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This Special Leave Petition challenges the final judgment and order dated 25.02.2021 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in an application under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 being Civil Miscellaneous Petition No.7 of 2020.

We have heard Mr. Arvind Kamath, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent.

Mr. Arvind Kamath, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner submits that the judgment and order passed by the High Court is not sustainable in view of the judgment of this Court in the case of Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. M/s. ECI-SPIC- SMO-MCML (JV), A Joint Venture Company, (2020) 14 SCC 712, rendered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court.

Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent per contra submits that the correctness of the view taken by this Court in “Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. M/s. ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV), A Joint Venture Company”, has been doubted by another three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India v. M/s. Tantia Constructions Ltd.”, SLP (Civil) No.12670 of 2020, and vide order dated 11.01.2021, the decision in the matter of Central Organisation for Railway Electrification (supra) has been referred to a larger Bench to re-look into the correctness thereof. The said order of reference reads as under:

“Having heard Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned ASG for sometime, it is clear that on the facts of this case, the judgment of the High Court cannot be faulted with. Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition is dismissed. However, reliance has been placed upon a recent three-Judge Bench decision of this Court delivered on 17.12.2019 in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification vs. M/s ECI-SPIC-SMO-MCML (JV) A Joint Venture Company, 2019 SCC OnLine 1635. We have perused the aforesaid judgment and prima facie disagree with it for the basic reason that once the appointing authority itself is incapacitated from referring the matter to arbitration, it does not then follow that notwithstanding this yet appointments may be valid depending on the facts of the case.