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Section 299 I.P.C. reads as under:

"299. Culpable homicide.  Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide"

Section 300 I.P.C. reads as under:

"300. Murder.  Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or-
Secondly,- If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or-
Thirdly,- If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or-
Fourthly,- If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid."
In Thangaiya v. State of T.N. [(2005) 9 SCC 650], relying upon a celebrated decision of this Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab [1958 SCR 1495], the Division Bench observed:
"17. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh case for the applicability of clause "thirdly" is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law. Under clause "thirdly" of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied: i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death viz. that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
18. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh case even if the intention of the accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point."

Therein it was held that there is no fixed rule that whenever a single blow is inflicted Section 302 would not be attracted.