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4. It was conceded on behalf of the Central Road Traffic Board, the first respondent, that the appeal by the second respondent was incompetent, vide paragraph 8 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent. Prima facie therefore the order of the first respondent was without jurisdiction. But the learned Advocate-General on its behalf raised two objections to the issue of a writ by this Court. The first was an objection as to the jurisdiction of this Court to issue the writ. This objection is based on the decision of the Judicial Committee in Ryots of Gara-bandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi (1943) 2 M.L.J. 254 : L.R. 70 I.A. 129 : I.L.R. (1944) Mad. 457 (P.C.), where it was held that the High Court at Madras had no power to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Board of Revenue passed in certain settlement proceedings relating to the estate of Parlakimedi in the Ganjam District. The learned Advocate-General contended that as the Regional Transport Authority which passed the original order had its office outside the limits of the original jurisdiction of this Court and as the subject-matter and the parties were both outside the said limits, this Court is not entitled to issue a writ of certiorari. The fact that the Central Road Traffic Board had its office in Madras was, he contended, of no importance just as the fact that the Board of Revenue was located in the town of Madras did not matter in the Parlakimedi case1. Before we decide whether the decision of the Judicial Committee in the Parlakimedi case1 has any application to the facts of the present case, it is necessary to examine the ratio decidendi of that decision. In that case there was a dispute between the Zamin-dar of Parlakimedi and the ryots of certain villages in his estate in respect of the settlement of rent of these villages. The Government of Madras had directed the Special Revenue Officer of the district to settle a fair and equitable rent in respect of lands in the said villages and the officer made an order doubling the previous rents. There was an appeal by the ryots to the Board of Revenue. A member of that Board sitting alone reversed the decision and allowed an increase of rent of only 12-1/2 per cent. considering himself bound by proviso (b) of Clause (1) of Section 30 of the Madras Estates Land Act. The Zamindar appealed by way of revision to the Collective Board of Revenue from the decision of the single member and the Collective Board of Revenue decided by a majority that the single member was wrong in his assumption that Section 30, Clause (1) proviso (b) applied to the case. The Collective Board however fixed the increase at 37-1/2 per cent. to be spread over a period of five years. The ryots applied for a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the Collective Board of Revenue. It is clear therefore that in that case there was a dispute between the parties in respect of rights governed by custom contract and statute and they were litigating their rights before Courts or judicial bodies appointed for the purpose by statute. As the Judicial Committee point out, the parties, viz, the Zamindar on the one side and the ryots on the other, were not subject to the original jurisdiction of the High Court and the estate of Parlakimedi lay in the north of the Province. The only ground on which the power of the High Court to issue the writ could be based was the fact that the Board of Revenue was located in Madras and the order was made within the town. But the position of the Board of Revenue was really that of a Court, though it is true that the Judicial Committee considered that it may not be proper to describe it as a Court in a hierarchy of Revenue Courts. It was, they point out, an official body especially entrusted with particular duties which include duties of a judicial character. In our opinion the rationale of the rule enunciated by their Lordships in the case is to be found in two passages, one at page 494 and the other at page 497. At page 494, their Lordships say as follows:

5. Now coming to the facts of the present case there are no parties here litigating their individual rights before a Court or a judicial body entrusted with power to adjudicate upon their individual rights. The right which the petitioner claims is a right which can only be granted by the authorities prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act. There can be no dispute as to such a right between private parties. The dispute can only be between the party applying for, or objecting to, the grant of a permit. The position of the Regional Transport Authority and the Central Road Traffic Board in this behalf is not to any extent similar to the position of the Special Officer or the Board of Revenue in the Parlakimedi case1. It there-fore becomes a matter of importance that the body whose order is being challenged is located, and has passed the order, within the limits of the original jurisdiction of this Court. Moreover, it cannot be said that no part of the subject-matter in question falls within the limits of the original jurisdiction of this Court. Admittedly Madras is a terminus on the route. An order of injunction which may be passed by this Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction in a suit perperly constituted can certainly be enforced against the petitioner or the second respondent and their officers and servants here in charge of the buses plying to and from Madras. It must be held that the transport business is being carried on at least in part in Madras though it is also being carried on outside the limits of Madras. Applying the test laid down by their Lordships.of the Privy Council in the Parlakimedi case1, we fail to see how this Court has no jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the first respondent.

11. It therefore follows that the order of the first respondent was passed without jurisdiction and must be quashed. The rule is made absolute. The petitioner will be entitled to his costs from the first respondent, advocate's fee Rs. 200.

12. The argument in this case has prominently brought out the anomaly created by the ruling of the Judicial Committee in the Parlakimedi case, particularly having regard to the recent tendency in this country as in other countries to invest quasi judicial and administrative bodies with large powers to pass orders affecting interests of parties. It is a matter for consideration that persons within the limits of the original juris-diction of this Court should have a remedy to approach this Court for the issue of a certiorari to quash illegal orders and orders made without jurisdiction, but that in respect of similar orders relating to subject matter outside the original jurisdiction of this Court such a remedy should be denied to parties outside its original jurisdiction. Whatever historical accidents might justify the ruling of the Judicial Committee in the Parlakimedi case, there is no reason why the anomaly resulting there from should be allowed to continue. This is a matter however for the Legilsature and our province is only to bring to their notice the anomaly and the hardship, caused to a great body of persons in the Province.