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6. In support of the first ground, taken on behalf of the appellants, it was contended that the effect of the two execution sales was to transfer absolutely to them the right, title and interest of the then judgment-debtor, Nemaicharan, in the properties mentioned in the sale-certificates. It was argued by the learned Vakil for the appellants that the view taken by the Court below was based upon an assumption for which there was no foundation in fact or in law. The learned Sub-Judge had hold that Binodini, on behalf of her three infant sons, was entitled, under Section 102 of the Probate and Administration Act, 1881, to be paid out of the estate the costs incurred by her in resisting suit No. 10 for the establishment of the Will of the 25th of August 1883; that she must be presumed to have received those costs from the funds of the estate which subsequently came into her hands as administratrix; that the amounts realizable under the decrees for cost must, therefore, be deemed in law to be property which she held for the benefit of the estate; and that, as on the face of the sale certificates the consideration for the purchases was set off against the decretal amounts, the properties acquired mast be deemed to be part and parcel of the estate. This view, in our opinion, is obviously fallacious. When Binodini defended suit No. 10 as the certificated guardian of her infant sons, she did so in her character of guardian of the infants, who were beneficiaries of the estate and who had consequently an interest therein sufficient to entitle them to enter a caveat; but this did not entitle them to claim as a matter of right that in the event of success they should be paid their costs of the litigation out of the estate. Section 102 of the Probate and Administration Act, upon which, the learned Sub-Judge relied, has no application to the matter in hand. That section merely provides that the expenses of obtaining Probate or Letters of Administration, including the costs incurred for or in respect of any judicial proceedings that may be necessary for administering the estate, are to be paid next after the funeral expenses and death-bed charges. This provision does not justify the inference that, if one beneficiary sets up a false Will and another beneficiary successfully resists his application, the latter is entitled as a matter of right to be paid his costs out of the estate. As is pointed out in Williams 'On Executors' 10th Edition, Volume 1, page 286, it does not follow that a party is entitled to his costs out of the estate, because there is Justa causa litigandi (Barwick v. Mulling 2 Haggard 234. The costs are in the discretion of the Court, and may be directed to be paid out of the estate of the deceased in a suitable case, for instance, as was ruled by Sir J.P. Wilde in Mitchell v. Gard, 3 Sw. & Tr. 275, the costs may be properly paid out of the estate, if the course of litigation takes its origin in the fault of the testator or of those interested in the residue, or, if there be a sufficient and probable ground to question either the execution of the Will or the capacity of the testator, or to put forward a charge of undue influence or fraud, the losing party may properly be relieved from the costs of his successful opponent. Again, the decision in Davis v. Gregory L.R. 3 P. & D. 28, indicates some of the circumstances in which each party may be made to pay his own costs; for instance, in cases where neither the testator, by his own conduct, nor the executors or persons interested under the Will, by their conduct, have brought about the litigation as to its validity, but the opponents of the Will, after due inquiry into the facts, entertain a belief in the existence of a state of things which, if it did exist, would justify the litigation and the opposition is unsuccessful, each party must pay his own costs [Prinsep v. Dyce Sombre. 