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4. The contention on behalf of the plaintiff was that when Shridhar died, his share should be considered to be 1/3rd in the joint family property and from the remaining 2/3rd, 1/3rd , would be the share of his adoptive father Narayan and the remaining 1/3rd would be the share of adoptive mother Laxmibai, that on the death of Shridhar 1/3rd share that would have been allotted to him in the joint family property would in his death be inherited equally by his mother Laxmibai and by his widow Shantabai as both of them are the female heirs specified in Class I to the Hindu Succession Act, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. Thus, the submission was that on the death of Shridhar, Laxmibai's share would come to 1/3rd plus 1/6th i.e., 1/2 share in the family property and that on the death of Laxmibai, the plaintiff as the daughter became entitled to 1/2 share in Laxmibai's estate. Thus she became entitled to 1/4th share in the whole of the joint family property. On the other hand, on behalf of the contesting defendants, the contention was that in a notional partition as provided under Section 6 of the Act Laxmibai will not be entitled to any share on the footing of a partition but under the proviso to Section 6 she will be entitled to 1/2 share in the 1/3rd share which will be allotted to Shridhar immediately before his death. Thus according to the contesting defendants. Laxmibai will be entitled to only 1/6th share in the entire family property and upon her death the plaintiff would be entitled to 1/12th share therein. As there was no appeal on behalf of the defendants, the decree passed by the trial Court giving the plaintiff 1/8th share in the family property was not sought to be disturbed.

12. Laxmibai is also one of the female heirs specified in Class of the Schedule to the Act. If that is so, upon Shridhar's death his 1/3rd interest in the property is not to go by survivorship to his father Narayanrao but is to be governed by intestate succession in accordance with the Act because he did not die leaving a Will. The heirs who were entitled to inherit Shridhar's property upon his death are those who are specified in Class I to the Schedule of the Act. So far s the present case is concerned, the widow and the mother are the two heirs so specified. Thus 1/3rd share which came to Shridhar upon partition will be equally divided between his widow Shantabai and his adoptive mother Laxmibai. Thus, Laxmibai in addition to 1/3rd share she gest on the partition, will also be entitled to 1/6th share in the family property as the heir of Shridhar.

25. Our attention is invited to the decisions of Andhra Pradesh High Court; one decision of the Full Bench in P. Govinda Reddy v. Golla Obulamma, and the other a decision of the single Judge in Yethirajulu Neelaya v. Mudummuru Ramaswami, . In both the cases the question that primarily arose for consideration was whether a suit that was instituted during the life time of a coparcener was liable to be continued in the absence of heirs of a coparcener who died during the pendcency of the suit being brought on record. In the decision of the Full Bench in P. Govinda Reddy's case a mortgage was executed in favour of one Potalpati Nagi Reddy. Reddy the mortgagee died in 1960 leaving him surviving his widow, four sons and two married daughters. his eldest son Govinda Reddy thereafter brought a suit against the heirs of the deceased mortgagor on the last day of limitation for enforcing the mortgage. A question arose in this case whether the female heirs who were entitled to inherit the property having regard to the provisions of the proviso to Section 6 of the Act were necessary parties to the suit and the Full bench of Andhra pradesh High Court took the view that it was so and in their absence the suit was liable to be dismissed. In that case within period of limitation an application to bring the female her is on record was not made and that was regarded as fatal to the suit. While considering this k question the Court undoubtedly considered scheme of Section 6 of the Act. Even before the Full bench the decision of the Division bench of this Court either in Rangubai's case or in Shirambai's case was not cited. While considering the provisions of Section 6 the Full bench pointed out that Explanation 1 introduces out of necessity a legal fiction for ascertainment of interest of the deceased coparcenary. His interest according to it will be deemed to be the share that would have been allotted to him if there was a partition immediately before he died irrespective of the fact whether he could claim such partition or not n that day. The need for the legal fiction arose out of impelling necessity for according to Mitakshara Law so longs there is no partition no coparcener can predicate that he has got a definite share in the coparcenary property. The legal fiction was designed for a limited purpose, namely for computation of the interest of the deceased copartner for purposes of devolution of the same on his heirs so that the repay be no difficulty in giving effect to the proviso. In the opinion of the Full Bench, Section 6 of the Act has nothing to do with the disruption of the joint family status. The coparcenary will continue notwithstanding the death of a coparcener until partition is effected. Till then the Karta of the joint family will be in charge of the management of the coparacernary property and will be entitled to exercise all powers which he enjoys by virtue of his position. The effect of Section 6 in the coparcenary, if at all is that in case the proviso applied to the devolution of the interest of the deceased that interest or specified share will be taken in pursuance of the legal fiction, out of the coparcenary property in so far as the heirs of the deceased are concerned and will be available for allotment to them. Otherwise the coparcenary will continue as ever. For the purpose of the case it was unnecessary to consider whether the remaining coparceners remained separate or became united. What was relevant to be considered was when the share or interest of a deceased coparcener in the coparcenary property devolved in the manner laid down in the proviso upon the heirs specified therein, whether such heirs were necessary parties to the suit and whether such heirs even though they were not the members of the coparcenary would have been represented by a Kartha. That question was answered by holding that such heirs were necessary parties in their own right and the Kartha could not represent them. Following this decision a similar view has also been taken by a Single Judge in Yethirajulu Neelayya v. Mudumuru Ramaswami, . It may however be pointed out in this case that even though the heirs of the deceased coparceners were not brought on record the continuance of the suit did not suffer from any infirmity by reason of absence of the heirs as it was a suit by at least some of the co-owners against the trespassers.

29. In none of the cases where a view has been taken that notwithstanding separation of the share of the deceased copartner having regard to the proviso to Section 6 of the Act. the remaining coparceners continued to be joint a question was considered relation to a coparcenary consisting of only two members. We are in the present case concerned with the simple case of the nature. The coparcenary consisted of the members viz., father Narayanrao and son Shridhar, Shridhar died after the coming into force of the Act leaving him surviving his heirs under the Act his mother Laxmibai and his widow Shantabai. Then undoubtedly in view of the provisions of Section 6 Shridhar's share has to be separated and it devolved by intestate succession as he did not leave any will. Such severance is effected by the language of the proviso to Section 6 itself and it is unnecessary for that purpose even to refer to the provisions of Explanation I thereto. If Shridhar's share is severed, then automatically having regard to the provisions prevailing under Shastric Hindu law upon a partition taking place between father and son the mothers right to claim a share equal to that of a son automatically springs up. That being the position, immediately before Shridhar's death a notional partition having taken place in view of the provisions of Section 6. Laxmibai as a result of that partition, will be entitled to 1/3rd share in the joint family property. The remaining 2/3rd share will be divided as under: 1/3rd share will be divided as under: 1/3rd will go to Narayanrao and 1/3rd coming to the share of Shridhar will devolve by intestate succession as provided under the Act. Thus Laxmibai as a result of this partition gets 1/3rd share. She is also an heir of Shridhar and as an heir of Shridhar she is entitled to half the interest in the share of Shridhar. So in addition to 1/3rd share obtained by her on a partition she will be entitled to 1/6th share as such heir of Shridhar. The total interest thus obtained by Laxmibai in view of the provisions of Section 6 and the provisions prevailing under pure Hindu Law will be 1/2 . Upon the death of Laxmibai in 1957 half the interest in the share left by Laxmibai will go to her husband Narauyanrao, and the remaining half will go to her daughter Sushilabai, the plaintiff. Thus, in our view, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case Shushilabai, the plaintiff is entitled to 1/4th share in the property and she is entitled to have a partition and separate possession thereof secured to her.