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"......it is a fallacy to speak of the powers thus conferred upon the Lieutenant-Governor (large as they undoubtedly are) as if, when they were exercised, the efficacy of the acts done under them would be due to any other legislative authority than that of the GovernorGeneral in Council. Their whole operation is, directly and immediately, under and by virtue of this Act (XXII of 1869) itself."

Reference was made by counsel to the case of Abeyesekra v. Jayatilake(1). The question there arose as to whether an Order in Council of 1928 amending another of 1923 making provision that the action of a common informer brought to recover penalties under the Order in Council of 1923 be dismissed and further amending the 1923 Order so as to except the office held by the respondent from its operation was valid and constituted all effective defence to the action although it was retrospective in operation. In upholding the validity of 1928 Order, it was observed by the Judicial Committee that legislators "have certainly the right to prevent, alter or reverse the consequences of their own decrees."

In the view taken Sharma's case(1) sec. 6 notification dated March 18, 1966 was invalid as sec. 4 notification dated Nov- ember 13, 1959 on which it was founded ceased to be efficacious and became exhausted after sec. 6 notification dated June 14, 1961 wag issued and the rest of the land not covered by it became as a result released from acquisition. Depending on the declaration of law made in this decision the petitioners filed these writ petition in April 1966 and thereafter.

Realising that if the view taken in Sharma's case(1) were to stand the government would have to issue a fresh sec. 4 notification and would have to pay compensation on the basis of the market value of the land on the date of such new notification instead of on November 13, 1959, the government promulgated an Ordinance dated January 20, 1967 called the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance 1 of 1967. It is not necessary to set out the provisions of the Ordinance as it has been substituted by Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 13 of 1967 (hereafter referred to as the Amendment Act) passed on April 12, 1967. There can be no manner of doubt that the Ordinance and the Amendment Act were enacted with the object of setting at naught the decision in Sharma's case(1).

sation at the market rate prevailing on such date. The practical effect of the Amendment Act is that by keeping alive sec. 4 notification and by declaring the declarations made after the first declaration valid, the legislature dated back the basis of compensation which would have been, put for this validation, the rate prevailing at the date of sec. 4 notification howsoever belatedcessary. The real purpose of enacting sec.4 is thus to enable government to freeze an unlimited area by first notifying it under sec. 4 and then to acquire bit by bit and pay compensation at the rate prevailing at the date of sec. 4 notification- howsoever belatedly it may choose to acquire such bits, provided it does so before 20-1-69 where the land is notified before 20-1-67 and before the expiry of three years where s. 4 notification is issued after 20-1-67 and thus avoid compensating the appreciation in value in the meantime to which the owner would have been entitled to. Though in form the Amendment Act purports to validate acquisitions in- cluding orders and declarations made therefor, the real purpose of enacting the Amendment Act is to, avoid having otherwise to compensate for the appreciation in the land value during the intervening period. It is a well-settled principle that in determining the constitutionality of a provision impugned, on the ground of its being. an invasion on a fundamental right the court must weigh not its form which may apparently look innocuous but its real effect and impact on such fundamental right. (cf. Re Kerala Education Bill(1); Gajapati Deo v. State of Orissa (2) It will be seen that. secs. 2 and 3 which enable piecemeal and multiple inquiries and reports of a Collector or Collectors under s, 5A. diverse declarations, and awards in respect of different 'Parcels of land covered by sec. 4 notification are prospective. It is only sec. 4 which is made retrospective. But it merely seeks to nullify the decision in Sharma's Case(3) and purports to keep alive sec. 4 notifications which would have otherwise lost their efficacy and validates acquisitions including orders and see. 6 declarations purported to have been made on the basis of such sec. 4 notifications. Section 4, however, does not contain any provision retrospectively amending sec. 4 or sec. 5A or sec. 6 and merely seeks to revitalise sec. 4 notifications already exhausted. The section does not also provide that an acquisition or an order or declaration under sec. 6 made on the basis of such exhausted notification will be deemed to have been made or issued under secs. 2 and 3 of the Amendment Act and as if the Amendment Act was in force at that date as, is usually done in such validating Acts. A notification under sec. 4 having exhausted itself after a declaration under sec. 6 in respect of a part of the land covered by it and the rest of the land being relieved from acquisition, (1) [1959] S.C.R. 995. (2) [1953] S.C.R. 357. (3) [1966] 3 S.C.R. 557.

there would be prima facie no basis for a sec. 6 declaration or acquisition unless such notification is retrospectively validated by a supporting amendment of sec. 4 of the Principal Act or by making secs. 2 and 3 of the Amendment Act retrospective. and by a fiction deeming it to have been made under such amending provision.

Counsel for the petitioners raised the following conten- tions:--

(1) that Act 13 of 1967 does not revive sec. 4 notification dated November 13, 1959 which became exhausted after the first sec. 6 declaration in 1961 was made and therefore no acquisition in respect of the rest of the land could be made without a fresh sec. 4 notification. The contention was that secs. 2 and 3 being prospective they did not resuscitate the sec. 4 notification though subsequent acquisitions including orders and declarations under sec. 6 are validated and that such validation has no efficacy as there would be no basis by way of a sec. 4 notification for such acquisition or order or declaration. (2) that Act 13 of 1967 is in derogation of the requirements of Art. 31(2) as it purports to authorise acquisition without a fresh sec. 4 notification thereby allowing compensation to be paid on the basis of an exhausted sec. 4 notification and on the value of the land prevailing on the date of such exhausted notification. (3) that the Amendment Act is in violation of Art. 14 in that