10 Moore P.C. 232; 14 Eng. Rep. 480 ]. That the successful objectors in such, a case would not be entitled, as a matter of right, to get their costs out of the estate is evident from the decision in Nash v. Yellaty 3 Sw. & Tr, 59. In that case, the plaintiff propounded a Will under which he claimed to be one of the executors; the defendant who was the heir-at-law of the deceased, contested the validity of the Will on the ground of undue influence, the opposition was successful, and the Court condemned the executors, plaintiffs, in costs. The defendant then applied that he might get such of his costs, out of the estate, as he might fail to realize from the plaintiff. Sir C. Cresswell declined to extend the practice of ordering costs out of the estate, and held that the defendant must rely on the party condemned in costs for payment. It is not necessary for our present purposes to consider whether the learned Judge of the Court of Probate should or should not have made an order for payment of the costs of Binodini out of the estate. It is sufficient to hold that no such order was made, and further, that she was not entitled ex debito justitix to pay herself the costs out of the estate in her hands. In this view of the matter, the assumption, upon which the decision of the Sub-Judge upon this point entirely rests, completely disappears. The learned Vakil for the defendants, other than the executors, defendants, has, however, argued that, although the view taken by the Sub-Judge cannot be supported, the purchases by Binodini at the execution sales may be successfully attacked on another ground. He contended that, under Section 91 of the Probate and Administration Act, if an executor or administrator purchases either directly or indirectly any part of the property of the deceased, the sale is voidable at the instance of any other persons interested in the property sold. With reference to this provision of the law, he suggested that, in 1899, when Binodini took out execution of the decree for costs, made in her favour as the certificated guardian of her infant sons, her position was that of an administratrix durante minoritate and that consequently, she was not entitled to purchase at the execution sales any part of the property of the deceased testator. It was further contended that it was not necessary for Nemaicharan to bring separate suit to avoid the sale, but that when, as defendant, he found his interest liable to be affected on the basis of the sale, he could elect to avoid it, with the result that thereupon the property must be treated, for the purposes of partition, as his property and neither the property of the execution purchaser, as contended by the appellants, nor part of the assets of the estate, as contended by the plaintiff respondent. It may be assumed that, if Section 91 of the Probate and Administration Act has any application to the case, the defendant is entitled to avoid the sales without recourse to another suit; for, as observed by this Court in the case of Eastern Mortgage and Agency Company v. Rebali Kumar May 3 0. L., J. 260, it is not necessary for the injured party to bring an action to set aside the transaction and it is sufficient for him to declare his will to rescind, by way of defence, when an action is brought to enforce the transaction, as against him. Glough v. L. & N.W. Ry. Coy. L.R., 7 Exch. 26. It may also very well be that, if a suit were now brought to avoid the sale, the judgment-debtor Nemaicharan would find himself barred by Article 120, if not by Article 12, Clause (a) of the second schedule to the Limitation Act, but that would not necessarily extinguish his title to the property, as Section 28 of the Limitation Act, is not in terms applicable to any suit other than a suit for possession. If we make, therefore, the most favourable assumption in favour of Nemaicharan, we have still to consider whether Section 91 of the Probate and Administration Act has any application to the case. The learned Vakil, who appeared in support of the cross-objections, contended that Section 91 is applicable to all cases of purchase, either direct or indirect, made by an executor, of any part of the property of the deceased. The learned Vakil for the appellants, on the other hand, contended that the present case was not governed by that principle, inasmuch as this was a purchase of the property of one of the beneficiaries of the estate. Now, there can be no doubt but that the rule embodied in Section 91 of the Probate and Administration Act is based upon the principle explained by Lord Eldon in Cook v. Collingridge 1823 Gac. 607; 23 R.R. 155. One of the most formly-established rules is that persons dealing as trustees and executors must put their own interest entirely out of question and this is so difficult to do in a transaction in which they are dealing with themselves that the Court will not enquire "whether it has been done or not, but at once say that such a transaction cannot stand. To the same effect are the decisions in. Wedderburn v. Wedderburn 2 Keen 722; 4 Myl. & Cr. 11; 44 R.R. 331; Willett v. Blandford 1 Hare 255; 58 R.R. 61; Porthole v. Gardner 1 Hare 594 at 603; 58 R.R. 206. In other words, as put