefit that each workman was entitled to was the highest under the impugned settlement and there was no wrongful loss to the workmen as alleged by the petitioners. The settlement was the result of 7 to 8 months of negotiations between the union and the company and was fair, reasonable and just and had been entered into keeping in mind the welfare of the workmen in general. It had also specifically denied the allegations made by the petitioners against respondent - 3. In paras 8 to 10 of the return, the union has stated in detail the developments from stage to stage, after the termination of the 1976 settlement which ceased to be in force form 1-4-1979, culminating in the impugned settlement. Further it has asserted that the settlement was properly entered into under S. 12(3) of the Act.
11. These contentions will be considered seriatim. Contention No. (i) Mr. Byra Reddy does not appear to be well-founded. His contention is that there was no notice to the Association as required under the Act and respondent-3 did not scrupulously follow the prescribed procedure. Under S. 12(1) of the Act, where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. The Act does not prescribe any particular procedure. Under S. 11(2) of the Act, the conciliation officer may, for the purpose of inquiry into any existing or apprehended industrial dispute, after giving reasonable notice, enter the premises occupied by any establishment to which the dispute relates, has not occurred in this case. Under S. 11(4) of the Act, the conciliation officer may call for and inspect any document which he has ground for considering to be relevant to the industrial dispute. Mr. Byra Reddy has not contended that the conciliation officer has violated any of the aforesaid provisions of the Act. Under Rule 10 of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka) Rules, 1957 (in short "the Rules") framed by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred on it by S. 38 of the Act, where the conciliation officer receives any information about any existing or apprehended industrial dispute and he considers it necessary to intervene in the dispute, he shall give formal intimation in writing to the parties concerned declaring his intention to commence conciliation proceedings with effect from such date as may be specified with therein. It is seen from the records produced by the learned Government Advocate that the notice of conciliation under Rule 10 of the Rules was issued on 1-2-1980 to the General Secretary of the union (respondent-5) and to the company. Such notice of conciliation was not served on the Association (petitioners). Hence, Mr. Byra Reddy maintained that there was no proper summoning of the parties to the industrial dispute and, therefore, the very initiation of conciliation proceedings was in contravention of the statutory provisions. That contention takes me to the point urged by Mr. Srinivasamurthy, learned counsel for the company that since the Association was a minority union and was not recognised for the purpose of collective bargaining under the Code of Discipline non-summoning of the Association did not vitiate the conciliation proceedings. Respondents 3 and 5 also have taken the same stand. Therefore, the point for consideration is whether under the Code of Discipline which admittedly has no statutory force, respondent-3 was justified in not issuing notice notice to the Association under Rule 10 of the Rules. The Code of Discipline (in short "the Code") which was ratified by all Central Employers' and 'Workers' Organisations at the 16th Session of the Indian Labour Conference held at Nainital in May, 1958 came into force from 1-6-1958. In Part V of the "Implementation and Evaluation Machinery - Its functions and procedures, "the rights arising out of recognition of unions are found." Para 13 which comes under the said part, reads :
"The question of rights of unions recognised under the Code of Discipline vis-a-vis unrecognised unions was discussed at the 20th Session of the Indian Labour Conference (August 1962). While a decision on the rights and privileges of un-recognised unions was deferred for future consideration it was agreed that unions granted recognition under the Code of Discipline, should, for the present, enjoy the following rights :
(i) to raise issues and enter into collective agreements with employers on general questions concerning the terms of employment and conditions of service of workers case of a Representative Union, in an industry in a local area;