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[iii] He has further argued that learned Advocate for the appellant is not correct to say that period stated in Condition No. 2 of Mark-3/2 was an essence of the contract. He has drawn attention of this Court to Condition No. 1 of banakhat at Mark-3/2. As per Condition No. 1 a period for execution of banakhat was fixed for six months from the date on which solicitor's certificate with regard to title clearance is received and also from the date on which permission under Section 20 of the U.L.C. Act is received from the Government. He has then argued that in this case, as per Condition Nos. 5 and 6 of banakhat, proceeding was to be initiated by the defendant No. 1 to obtain a permission. In this case, no such permission has been obtained and no title clearance certificate is received from the solicitors, by the defendant No. 1, and therefore, it cannot be said that time was essence of the contract for execution of final sale-deed. He has drawn my attention to last line of Condition No. 1 at Mark-3/2, wherein it is stated that in case if necessity will arise then with the consent of both the parties, the period of six months can further be extended. Under the circumstances, this is not a case in which, the time was an essence of the contract.

17. Here in this case, the learned Judge of the trial Court has dealt with this important contention of defendant No. 1 by observing that by an act of putting two endorsements below Mark-3/2, a birth of new contract has taken place. The learned Judge of the trial Court has observed in his impugned order that by enhancing the period from 12 months to 27 months for the purpose stated in Condition No. 2 of Mark-3/2, a new contract has come into existence on 28-1-1980, and therefore, now defendant No. 1 is a estopped from saying that Mark-3/2 is a void contract. This observation is contrary to well settled legal position with regard to ratification of the contract. It may be noted that defendant No. 1 had put two endorsements below Mark-3/2 and that two endorsements are in respect of Condition No. 2 which is for a period as to within what period the proceeding should be initiated to obtain a permission from the Government, as also a title clearance from the solicitors. Initially, as per Condition No. 2 that period was fixed for 12 months, but subsequently that period was first enhanced by endorsement dated 2-10-1978 of defendant No. 1 from 12 months to 24 months and later on by second endorsement dated 28-1-1980 of defendant No. 1, that period was further extended from 24 months to 27 months. This Court is of the view that by these two endorsements, it cannot be said that the entire agreement for sale has been ratified by the defendant No. 1. At the best, it can be said that by these two endorsements Condition No. 2 is ratified and not the entire agreement.

21. As per Condition No. 1 of Mark-3/2, a time was fixed for execution of final deed. This Condition No. 1 of Mark-3/2 clearly suggests that defendant No. 1 had agreed to execute a final sale-deed within six months from the date on which title clearance certificate of solicitor as well as a permission under Section 20 of the U.L.C. Act from the Government, are obtained. Condition No. 2 suggests that proceeding to obtain a title clearance certificate from solicitor as well as a permission from the Government, was to be initiated within 12 months from 31-1-1978. As discussed earlier that period of 12 months was first enhanced vide endorsement of defendant No. 1 dated 2-10-1978 below Mark-3/2 from 12 months to 24 months and subsequently that period was again enhanced vide second endorsement dated 28-1-1980 of defendant No. 1 below Mark-3/2, from 12 months to 27 months, and therefore, proceeding as stated in Condition No. 2 was to be initiated on or before 30-4-1980 (27 months from 31-1-1978). Condition No. 4 of Mark-3/2 further clarified that certificates referred to in Condition No. 1 were to be obtained by defendant No. 1 and it was his duty to obtain such certificates. Condition No. 5 of Mark-3/2 reveals that both the parties had to make an application for permission under Sections 20, 21 and 26 of the U.L.C. Act for suit land to the Government and after obtaining such permission final sale-deed was agreed to be executed by defendant No. 1 and expenses for obtaining such permission was agreed to be divided equally by Housing Society (Proposed) and defendant No. 1. Condition No. 6 suggests that Housing Society (Proposed) was at liberty to move the Government to obtain permission under Section 20 of the U.L.C. Act and against such application, defendant No. 1 had agreed that he would not object. From Yadi dated 21-5-1982 of the Government (Page-119), it clearly suggests that in compliance of Condition Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, the Housing Society (Proposed) and defendant No. 1 jointly submitted an application dated 30-4-1980 to the Government to obtain a permission under Section 20 of the U.L.C. Act i.e. within 27 months from 31-1-1978.