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Charles Campbell, a merchant in Melbourne, died. Seven children survived him. In his last testament, he created a trust for twenty-one years. On expiration of the period, the trustees were to divide the corpus among the children. The children of the deceased took the parents' share. The issue came to be decided in the case under the Land Tax Assessment Act, 1910-1916. In the assessment order for 1918-1919 under the Act, the trustees claimed seven deductions of 5,000 (pounds). Six deductions of 5,000 (pounds) were allowed. The Revenue raised the self-same question in a different form in the assessment for 1920-1921. The Privy Council observed (at p. 163) : "It amounts to this-that in the former case it was not a matter of decision that the appellants were joint owners, but was a matter of admission". It was explained that Campbell's six children were not joint owners was admitted by the Revenue and six deductions were ordered. In the subsequent proceedings, in assessment order for 1920-1921 between the same parties, the question again was raised by the Revenue. The Privy Council held (at p. 165) : "In the opinion of their Lordship, it is settled, first, that the admission of a fact fundamental to the decision arrived at cannot be withdrawn and a fresh litigation started, with a view to obtaining another judgment upon a different assumption of fact; secondly, the same principle applies not only to an erroneous admission of a fundamental fact, but to an erroneous assumption as to the legal quality of that fact. Parties are not permitted to begin fresh litigations because of new views they may entertain of the law of the case, or new versions which they present as to what should be a proper apprehension by the court of the legal result either of the construction of the documents or the weight of certain circumstances. If this were permitted, litigation would have no end, except when legal ingenuity is exhausted. It is a principle of law that this cannot be permitted, and there is abundant authority reiterating that principle. Thirdly, the same principle-namely, that of setting to rest rights of litigants, applies to the case where a point, fundamental to the decision, taken or assumed by the plaintiff and traversable by the defendant, has not been traversed. In that case also, a defendant is bound by the judgment, although it may be true enough that subsequent light or ingenuity might suggest some traverse which had not been taken. The same principle of setting parties' right to rest applies and estoppel occurs." Similar is the ratio in a case decided by one of us (Raghuvir J.) in Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. v. ITO . "The admission of a fundamental fact or primary fact cannot be withdrawn and on fresh litigation cannot be started with a view to obtain another assessment upon different assumption of facts."