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5. The partner of the petitioner deposed to the effect that the wp705.2000 respondent's services being not satisfactory, he was asked to improve and the respondent assured that he would improve in his work. The Industrial Court, however, held against the petitioner and directed reinstatement by the impugned award. On behalf of the petitioner one Shri Narsinh Chitale deposed to the fact that the respondent was provided all statutory benefits such as Provident Fund and E.S.I. contribution. On the aspect of period of probation, he admitted that appointment letter erroneously stated that the period of probation was for three months since factually the period of probation was six months. Although the witness did not remember whether there were fixed service rules, he admitted that there was no occasion for issuing any memo to the respondent for unsatisfactory performance. He also could not explain why the Provident Fund form contains the reason for leaving employment as "resigned". These are the aspects which are not evident from deposition of the witnesses. The evidence on behalf of the petitioner therefore is largely silent on these aspects. However, the allegations of personal bias have been denied.

15. According to Mr.Bhargude, on a plain reading of the letter it becomes obvious that the respondent was initially engaged for a period of six months but subject to extension of probation. The manner in which the petitioner has treated the respondent's service reveals that the respondent was granted extension of probation on or about 29th October, 1985 notwithstanding the allegation of unsatisfactory performance. Even assuming wp705.2000 the same to be true, there is no occasion for the petitioner to increase salary while extending the probation. Thus, even though the petitioner has contended that the respondent's service could not be terminated and under the guise of unsatisfactory performance, the grant of increment is ample proof of the fact that there was no occasion to complain of the respondent's performance. Mr.Bhargude submitted that the impugned order correctly records that there is no proof, that the order of termination was justified and indeed the Industrial Court has found in favour of the respondent, the petitioner has failed to establish that the workman had not worked satisfactorily for the petitioner-employer. Mr.Bhargude further submitted that the appointment order contemplated two periods, first period being of three months and second period being of further three months and, therefore, it is not as if the petitioner had not contemplated extension of the probation.

22. In Saudi Arabian Airlines (supra) the Court held that in that case the post of security guard was a permanent post and therefore Section 2(oo) wp705.2000 (bb) would not apply. In that context, the Court checked and found that the petitioner had applied to the police authorities to issue a permanent airport pass to the security guard and on that basis it is found that if intention was to continue workman only for a period of two years it was not necessary to apply for permanent airport pass. The Court held that the order of Industrial Court directing the complainant to be made permanent on the date he completed 240 days was justified and therefore no interference was called for. I am of the view that the decision in Saudi Arabian Airlines (supra) was rendered in the facts of that case cannot be applied in the present case where there was nothing to establish that the Respondent was to be appointed permanently. In the instant case the person concerned was a probationer, initially employed for a period of six months and thereafter continued on probation. There is no occasion to equate the facts of Saudi Arabian Airlines (supra) to the case at hand. The impugned order records that burden of proving that the termination was issued in a bonafide exercise of powers given to the employer and there is no iota of evidence to prove that the work of the respondent was unsatisfactory. In absence of such evidence of unsatisfactory services, it cannot be said that the termination was bonafide. The impugned order did not find any favour to the respondent on the aspect of the records of the Provident Fund Authorities recording that the respondent had resigned. The Industrial Tribunal found that evidence on that aspect was not relevant since the employer had clearly indicated that the wp705.2000 services of the respondent were terminated. One other reason why the Industrial Tribunal found that the alleged unsatisfactory performance does not appear to be true is that in the letter of termination dated 2nd January, 1986, there is not even whisper of his services being unsatisfactory and that his services were being terminated for the said reason. Adverting to the provisions of Section 66 of the Act, the Court found that although the provision permits an employer to terminate the services of an employee who has not completed one year services by giving 14 days notice or wages in lieu of notice such right could not be exercised arbitrarily. In the present case, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the action of the petitioner was bonafide. It is for the aforesaid reasons that the Tribunal found that the order of the termination was bad and directed reinstatement of the respondent.

27. The impugned order after analysing the facts, evidence, submissions on both sides concludes that because an increment was granted wp705.2000 in November 1995, it could be presumed that performance of workman was acceptable since no employer would give an employee increment for unsatisfactory performance. It further goes on to hold that the contention of unsatisfactory performance does not appear to be correct because the termination order does not mention unsatisfactory performance of the respondent. According to the Industrial Court there is no evidence at all to substantiate the contention that the services of respondent were terminated because of unsatisfactory performance. This has led the Tribunal to hold that notwithstanding Section 66 of the Bombay Shops and Establishment Act, 1948 providing for a right to terminate services of an employee who has completed less than one year service by giving 14 days notice, this right cannot be exercised arbitrarily but only in a bonafide manner. It is burden upon an employer to establish that the termination was bonafide.