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10. The argument raised by Mr. Bhagat Singh Chawla appearing for the appellant is twofold. It is firstly stated that the President having delegated to the State Governments the functions of the Central Government under Section 7 of the Explosive Substances Act the State Government could not further delegate this power to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary on the basis of that delegated power was consequently without jurisdiction. The second contention of Mr. Chawla is that the State Government while giving sanction was in fact performing the function of the Central Government and the rules of business framed by the Governor under Art. 166(3) would not govern the performance of this function by the State Government.

Mr. Chawla states that as the executive power of a State Government extends to matters with respect to which the legislature of a State has power to make laws and as the subject of arms, firearms, explosives, etc., is the Union List the executive power of the State Government does not extend to matters connected with explosives. The rules of business framed by the Governor under Art. 166(3) could, therefore, not be pressed into service by the State Government while performing the functions of the Central Government under Article 258(1).

13. The meaning of the expression 'State Government' was also considered by this Court in Manmohan Singh Johal v. The State, ILR (1969) 2 Punj & Har 173 = (AIR 1969 Punj 225), wherein Sarkaria, J., observed as under-

"The Government' spoken of in Section 196-A, Criminal P. C., means the Governor acting on the advice of the Council of the Minister, or on the advice of the individual Minister to whom the Department concerned has been allocated under the Rules of Business framed by the Governor. In the ultimate analysis it may also mean a Secretary to the Government to whom the transaction of that business has been delegated by the Minister concerned by a standing order or otherwise in accordance with the Rules of Business framed by the Governor under Cls. (2) and (3) of Art. 166 of the Constitution. If an order according the consent for the purposes of sub-section (2) of S. 196-A, Criminal P. C., is passed by the Council of Ministers, authorised Minister, or the authorised Secretary, and is thereafter expressed in the name of the Governor as required by Clause (1) of Art. 166 and authenticated in accordance with the rules of business, then in view of the provisions of Clause (2) of Art. 166, this order cannot be challenged on the ground that it was not passed or made by the Governor."

14. The second argument raised by Mr. Chawla is equally without force. The General Clauses Act, 1897, defines 'State Government' to mean the Governor. A statutory function of the State Government becomes the function of the Governor and the business of State Government under Art. 166(3) such statutory business. It is, therefore, competent for the Governor to allocate such statutory functions to the Ministers by making rules under Art. 166(3). The State Government while according sanction under Section 7 of the Explosive Substances Act would no doubt be discharging the function of the Central Government and not of the State Government, but the performance of this function would be the business of the State Government for the convenient transaction of which the Governor can make rules of business under Art. 166(3). While making rules under Art. 166(3) the Governor is not legislating in respect of the matters included in List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and is only regulating the manner in which the business of the State Government is to be performed.