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It is clear that the stress has been (laid ?) on the fact that the order was a decision which conclusively determined the rights of parties and not on its being embodied in a formal decree. In Mungniram v. Gursahai, 16 r. A. 195 : (17 Oal. 347 P. C.) the Privy Council treated a mere order for the issue of a certificate under Act XL [40] of 1858 as in itself a certificate though no formal certificate bad been issued and in so holding, applied the analogy of a person obtaining a judgment in Court being treated as one having obtained the decree 'itself though the decree itself is drawn up afterwards. The Privy Council case in The Owemr's of ' Brenkilda ' v. B. S. S. N., Co., 7 Cal. 547 at p. 551 : (8 I. A. 159 P. C.) is very instructive on this matter, and it says as follows r "Their Lordabips, therefore, think that the date of the decree did not mean the date on which the decree was reduced to writing and signed by the Court, but the date on which the High Court delivered their judgment and expressed what the decree was." This clearly indicates that in their Lordships" view, on the delivery or pronouncement of the judgment the decree itself is expressed. In fact, it is usually the practice that the Court after pronouncing its judgment in terms also states what the exact effect of that judgment is on the rights of the patties and gives specific directions as to the relief that it grants. In this sense the mandatory provision of Section 33, Civil P. C., that on the pronouncement of the judgment, a decree shall follow is as a matter of fact, carried out in everyday practice by immediate and simultaneous pronouncement of the relief granted. What usually is known as a "judgment" appears technically to be a combination of the judgment and the decree as understood in the definition of the words "judgment" and "decree" in Section 2. It appears to me, therefore, that the phrase "formal expression of adjudication " in the definition of the word " decree " in s, 2, Civil P. C., has no reference to the formalities as prescribed in Order 20, but is in contradistinction to a judgment which is a mere statement of grounds of the decision-and that it has reference cob necessarily to the formal drafting but to the formal pronouncement of the effect of adjudication by way of granting of relief. It appears to me, therefore, that argument that has been built up by emphasising that the decree is a formal expression is unwarranted, I think the argument is due to a confusion between a formal expression as opposed to a mere statement of the grounds of the decision and a document drafted, in accordance with the precribed form. The Code does not define the decree as being the latter.