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1. The real question that arises in this appeal is whether the repondent is disentitled by lapse of time from maintaining the proceedings which she instituted on February 26, 1916, for the purpose of obtaining (1.) a declaration as to the effect of a gift for yearly and other sacrifices contained in the will of a testator who died on May 25, 1882, and (2.) the distribution of the etstate upon the footing that the gift was void and the property so given passed to the next of kin. The will is in Chinese form, and was made in 1874; the original has been lost, and there is nothing but a translation by a former interpreter of the Court in Penang by which it is possible to ascertain its contents. So far however, as the critical question in this case is concerned, the translation, as it is before their Lordships, is adequate for the purpose. The testator provided that his property was to be dealt with by payment of a very large number of pecuniary legacies, and after they had been paid and satisfied, the residue was to be divided into sixty shares. As to sixteen of those sixty shares he directed that they should be the means of his maintenance during his life-time, and should be "Kong Lin for yearly and other sacrifices" after his death. Both by Clause 4 and by Clause 22 of the testator's will it appears that he contemplated that this residue should be left undistributed for sixteen years. It is unnecessary for their Lordships to say definitely whether the directions that he imposed upon his executors in this respect were in the nature of a mere appeal to their discretion or created an imperative trust, since for the respondent's purpose the most favourable assumption is that the period of sixteen years was a definite period definitely fixed before which no division of the estate could take place, and for the purpose of this decision their Lordships will accept this view. At the expiration of sixteen years the testator declares by Clause 22 that the income of the shares shall "begin to be my sons' and grandsons (or grandchildren) Kong Lin for yearly sacrifices as well as for sacrifices in spring and autumn."

8. Their Lordships therefore think that so far as the general claim of the next of kin is concerned on the hypothesis that the gift is wholly void, the Limitation Ordinance affords a complete and effectual bar, and this view appears to be in agreement with that of Sproule J.

9. But it was then urged that there was an alternative view which arises upon the face of the will by which it may be said that the plaintiff was in fact entitled under the benefit contained in Clause 22. This proposition was only raised at the end of the earlier argument and certainly found no part in the original claim. There was therefore some technical difficulty in the way of the respondent, but their Lordships were anxious that a matter which had come from such a distance and is of such importance to the parties should not be imperfectly considered, and therefore they heard all that could be urged upon this later branch of the case, but in truth when it is examined there is very little that can be said, Clause 22 provides that at the expiration of sixteen years the shares "shall begin to be my sons and grand-sons Kong Lin for yearly sacrifices as well as sacrifices in the spring and autumn." The copy of the will before us has the words "or grandchildren" added after the "grandsons," but whether or no that was the real interpretation of the word it seems difficult to ascertain, because the word in the previous Clause 21, which has been the subject of interpretation and has been held to include grandchildren, has not necessarily the same meaning in Clause 22, and their Lordships think there is much weight in the statement made by Ebden J. who must be much more familiar with the local circumstances than their Lordships can possibly be, when he pointed out that the sacrificial rites which are imposed upon the property and for which, under Clause 22, the beneficiaries there mentioned are to use the estate, are rites for which the daughter is a useless person. To use the language of the learned Judge, he Bays: "She is useless for the purpose of ancestor worship which requires male issue;" and he says again that "the phrase itself which was assumed to mean grandchildren, including daughters, might, on careful consideration, be shown only to mean sons and grandsons for the reason that daughters have no place in Chinese succession." This is a cogent argument to show that in Clause 22 there never was any intention that a granddaughter should be included. If, however, the clause is capable of such a construction as the two other learned judges in the appellate Court appear to hold, there still remains the difficulty that the gift is not to the class beneficially, but to perform ceremonies which it is said render the gift void ; so that even on this hypothesis the respondent is not seeking to restore the property to the trust but to take it away, and consequently Section 10 is inapplicable. It follows, therefore, that the respondent is unable to escape from the general effect of the Limitations Ordinance, and that this suit was instituted too late for it to be capable of being entertained by the Court before which it was brought.