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24. In the present case, in the latter half of the FIR, it is alleged that the complainant was given poisonous food by the appellants herein and was coerced into consuming the same. This led to the miscarriage and therefore the offences under Sections 312 and 313 of IPC were attracted. Sections 312 and 313 of the IPC read as under:

“312. Causing miscarriage.- Whoever voluntarily causes a woman with child to miscarry, shall, if such miscarriage be not caused in good faith for the purpose of saving the life of the woman, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both; and, if the woman be quick with child, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—A woman who causes herself to miscarry, is within the meaning of this section.”
313. Causing miscarriage without woman's consent.- Whoever commits the offence defined in the last preceding section without the consent of the woman, whether the woman is quick with child or not, shall be punished with 349[imprisonment for life], or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
30. In the present case also, as discussed above, the facts when taken at face value, do not reveal any specific instance of cruelty committed by the appellants herein. In our view, only stating that cruelty has been committed by the appellants herein due to some reason, would not amount to the offence under Section 498-A of IPC being attracted. The next allegation regarding a specific incident relating to the miscarriage being caused by the appellants herein has also been discussed above. A bare perusal of the allegation and the analysis of the same when compared with the statement of the Doctor reveals that even if the allegations are accepted at the face value, it would not prima facie make out a case against the present appellants.
31. Furthermore, the complaint was lodged after the notice of Divorce was given by the complainant, wherein, there was not even a whisper of the allegation of the cruelty or the miscarriage caused by the appellants. The alleged incident took place in 2016, whereas the complaint was filed after the notice of Divorce was given by the complainant, i.e. in 2018.

The latest alleged incident in the FIR is of the year 2016, wherein the most serious allegations under Sections 312 and 313 of the IPC is raised. The explanation for the delay in filing of the complaint given by the complainant is that she did not want to spoil the marital relations. However, she has herself stated that she began residing separately and had moved out of the matrimonial house. Further, she had sent the notice of Divorce on 15th May 2018. This would certainly mean that she believed that the marriage had broken down without there being any hope of reconciliation. It is difficult to believe that despite the complainant taking such drastic steps, she did not file the present FIR for another six months after the notice of Divorce was sent. Moreover, the notice of Divorce was completely silent about the allegations raised in the FIR which was subsequently filed. The notice of Divorce on the other hand contained allegations relating to the demand of money and jewellery from the complainant by the son of the appellants. It also contained vague allegations of physical assault inflicted by the son of the appellants. No allegation of cruelty or the miscarriage allegedly caused by the appellants was raised.