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9. The following two questions were raised before Dhavan J. and also before the Bench consisting of S. K. Venna and Rajeshwari Prasad, J:--

1. That the compromise decree was a conditional one and the decree was not executable.
2. That the execution application was barred by limitation as the Article applicable is 181 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act and not Article 182 of the same Schedule.

The same questions have been raised before us.

10. It has been contended that even though Clause 4 of the compromise deed did not fix any time within which the appeal of Mst. Roza Bibi was required to be dismissed, the said appeal should have been dismissed latest by the 30th of March 1953, that is, a day before the payment of first instalment fell due. This submission has prevailed with my brother Pathak, but I regret I cannot accept the submission as a sound one.

12. When a decree has been passed even though in terms of the compromise, the executing Court has to see the decree and not the original compromise that was filed in the Court and on the basis of which the decree has been passed, assuming that there is a conflict between the compromise decree and the compromise deed.

13. The legal position as stated above, in my opinion, is well settled and no authority need be cited in support of it.

14. The question, therefore, that requires consideration is as to what was the effect of the passing of the decree on 17th of March 1952. In the decree all the clauses of the agreement deed have been reproduced. Clause 1 clearly provides that a decree shall be passed for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 6,500 though payable in four annual instalments commencing from 31st of March 1953. There is also the fourth, clause which provides that in case the appeal of Mst. Roza Bibi was not got dismissed, all the clauses of the compromise deed shall be treated cancelled and the suit would be deemed to have been dismissed.

37. It appears that the judgment-debtors, Habib Mian and Ishaq Mian, did not make payment of the instalments. There is no dispute that the decree-holder, on his part, obtained the dismissal of the suit (No, 121 of 1951) within the stipulated period of one week,

38. On March 31, 1960, the decree-holder applied for execution of the decree and prayed for recovery of the instalments which had fallen due on March 31, 1954, March 31, 1955 and March 31, 1956. Apparently the decree-holder considered that the period of limitation for executing the decree in respect of the instalment due on March 31, 1953, had expired. On December I, 1960, the judgment-debtors filed an objection under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure contending that the execution application was not maintainable as the decree-holder had not secured the dismissal of the appeal pending in this Court in accordance with the terms of the compromise decree. The decree-holder was allowed one month by the executing Court to file a copy of the order of this Court dismissing the appeal. On December 16, 1960 he filed a certified copy of the order. The objection uf the judgment-debtors was dismissed on December 17, 1962. An appeal by the judgment-iebtors was dismissed by the learned Ditstrict Judge, Ghazipur, on March 27, 1963. The instant execution second appeal was then preferred.