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10. The Division Bench, while referring the matter, took note of the fact that in Jagveer Singhaa v. Chairman, U.P. Co-operative Textiles Mills Ltd., Bidandshahr and Anr., (1999) 17 LCD 1105, in Paragraph 13, it was held by the said Division Bench, inter alia, as follows :-

"13. There is a Full Bench decision in Radha Charan Sharma v. U.P. Co-operative Federation, 1982 UPLBEC 89, reliance on which has been placed by the learned Single Judge in support of his conclusion that the respondent-Society is not instrumentality of State and that the writ petition is not maintainable against it but the same is no longer quotable as a binding precedent in view of recent Supreme Court decisions referred to here-in-abovc particularly the latest one in U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey (supra)."

21. The view of the Division Bench in Jagveer Singhaa's case (supra) that every Co-operative Society can be treated as an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 226 of the Constitution of India because of its control by the Registrar under the provisions of the Act, in our view, is incorrect. In Jagveer Singhaa's case (supra), the Division Bench further held that the view taken by the Full Bench in Radha Charan Sharma's case (supra) was inconsistent with the view taken by the Apex Court in U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey (supra). In U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Chandra Bhan Dubey (supra), the facts were that the U.P. Co- operative Federation Ltd., employed the petitioner therein as Sales Representative in its Co-operative Drugs Factory at Ranikhet. He was transferred as an Accountant-cum-Godownkeeper in the Branch Office of the Federation at Ghaziabad. A report of theft of fertilizers and misappropriation of money and materials was received by the Federation and the employee was suspended. He instituted a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Division Bench referred three questions. The first question was whether Co-operative Society which is an Apex or State level Co-operative Society governed by the provisions of U.P. Co-operative Societies Act is statutory body or is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Referring the decision in Ajay Hasia's (supra), the Full Bench recorded finding that the petitioner failed to prove that the Government controls the activities or decision making power of the managing body of the Federation. Paragraph 16 of the report in U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd. 's (supra), reads thus :

"It is obvious that a juristic personality like a Co-operative Society which is registered under the Act but is otherwise free of Governmental control will not be an authority within meaning of Article 12. In the present case, it has been stressed that 40 to 60 per cent of the share-holding of the Federation is owned by the State Government. The President of the Federation is the Registrar of Co-operative Society, a Government Servant, and the Secretary of the Federation is the Deputy Registrar, another Government Servant. The petitioner has not indicated what is the constitution of the Federation in which organ or body of the Federation is the power of management and taking decisions resides. It has not been shown how far the Government controls the activities or decision making power of the managing authority of the Federation. In these circumstances, it is difficult to hold that the Federation was an authority within meaning of Article 12."

The Court did not consider that in the Full Bench decision in Radha Charan Sharma's case (supra), the Court had recorded a finding on facts that U.P. Co-operative Federation was not a Society and secondly, even if it was a Society, there was no statutory rule which was violated by such Society. Paragraph 11 of the said judgment, which is relevant for the purposes of the instant case, is being extracted below :-

"Learned Counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to the U.P. Co-operative Societies Employees Service Regulations, 1973. They came into force on July 3, 1973. There is nothing in these Regulations indicating that they shall have retrospective effect so as to cover the order of suspension passed in 1969. Clause (a) of sub-rule (vii) of Regulation 85 provides that an employee who is under suspension on the date of coming into force of these regulations shall continue to draw such portion of pay and such allowances as he was allowed to draw for the period of suspension. This only shows that the pre-existing rules will continue to operate and apply to an employee under suspension. In the present case, Rule 20 of the 1956 Rules provide that a suspended employee shall be entitled to 1/4 of his emoluments as subsistence allowance. Under Regulation 85 of 1973 Regulations, the subsistence allowance is to be equal to 1/3 of the emoluments. In spite of it, for employees who were under suspension on the date of coming into force of these regulations, the preexisting rules have been made to apply. This does not show that the Regulations of 1973 have any retrospective operation. Further, learned Counsel for unable to point out any particular regulation which may be said to have been violated by the respondents in passing the impugned order of suspension. In the view, it seems unnecessary to decide whether the respondent-Federation is a 'State' within meaning of that expression in Article 12 of the Constitution so as to amenable to a writ petition."