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death of the plaintiffs' father. Actually, the cause of action has arisen when the defendants filed final decree application and commission application and caused notices to the parties and started to proceed against the plaint schedule properties. This fact is inadvertently and mistakenly omitted in the plaint. Since the father is not a party to the suit, the decree and judgment in O.S.No.745/94 are only to be ignored. This is also not properly stated in the plaint. Hence, sought for an order permitting the plaintiffs to substitute a fresh cause of action which arose on 15-9-1999, when the defendants instituted final decree proceedings in O.S.No.745/94, after deleting the existing cause of action which arose on 29-10-1998. Two other amendments are also sought for. The respondents resisted the suit as well as the amendment application. In the objection to the amendment application, the respondents contended that the amendment sought for is highly belated and the same is intended to get over the bar under the Limitation Act. O.S.No.745/94 was decreed ex parte on 29-9-1998. But, as per the original cause of action, the suit was filed after 3 years. Thus, the amendment was intended to circumvent the bar under the Limitation Act. It is also contended that the petitioners were well aware of the institution of O.S. No.745/94 and the decree passed thereunder.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents advanced arguments to justify the finding that the amendment is intended to circumvent the bar under the Limitation Act. According to the respondents, the amendment will change the basic nature and character of the suit. Moreover, the amendment, if allowed, will take away a valuable right of defence accrued to the respondents under law. Thus, the petition lacks bona fides and the same is a mischievous attempt to get over the bar of institution of the suit under the Limitation Act only.

O.P(C).1089/10-O :7:
9. In the above view, date of cause of action is the date that spontaneously emerges from bundle of facts which gives rise to a right or liability. If that be so, the date of cause of action must be the date on which a right or liability arose and that date must be compatible with bundle of remaining facts pleaded so as to make cause of action compact and perfect. The date on which cause of action arose cannot be one divorced from the bundle of facts pleaded and it must be seemly compact and compatible with facts pleaded. In short, substitution or interpolation of the date of cause of action by way of amendment, which gives rise to incompatibility or dissonance with remaining fact, so as to circumvent bar under the Law of Limitation, is impermissible and liable to be rejected.
not a disputed question and the plaintiffs themselves averred that their cause of action has arisen on 29-10-1998, when their father died. I am of the opinion that the said averment is not a mistake as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The reliefs sought for in the suit are made in suitable and compatible with the existing cause of action. I am unable to believe that it is a mistake inadvertently made or it is an omission. When the petitioners were parties in O.S.No.745/94 and they themselves had earlier filed an I.A. for setting aside the preliminary decree passed in O.S.No.745/94, it cannot be contended that the cause of action has arisen on 15-9-1999, when the respondents filed the final decree application, which ended in dismissal. Indisputably, the petitioners were fully aware of the proceedings in O.S.No.745/94 in which they were also parties and the final decree application is only a natural consequence of the preliminary decree against which they themselves earlier filed an application to set it aside. Therefore, I find that there is no bona fides in the application to amend the cause of action and the same is incompatible with the rest of the pleadings in the original suit. In short, the change of cause of action is intended to circumvent the bar under the Limitation Act. Therefore, I cannot find fault with the court below in arriving at such a conclusion. There is no illegality or O.P(C).1089/10-O :9: