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6. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, the defendant has preferred this second appeal.

7. Thiru D. Ramaswami Ayyangar, the learned Counsel for the appellant, submitted that there is an implied grant of easement already over the 30-feet road by the original owner and the same has been confirmed by the various documents produced in this case. The learned Counsel further submitted that the lower appellate Court has completely gone Wrong in not properly appreciating and applying the law of implied grant of easement despite the fact that the documentary evidence on record makes it clear that such a right is conferred. According to the learned Counsel, there is absolutely no warrant for the presumption that the 30-feet road might have been left for the benefit of the property sold to the plaintiff, and not for that of the defendant.

10. From all these documents, Thiru D. Ramaswami Ayyangar stated, it is clear that there is on implied grant of easement over the 30-feet road. He cited Ratanckand Chordia v. Kasim Khaleeli , wherein a Bench of this Court has laid down the principles on which an implied grant can be inferred. The question whether a grant can be implied or not would only arise in a case where there is no express grant. To say the least the contention that the absence of an express grant would negative an implied grant is quite untenable. It is from attendant circumstances and other documentary evidence that an implied grant has to be inferred. It is a pity that the lower appellate Court has not bestowed its attention before it disposed of the appeal, on the aspect of spelling out an implied grant, which is recognised by law.

11. Annapurana v. Santosh Kumar (1937) I.L.R. 2 Cal. 727 : A.I.R. 1937 Cal. 661, also makes it clear that in law implied grant can be inferred and lays down that grant can be presumed from the description of boundaries in the conveyance which mentions the same to be a common passage.

12. In Kuppakkal v. Mathan Chettiar 1, the facts were: The owner of a block of a vacant land sold a portion thereof as a building site to A. In the conveyance in favour of A the parcel of land sold to him was described as bounded on its southern side by a pathway intended to be set apart by the vendor. Shortly after the sale to A, the vendor conveyed the remainder of the block including the site of the intended pathway to B, who refused to allow A a right of way over his land. On those facts, this Court held that A was entitled to a right of way on B's land along the intended pathway and that neither the vendor nor anybody claiming under him could dispute A's right of way.

15. In this view, I am not agreeing with the conclusion arrived at by the lower appellate Court which has missed to apply the clear proposition of law as regard implied grant. The lower appellate Court has also failed to properly interpret the various documents in their proper perspective, which, if 'done, clearly spell out an implied grant in favour of the purchasers of the sites comprised in Exhibit B-1. The lower appellate Court has not at all applied its mind to this proposition of law except formulating the points for determination as to whether the defendant has right to the pathway and as to whether he has perfected the right to the pathway by prescription.