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53. The aforesaid decision in Pradeep Jain (supra) was considered by another three-Judge Bench in Reita Nirankari (supra). The order passed in Reita Nirankari (supra) supra reads as under:

1. Some of the students seeking admission to the MBBS course in this academic year have made an application to this Court that the Judgment delivered on June 22, 1984 [ Pradeep Jain v Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 654] in the medical admission cases may be given effect to only from the next academic year, because admissions have already been made in the medical colleges attached to some of the Universities in the country prior to the delivery of the Judgment on June 22, 1984 and moreover, some time would be required for the purpose of achieving uniformity in the procedure relating to admissions in the various Universities. We accordingly issued notice on the application to the learned advocates who had appeared on behalf of the various parties at the hearing of the main writ petitions as also to the Attorney General and after hearing them, we have come to the conclusion and this is accepted by all parties that in view of the fact that all formalities for admission, including the holding of entrance examination, have been completed in some of the States prior to the Judgment dated June 22, 1984 and also since some time would be required for making the necessary preparations for implementing the judgment, it is not practicable to give effect to the judgment from the present academic year and in fact compelling some States to give effect to the Judgment from the present academic year when others have not, would result in producing inequality and if all the States were to be required to implement the judgment immediately, admissions already made would have to be cancelled and fresh entrance examinations would have to be held and this would require at least 2 or 2½ months delaying the commencement of the academic term apart from causing immense hardship to the students. We therefore direct that the judgment shall be implemented with effect from the next academic year 1985-86. Whatever admissions, provisional or otherwise, have been made for the academic year 1984-85, shall not be disturbed on the basis of the judgment. We may make it clear that the judgment will not apply to the States of Andhra Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir because at the time of hearing of the main writ petitions, it was pointed out to us by the learned advocates appearing on behalf of those States that there were special constitutional provisions in regard to them which would need independent consideration by this Court.

19. After the said judgment was delivered, the said three-Judge Bench passed a clarificatory order in Reita Nirankari [Reita Nirankari v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 706] wherein the Court considered three aspects, one of which is relevant for the present case.

We reproduce the same: (SCC pp. 707-708, para 1) "1. ... We may make it clear that the judgment will not apply to the States of Andhra Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir because at the time of hearing of the main writ petitions, it was pointed out to us by the learned advocates appearing on behalf of those States that there were special constitutional provisions in regard to them which would need independent consideration by this Court."

The aforesaid clarificatory order has its own significance, for it undeniably excludes the applicability of the domicile test stated in Pradeep Jain [Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 654] in respect of the State of Andhra Pradesh.

20. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to C. Surekha [C. Surekha v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 526]. The said case arose from Osmania University in Andhra Pradesh. The petitioner therein had passed from the said University and he intended to take the All India Entrance Examination for admission to PG medical course in 1988. He had challenged the constitutional validity of Articles 371- D(2)(b)(iii) and (c)(ii) of the Constitution as well as the Presidential Order as a consequence of which the students of Andhra Pradesh have been excluded for competing in the aforesaid examination. The two- Judge Bench referred to the decisions in Pradeep Jain [Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 654] and Reita Nirankari [Reita Nirankari v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 706] and noted the stand of the Union of India and Andhra Pradesh in their respective counter-affidavits that had asserted that institutions in the State of Andhra Pradesh were kept out from the purview of the scheme in view of the decision rendered in Pradeep Jain [Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 654] . The Court also took note of the fact that the issue was kept open in Reita Nirankari [Reita Nirankari v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 706] , and referred to the pronouncements in P. Sambamurthy v. State of A.P. [P. Sambamurthy v. State of A.P., (1987) 1 SCC 362 : (1987) 2 ATC 502] , Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India [Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625] , S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India [S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1985) 4 SCC 458 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 986] and reiterated the principle that Article 371-D(3) was valid because clause (10) of Article 371- D provides as follows: (C. Surekha case [C. Surekha v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 526] , SCC p. 531, para 4) "4. ...'371-D. (3) The provisions of this Article and of any order made by the President thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything in any other provision of this Constitution or in any other law for the time being in force.'"

The judgments of the larger Bench do not refer to the said Article nor do they refer to the Presidential Order, for the said issue did not arise in the said cases.

A scheme has been laid down in Pradeep Jain [Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 654] and the concept of percentage had undergone certain changes. In Reita Nirankari [Reita Nirankari v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 706] , the same three-Judge Bench clarified the position which we have already reproduced hereinbefore. However, in C. Surekha [C. Surekha v. Union of India, (1988) 4 SCC 526] , the Court had expressed its view about the amendment of the Presidential Order regard being had to the passage of time and the advancement in the State of Andhra Pradesh. It has been vehemently urged by Mr Marlapalle that despite 27 years having been elapsed, the situation remains the same. We take note of the said submission and we are also inclined to echo the observation that was made in Fazal Ghafoor [Fazal Ghafoor v. Union of India, 1988 Supp SCC 794 : 1 SCEC 356] wherein it has been stated thus: (SCC p. 795, para 2) "2. ... In Pradeep Jain case [Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 654] this Court has observed that in superspecialities there should really be no reservation. This is so in the general interest of the country and for improving the standard of higher education and thereby improving the quality of available medical services to the people of India. We hope and trust that the Government of India and the State Governments shall seriously consider this aspect of the matter without delay and appropriate guidelines shall be evolved by the Indian Medical Council so as to keep the superspecialities in medical education unreserved, open and free."