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2. In a bid to challenge her termination, the petitioner has pressed this writ application before this Court. However, when the matter was taken up for hearing on March 12, 2021, Mr. Y.J. Dastoor, learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the contesting Respondents 2 to 8, had demurred on the maintainability of the writ application itself.

3. In the opinion of Mr. Dastoor, such writ application was not maintainable for the forthright reason that the said school is a private unaided educational institution operated by the Army Welfare Education Society (arraigned as ―Respondent No. 3‖ in this writ application and hereinafter referred to as ―AWES‖), a society registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860. In other words, Mr. Dastoor argued that since the said school was a private unaided school and the AWES which is managing it, is not a public body, in view of the mandate of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, neither the said school nor the society overseeing the affairs of the said school would be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court.

29. It is not in dispute that the said school is an unaided school and is managed by the AWES. AWES, as has been previously stated, is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Whether such a categorization is sufficient to place the said school or the AWES beyond the contours of Article 12 of the Constitution of India requires a thorough examination. Merely registering a body under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 does not ensure that such body is beyond the pervasive edict of Article 12; a related case in point would be the case of B.S. Minhas -v- Indian Statistical Institute reported in (1983) 4 SCC 582, whereby the respondent institute was declared to be an ‗instrumentality' of the Union Government and classified as a State under Article 12 inspite of being a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860.

31. Mr. Dastoor had argued that the AWES was not a statutory body nor are its relations governed by a statute and for this reason alone, AWES or its educational institutions are not a ‗State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Ms. Sinha, on the other hand, had relied upon V.R. Rudani (supra). The Supreme Court in the case had ruled very clearly stating that a writ of mandamus could lie to any person or authority performing a public duty and owing a positive obligation to the affected party, wherein such a duty need not be imposed by statute. The Court had held:

e) If the private body is discharging a public function and the denial of any right is in connection with the public duty imposed on such body, the public law remedy can be enforced.

f) The duty cast on the public body may be either statutory or otherwise and the source of such power is immaterial, but, nevertheless, there must be a public law element in such action.

34. As a result of these principles, what patently stands out is the necessity to examine a sole criterion, that is, if the AWES was discharging a public duty by operating the Army Public Schools, as is the case with the said school, through its supervision, management and financing. Mr. Dastoor's argument apropos the nature of AWES - private or otherwise- now appears to be nothing more than surplusage.