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2. The first question that was canvassed before the learned Judge was whether this Ct. had jurisdiction to interfere with the decision of the Industrial Tribunal that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the claim of contract labour in respect of a bonus. The Industrial Tribunal hold that contract labour satisfied the conditions laid down in the Act & those who were employed by contract were employees within the meaning of the Act & therefore, it came to the conclusion that it had jurisdiction to proceed with the reference with regard to contract labour as well. What was urged by the State of Bombay before Bhagwati J. was that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal that contract labourers were employees was a finding of fact which could not be controlled in any way by this Ct.; that that finding & decision was final & binding & no writ of certiorari could be issued to interfere with that decision. Now the Industrial Court is a Ct. of limited jurisdiction; it is a creature of statute & its jurisdiction is strictly controlled by the Act which brings it into existence, & if the Tribunal acts in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the statute, the H. C. can always correct the Ct. by an appropriate writ. The jurisdiction of the Ct. to deal with this reference is to be found in Section 78 of the Act, which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Provincial Govt. may, at any time, refer an industrial dispute to the arbitration of the Industrial Court, if certain conditions are satisfied with which we are note concerned in this case. Therefore, the only jurisdiction which the Provincial Govt. has is to refer a matter to the Industrial Ct. & the only jurisdiction that the Industrial Ct. has is to try a matter which relates to an industrial dispute as defined by the Act. If something is referred to the Tribunal which is not an industrial dispute, then the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to deal with that matter. "Industrial dispute" is defined by Section 8(17) as meaning "any dispute or difference between an employer & employee or between employers & employees or between employees & employees & which is connected with any industrial matter", & "industrial matter" is defined by Section 8(18). There is no controversy in this case that the dispute between contract labour & the Sugar Co. is connected with an industrial matter. The only controversy is that the dispute is not between an employer & an employee. The question with regard to jurisdiction arises in this way, that the Industrial Tribunal having decided that there was a relationship of employer & employee between the company & the contract labour; whether it is open to this Ct. to question that finding & to determine for itself whether that finding is a correct one or not. Now, it is well established, & we went into this matter at some length in a recent decision of this Ct. Mohsinali Mahomedali v. State of Bombay, 53 Bom. L. R. 94 : (A. I. R. (38) 1951 Bom. 30l) that when there is a collateral fact upon the determination of which the jurisdiction of a Tribunal arises, if the Tribunal decides the collateral fact erroneously & assumes jurisdiction, the superior Ct. can always correct the decision of tbe inferior Ct. It must be a fact which it is necessary to decide in order to assume jurisdiction; or in other words, the jurisdiction of the Ct. must be conditional upon the existence of that fact. In contradistinction to such collateral facts there are relevant facts or facts in issue which the Ct. has been created in order to determine. Express jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Ct. to decide & determine those facts, & as far as the determination of those facts is concerned, the decision of the Ct. is final & however erroneous its decision may be in fact or in law, the superior Ct. will not interfere with that decision. Therefore, what has got to be considered in this case is, whether the question as to the relationship between the company & the contract labour & as to whether that relationship was that of employer & employee is a collateral fact or a relevant fact which the Ob, had to determine as required by statute. In our opinion Bhagwati J. was quite right when he came to the conclusion that the very jurisdiction of the Tribunal depended upon the matter which it was determining being an industrial dispute. If it was not an industrial dispute, then the Ct. has no jurisdiction to decide the matter, & in order to decide whether it was an industrial dispute or not, the Tribunal had, in the first instance & in limine, to determine whether the relationship between the company & the contract labour was that of employer & employee or not. It was only on the determination of this issue that the Ct. could either have jurisdiction or no jurisdiction to determine the matter. Therefore, the existence of an industrial dispute was the very foundation of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide this matter. Therefore, it is clear that the Tribunal could not assume to itself jurisdiction to decide this question by erroneously finding that the relationship between the company & contract labour was that of employer & employee. If that determination was wrong, the superior Ct. could certainly interfere & correct the lower Ct. as far as the determination of this particular issue was concerned. Therefore, there can be no question that this Ct. has ample jurisdiction to consider whether the finding of the Tribunal that the relationship between the company & contract labour was that of employer & employee was right or not. The only substantial point that has been argued before us by both Mr. K.T. Desai on behalf of the State & by Mr. M.V. Desai on behalf of the company is whether the decision of the Tribunal that the contract labour were employees & that the company were employers is a correct decision.