by Sir Barnes Peacock in DeCordova v. DeCordova 4 App. Cas. 692 at 703, such a purchase is treated as a breach of trust without inquiry whether the transaction was beneficial or not. As a general rule, therefore, an executor cannot be allowed, either immediately or by means of a trustee, to be a purchaser from himself, of any part of the assets but is considered trustee for the persons interested in the estate and must account to the utmost extent of advantage made by him of the subject so purchased. Hall v. Hallet 1 Cox. 134; Watson v. Toone 6 Mad. 153. The position, however, is somewhat different when an executor or administrator purchases the interest of a legatee. The executor stands in the position of a trustee, and the legatee in the position of a cestui que trust. A case like this is to be tested by principles applicable to cases where a trustee has entered into dealings with the cestui que trust, dealings which may be legitimate, but which, on the other hand, are open to examination when they are complained of. As observed by Lord Cairns in. Thompson v. Eastwood 2 App. Cas. 215 at 236, there is no rule of law which says that a trustee shall not buy a trust property from a cestui que trust, but it is a well-known doctrine of equity that, if a transaction of that kind is challenged in proper time, a Court of equity will examine into it, will ascertain the value that was paid by the trustee and will throw upon the trustee the onus of proving that he gave full value and that all information was laid before the cestui que trust when it was sold. The doctrine enunciated in this dictum of Lord Cairns had been previously stated by Lord Chancellor Sugden in Barton v. Hassard 3 Dr. and War. 461, and has been recently affirmed by the House of Lords in Dongan v. Macpherson 1902 A.C. 197. In the first of these cases, an executor purchased some legacies for sums considerably less in amount. In the second case, a trustee purchased the interest of one of the beneficiaries at an under-valuation, and never informed him of the true valuation, the materials for which ho had in his possession. In eac h in stance, the Court declined to uphold the purchase and held that the benefit of the purchase must belong to the persons who assigned. No doubt a purchase by a trustee of the interest of his cestui que trust is at all times a transaction of great nicety, which the Court will watch with the utmost jealousy and will set aside if the consideration was insufficient. Coles v. Trecothick 9 Ves. 234; 7 R.R. 167; 1 Smith, 233, Ex parte Lacey 6 Ves. 626; 6 It. R. 9. There is, however, a well-defined distinction between a purchase by a trustee from himself and a purchase by a trustee from a cestui que trust, although, as Lord Erskine observed in Morse v. Royal 12 Ves. 355, 372; 8 R.R. 338: "The exception runs so near the verge of the rule that it might as well have been included within it." If we test the case before us in the light of the principles, we have just explained, what is the position of the parties? Binodini, on behalf of her infant sons, had obtained decrees for costs against Nemaicharan. She took out execution of these decrees which remained unsatisfied for nearly 12 years. The parties were at arm's length. The execution proceedings were taken fairly and the sale was held by the Court. An endeavour was made to set aside the sales on the ground of fraud, but it was unsuccessful. No suggestion has been made, much less has foundation been laid for any possible suggestion, that the properties were sold for under-value. Inspite of these sales, which were brought about fairly and honestly as far back as in 1899, Nemaicharan did not take any steps to avoid them, as he might have done, and objection was taken by his sons for the first time in their written statement in this suit. They did not even then suggest that they had retained their exclusive interest in those properties as legatees under the Will of Biswambhor. Their suggestion rather was that the properties still continued to be part of the estate of the testator; presumably on the ground that the administratrix could not purchase directly or indirectly any part of the property of the deceased. In these; circumstances, we must hold that the execution sales were perfectly fail and valid, and that no grounds have been established on which we can conclude that the sales ought to be avoided on equitable principles. The first ground taken on behalf of the appellants must prevail and the first ground taken in support of the cross-objections must, consequently, to overruled.

