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Precision Steel & Engineering Works and Anr. v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, [1982] 3 SCC 270, harmonised.

7. The landlord in SLP No. 11425/90 is living in a rented house and is paying a rent of Rs.2,000 p.m. and requires the premises for himself and the members of his family. The landlord cannot be denied possession of his own premises under section 14B when he is residing in a rented premises. [38OD-E]

8. The contention that the concerned landlord has taken voluntary retirement long earlier and has become a part of the Society just like any other landlord and Section 14B was not intended to confer such landlord the special right to recover immediate possession of the premises is not maintainable because Section 14B(l) states that the persons who have already retired may within one year from the date of their release or retirement from such Armed Forces or, within a period of one year from the date of introduction of Section 14B, whichever is later, apply to the controller for recovering the immediate possession of their premises. That is the legislative wisdom. [38OF-G]

There is one other aspect which requires elucidation. In Busching Schmitz Private Limited v. P. T. Meighani and Anr., [1977] 2 SCC 835 this Court while dealing with the scope of Section 14-A and the corresponding right of the tenant to resist the application thereunder, has inter-alia, observed that sub-section (5) of Section 25-B cannot be equated with Order 37 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The social setting demanding summary proceeding, the nature of the subject-matter and, above all, the legislative diction which has been deliberately designed, differ in the two provisions. The Controller's power to give leave to contest the application filed under Section 14(l)(e) or Section 14-A is cribbed by the condition that the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground specified in the respective sections. Needless to state, therefore if an application is filed under Section 14-B or 14-C or 14-D, the tenant's right to contest the application is narrowed down and is restricted to the parameters of the respective sections. He cannot widen the scope of his defence by relying upon Section 14(l)(e). We find nothing contrary to our view in Precision Steel & Engineering Works and Anr. v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, [ 1982] 3 SCC 270. Subsection (5) of Section 25 is self contained and Order 37 Rule 3 CPC has no part to play there. We, therefore, reiterate the views expressed in Basching Schmitz Private Limited case.