Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

C.M.Davis who conducted business therein are the same C.M.Joseph and C.M.Davis who are respondents 2 and 3 herein, though it is noted that at the time of visit of the Commissioner, the fourth respondent was found in the helm of arrairs in respect of the business conducted in that building.

19. Section 11(4)(iii) provides that if the tenant already has in his possession a building or subsequently acquires possession of or put up a building reasonably sufficient for his requirements, in the same city, town or village, the landlord would be entitled to an order of eviction. It is not necessary that the tenant should own an alternate building. It is sufficient if he has already in his possession another building or subsequently acquires possession of another building. In the instant case, on the death of the tenant, the tenancy right devolved on all the respondents including Rosily. On the death of Rosily, her rights devolved on the other respondents. If the respondents are in possession of another building satisfying the other requirements of Section 11(4)(iii), it would enable the landlord to get an order of eviction. The question is whether all the legal representatives of the deceased tenant should acquire possession or own such alternate accommodation jointly or whether it is sufficient if some of them acquire possession or own such building. The decision on this point would rest on the facts and circumstances of each case. For example, a tenant dies and he is survived by his widow and children ; one of them constructs a C.R.P. NO.3348 OF 2001 :: 15 ::

building for his own use with his own funds. If it is established that the alternate building was constructed or occupied by one of the legal representatives in his individual capacity, it would be very harsh to pass an order under Section 11(4)(iii), which would have the effect of depriving the other legal representatives of the tenant of the right to continue to enjoy the tenancy right. It is also possible that in order to defeat the rights of the landlord, instead of acquiring possession of another building in the name of all the legal representatives of the deceased tenant, one or some of them may acquire possession of another building in their name though really such acquisition may be for the benefit of all the legal representatives. In such cases, on the facts of the case, if the Court comes to the conclusion that if the other building is really possessed or owned by all the legal representatives, an order could be passed under Section 11(4)(iii). Section 2(b) of the Act defines tenant. The definition includes "the heir or heirs of a deceased tenant". The contention of the respondents that the petition schedule building is occupied and possessed by the second respondent Joseph alone after the death of the original tenant is not relevant in deciding whether possession of the other buildings could be reckoned for the purpose of Section 11(4)(iii), since on the death of the original tenant the tenancy right devolves on all his legal representatives including second respondent Joseph. Running of business in the petition schedule building by Joseph alone, even if it is true, is an internal arrangement among the C.R.P. NO.3348 OF 2001 :: 16 ::