7. The second ground taken on behalf of the appellants raises the question, of the exclusive right of the executors to perform the Durgotsab, Kali Poojah and Dole Jatra ceremonies. The learned Subordinate Judge has held upon the construction of the Will of the testator that the executors are exclusively entitled to perform the Atithi sheba only, but that the Durgotsab, Kali Poojah and Dole Jatra are to be performed by all the parties in rotation, according to the amount of their respective contributions. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that this view is erroneous, and that there is no distinction upon this point between the four ceremonies named. In our opinion, this contention is well-founded. In paragraph (gha) of the Will it is provided that Rs. 600 are to be paid in certain proportions towards the expenses of Durgotsab, Shamapoojah, Dole Jatra and the feeding of Atithis. It is also provided, that if the amount remains unpaid, for a period of one year and the Poojah &c. are not performed, any surviving member of the family of the testator, or his sister's son, Jado Gopal Chatterjee or Mannu Lall Chatterjee, successively, whosoever he may be, will be entitled to realize the said money amicably or with the aid of Court and to spend the same in performing the poojah &c, according to the usual practice at the rates mentioned. Paragraph (ga) then lays down that Jadu Gopal Chatterjee, Ramacharan Banerjee and the present appellants Baroda, Kunjo and Kishori, are to be the executors of the Will, and that they are to carry out the terms of the Will, manage all the affairs, and perform the Poojahs &c. Paragraph (gha) refers to Atithi Sheba, and provides that Jadu Gopal, Ramacharan and the three appellants are to be managers, and are to feed the mendicants and other guests, and be very watchful and diligent to see that they do not go away unattended to. In paragraph (Inya) the testator then dedicates the residue of his estate to the family idol and also for the purpose of Durgotsab, Kalipoojah Dolejatra and Atithi Sheba; It appears to us to be quite clear from paragraph (ja) that the performance of the Pooja was entrusted to the executors exclusively in the first instance, and from, paragraph (gha) it appears that any surviving member of the family of the testator would be entitled to perform the Poojahs only in the event of the amounts payable in respect thereof remaining unpaid for a period of one year and the poojahs not being performed for that reason. Now it so happened that, of the persons named as executors, the present appellants alone took out probate of the Will, while Jadu Gopal Chatterjee, the sister's son of the testator, declined to act, and his grandson Ramacharan set up a false Will and did not take out probate of the Will upon which the rights of the parties must now be based. But, even if Ramacharan had joined in the application for probate, upon his death his right as executor would not have been transmitted to his heirs. Under Section 11 of the Probate and Administration Act, the entire representation of the estate of the testator would, upon his death, have accrued to the surviving executor or executors, which is consistent with the rule which prevails in England, Flanders v. Clarke 3 Atk. 509, Jacomb v. Harwood 2 Ves. (Sen) 265. We must consequently hold that the right to perform the three poojahs is vested in the appellants as executors and so long as any of them is alive, the other members of the family are not entitled to perform them. In this respect, the performance of the poojah stands on the same footing as the Atithi Sheba, and it is worthy of note that the plaintiff himself took the same view of the matter, as appears from paragraph 6 of the plaint in which he stated that under the Will the executors were to perform Durgotsab &c, and Atithi Sheba. The second ground upon which the judgment of the Subordinate Judge is challenged must, consequently, be decided in favour of the appellants.

15. The second branch of the fifth ground raises another important question, namely, whether any portion of the claim for accounts is barred by limitation. It will be observed that the plaintiff seeks accounts of the estate from the 5th September 1886, when Binodini was first appointed administratrix pendente lite. As the present action was commenced on the 10th December 1906, the claim in substance is for account of the estate for over 20 years. The learned Vakil for the appellants has contended that Article 120 of the second Schedule of the Limitation Act is applicable to a suit of this description and that the plaintiff is not entitled to accounts for any period beyond 6 years prior to the institution of the suit. It has been argued, on the other hand, by the learned Vakil for the respondents, plaintiff as well as defendants, that Section 10 of the Limitation Act governs the matter and that consequently no portion of the claim is barred by limitation. Section 10, upon which reliance is placed, provides that no suit against a person, in whom property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose or against his legal representatives or assignees (not being assignees for valuable consideration), for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property, shall be barred by any length of time. In order to make this section applicable, it has to be