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"The successful bidder would be entitled to nominate proportionate members on the Board of OPGC including the director (operations) who would be responsible for day-to-day plant operations."

28.3 Perhaps the said invitation did not evoke enough response. Therefore, the 2nd respondent decided to offer 49% shares. In the invitation for offer for acquisition of 49% equity (Annexure D), it was stated-

"The successful bidder and Government of Orissa would have equal nominees on the Board of OPGC. The Government of Orissa would appoint the non-executive chairman and director (Finance). The managing director and functional directors (other than the director (finance) would be appointed by the investor. I he shareholders agreement would have provisions to protects the minority interest of the investor".
"In this connection, you are aware that the dues which CESCO owes to GRIDCO far exceeds the dues of GRIDCO to OPGC. Hence, the unilateral decision of the managing director, OPG.C is not only unfortunate, but also amounts to sabotaging the electricity supply of the State. The result of this decision will be that GRIDCO will have to buy more amount of high cost NTPC power which will ultimately affect the tariff structure. Apart from this, a proposal to sell surplus power to Karnataka and other States goes for a Sixer."