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“10.The above statutory scheme clearly indicates that for computing the period of limitation the period during which the assessment proceedings is stayed shall be excluded. In excluding the above period, the concept of communication of the order of the Court cannot be imported. The exclusion of the period has been provided because of stay or injunction by any Court during which the assessment proceedings are stayed. The intention is clear that when the limitation for assessment has started it can be stayed only by an order or injunction of any Court and as soon as the order or injunction of the Court is vacated, the period of limitation shall re-start since after the vacation of the order of the Court, there is no embargo on the authorities to proceed with the assessment. The submission of Shri Shambhu Chopra learned counsel appearing for the Revenue that the limitation will start again only when the order is communicated to the Department thus cannot be accepted. The other reason https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ W.P.Nos.3005 of 2013 & 28434 of 2014 for not accepting the above submission is also equally potent. Explanation 1 (v) and (vi) to Section 153 of the Act, 1961 are also part of the same statutory scheme. In Explanation 1 (v) and (vi) to Section 153 of the Act, 1961 the statutory scheme provides for computing the period of limitation from the date when the order under sub-section (1) of Section 245D and 245Q is received by the Commissioner. Thus, the legislature has provided for excluding the period from the date of communication of the order where they so intended. The use of concept of communication of receiving the order in the same provision which is absent in Explanation 1 (ii) concerned clearly indicates that for the purposes of Explanation 1 (ii), the communication of the order of the Court vacating the stay order or injunction is not contemplated.”

In the present case, we are not concerned with limitation for any particular act to be performed, but the arrest of the limitation by an interim order passed by the High Court. As soon as the order was vacated, the limitation will restart and will exhaust itself on the period of limitation provided under the Act.”

17. ..........

18. In any event, clause (ii) to Explanation 1 only excludes from the computation of limitation "the period during which the assessment proceeding is stayed by an order or an injunction of any court." It does not exclude the period between the date of the order of vacation of stay by the Court and the date of receipt of such order by the Department. Therefore, in the present case, the Revenue cannot take advantage of the fact that it received a copy of the order dated 9th November 2016 of this Court only on 2nd December 2016.”

26.Undoubtedly, as rightly pointed out, if the date of expiry of the interim stay is taken into consideration, the petitioner may be correct, as the period of limitation contemplated expired. However, the fact remains that https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ W.P.Nos.3005 of 2013 & 28434 of 2014 the interim order granted initially on 06.02.2013, which was extended up to 08.06.2014 was neither extended nor vacated by the High Court subsequently. Admittedly, the High Court has not passed any orders either vacating the stay or extending the stay. Thus, no order has been passed on the date of expiry. In practice, the cases are not listed on the date of expiry of interim order in all circumstances by the Registry of High Court, for which the litigants should not made to suffer. In most of the writ petitions, even after the expiry of interim orders, the cases are not listed for various reasons. It is a practical difficulty being faced by the High Courts across the country, as large number of litigations are pending. When the cases are not listed on a particular day more specifically on the day of expiry of an interim order, then the parties cannot be penalised or blamed for non-listing of the matter for hearing, nor parties should made to suffer for the practical difficulties being faced by Courts. In this context, it is to be construed that in the absence of any order passed by the High Court either vacating the interim order or extending the order, it is to be construed that the same position as on 08.04.2014 shall continue for all purposes and the assessee cannot take undue advantages of the situation for the purpose of seeking https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis/ W.P.Nos.3005 of 2013 & 28434 of 2014 exoneration from the clutches of the proceedings more specifically, under the IT Act. Such hyper-technical grounds raised cannot be a reason for granting exoneration. The department admittedly had not received any orders from the High Court. The only contention is that the counsels were aware of such orders. Even in such circumstances in the absence of any order communicated, it may not be possible for the Income Tax Department to act in a particular manner. In the event of no order, the Department has to wait for the orders to be received and cannot presume or assume certain implications and take a decision. Thus, the Income Tax Department has rightly acted upon based on the final order passed in the writ petition and the automatic expiry theory as contemplated by the petitioner cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of reckoning the period of limitation with reference to the provisions of the IT Act. This apart, W.P.No.3005 of 2013 was dismissed on merits. Thus, no further adjudication on merits is required in respect of the present writ petition, as the present writ petition has been filed challenging the proceedings dated 24.10.2014, which is the reassessment order passed by the competent authority.