established in the first place that the executor was a person in whom property had become vested in trust for any specific purpose, for it has been held that an executor as such is not an express trustee even for a legatee Evans v. Moore 3 Ch. 119. It has to be seen, therefore, whether the provisions of the Will are such that the executor must be treated as trustee Ramdhan v. Mani Bai 25 B. 420. If we examine the provisions of the Will in the present case, it is difficult to say that the properties of the testator became vested in the executors in trust for a specific purpose Various properties were left to legatees under different provisions of the Will and the residue of the ancestral and self-acquired properties of the testator were dedicated to his ancestral idol and for the performance of certain ceremonies. The executors were no doubt directed to carry out the provisions of the Will and to distribute the properties among the legatees, but we are unable to hold that any property was vested in them in trust for any specific purpose. In the second place, in order to make the section applicable, the scope and character of the suit have to be considered. It must be a suit for the purpose of following, in the hands of the trustee or of his legal representatives, property which had become vested in them for a specific purpose. It is impossible to say, when regard is had to the frame of this suit, that it is one of this description. Apart from the authorities, therefore, we should be inclined to hold that Section 10 has no application to this case. But the view we take is also supported by the decisions in Saroda Pershad v. Brojo Nath 5 C. 910 Hemangini v. Nobin 8 C. 788; Shapurjee v. Vikhajee 10 B. 242; Rangopai v. Baba 20 M. 398. The decisions in Hurro Kumari Dossee v. Tarini Churn Bysack 8 C. 766; Nistarini v. Nando Lal 30 C. 369 at 384 and Thackersey v. Hurbhum 8 B. 432, in which the contrary view was apparently adopted, are upon closer examination, found to be distinguishable. In each, upon the terms of the Will, it must be determined whether there was a trust under which the property had become vested in the executors for a specific purpose: and it must also be determined, with reference to the frame and scope of the suit, whether its purpose was to follow, in the hands of the trustee or his legal representatives, the property which had become so vested in trust for a specific purpose. No doubt as observed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Balwant Rao v. Puran Mal L, R. 10 I.A. 90; 6 A. 1, the expression used by the Legislature "for the purpose of following in his or their hands such property" means, for the purpose of recovering such property for the trust in question. But this by no means concludes the fundamental question which must arise in every case to which the provisions of Section 10 are sought to be made applicable. A suit for accounts, pure and simple, of the description now before us, cannot, in our opinion, be treated as a suit against a trustee for the purpose of following a trust property. To use the language of Mr. Justice White in the case of Saroda Pershad Chattopadhya v. Brojonath Bhuttacharji 5 C. 910, the object of the suit is not to recover any property in specie, but merely to have an account of the stewardship of the defendants and of their predecessor in the administration, which means an account of the money received and disbursed by them on behalf of the beneficiaries, and to obtain any balance which may be found due on the taking of the accounts. We must, therefore, hold that Section 10 has no application and the only provision applicable is Article 120 which provides for a period of 6 years from the date when the right to sue accrues. Now, when did the right to sue accrue in the present case. So far as an executor or administrator is concerned, his obligation to account may be treated as continuous, and the person who is entitled to call for an account has the right to demand an account at every moment of the time during which the administrator acts as such, in other words, his right to demand an account runs with the duty of the administrator and may be asserted so long as it remains unperformed. In this view of the matter, the plaintiff would be entitled to an account for 6 years prior to the institution of the suit. The claim for account, in respect of any period antecedent to that, must be treated as barred by limitation under Article 120. We may add that the result of this decision is consistent with the manifest justice of the case. From an examination of the records of Probate Suit No. 9 of 1886, in which administration was granted to Binodini, it appears that Binodini had from time to time filed the accounts of the estate before the District Judge. As previously stated, on the 4th July 1890, she filed an inventory and also an account of the estate from the 5th September 1886 to the 12th April 1889. On the 12th August 1892, she filed the accounts for another year, and on the 5th July 1900, she filed the accounts from 1891 to 1898. These accounts were not challenged by any of the beneficiaries, and so long as Binodini was alive, not the remotest suggestion was made that the duly verified accounts filed on her behalf were open to any objection. On what principle, then, can the plaintiff or the other beneficiaries of the estate now call upon the successors in administration to render accounts for the whole period which has intervened between the 5th September 1886 and the date of the institution of this suit? It is a well-settled rule that if a person, entitled to an accounting, delays for a great length of time, his right may be barred by the presumption that the estate has been fully administered or by the rule of equity which discountenances stale claims. No doubt this effect of the lapse of time may be obviated either by the facts of the case or by the evidence showing a subsisting right in the petitioner and a corresponding obligation on the part of the executor or administrator, for instance, lapse of time may not bar an accounting, if it is proved that there are assets in the hands of the executor or administrator, or if no account has ever been filed. But what has been the conduct of the parties in this case? The administratrix did, from time to time, file before the District Judge a detailed statement of the accounts of the estate. No objection was ever taken to the correctness of these accounts. She was in possession of the estate from 1886 to 1901, and her sons as executors have now been in possession for at least five years prior to the institution of the suit. The beneficiaries come forward after this lapse of time and call upon the executors to render accounts, not only for the time that they themselves have been in charge of the estate, but also for the 15 years during which their mother as administratrix was in occupation. The legitimate inference is that, if the party in interest has been content to let the estate rest for such a length of time, it is, to use the language of the decision in. Thomson v. Thomson 1 Bradf N.Y. 24, not very unreasonable to infer that he has been satisfied with what he supposed to be the course of the administrator. The whole policy of the law is against the enforcement of stale demands, when from the mere fact of acquiescence, the party responsible for the discharge of a trust may have been led into a less careful preservation of vouchers and accounts than would otherwise have been the case, had the duty of accounting been insisted upon at an earlier period. To the same effect are the decisions in Scurrah v. Scurrah 2 Cunteis 919; Weatherford v. Tate 2 Stroble Eq. (S.C.) 27; Lupton v. Jonney 13 Peter 381. if any other view were taken, an executor who had regularly furnished his accounts, to which no objection had ever been taken, might after the lapse of any length of time be called upon to prove his account when he and all the witnesses conversant with his acts as executor were dead and the records and other evidence of the administration had been lost or destroyed. In the present case, the last account filed on behalf of Binodini ended with the period which terminated on the 12th April 1899. According to the view which we take of the question of limitation the plaintiff will be entitled to have on account from the 10th December 1900; in other words, the plaintiff will have an account of the whole of the period during which the defendants appellants have themselves acted as executors and also for the greater portion of the antecedent period for which Binodini had not filed any accounts. For all these reasons, we must hold that the fifth ground taken on behalf of the appellants must be allowed in part. The defendants, executors, will be called upon to account only for the period commencing from the 10th December 1900.

16. The result, therefore, is that this appeal must be allowed, and the decree of the Subordinate Judge modified in the following particulars; (1) the properties covered by the sale certificates of the 14th June 1899, and 15th December 1899 must be treated as the exclusive properties of defendants 1 to 3, and not as part of the estate of Bishwambhar Banerjee; (2) the defendants, executors, will be declared exclusively entitled to perform the Durgotsab, Kalipuja and Dolejatra ceremonies: (3) out of the property known as the land of Kailas Mukerjee (plot No. 30 of the plaint) 10 cottahs are to be treated as the exclusive property of defendants 1 to 3, the remainder alone, if any, will be liable to be partitioned: (4) plots Nos. 29 and 43 of the plaint, which are alleged to be the properties of Jodu Gopal Chatterjee, are to be treated as joint and not allotted to the share of any of the parties at the time of partition; (5) a separate allotment will be made to represent what would have been the share of Bijoy if he had been alive now: and it is to be given under the decree for partition to defendants 1 to 3. The question, however, will be left open for decision in a future suit as to whether transfer by the widow of Bijoy was effected in circumstances which made the alienation binding upon the reversionary heirs of her husband; (6) a separate allotment is to be made of what would have been the share of Shashee if he had been alive now, and it is to be awarded to defendants Nos. 1 to 3 under the partition decree. The question, however, will be kept open as to whether the transfer effected by the widow of Shashee was made in circumstances which made it binding upon the reversionary heirs of her husband; and (7) defendants 1 to 3 will be called upon to render an account of the estate of Bishwambhar Banerjee from the 10th December, 1900, but not for any antecedent period.