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3. Before I proceed further to consider as to whether the grounds alleged by the wife for the dissolution of the marriage have been proved and the decree for dissolution passed by the trial court should be confirmed. I would like to note that. Section 17 apart, there are several other provisions in this Century-old Divorce Act of 1869 which are not only manifestly anachronistic, but have rendered themselves patently open to Constitutional challenge. To start with, under Section 10 of the Act, while the husband is entitled to a dissolution on the ground of the wife's adultery, the wife is not so entitled unless she proves that the husband's adultery is incestuous or is coupled with cruelty or bigamy or desertion. If the husband is entitled to dissolution on the ground of adultery simpliciter on the part of the wife, but the wife is not so entitled unless some other matrimonial fault is also found to be super-added, then it is difficult to understand as to why this provision shall not be held to be discriminatory on the ground of sex alone and thus to be ultra vires Article 15 of the Constitution countermanding any discrimination on such ground. The only reported decision that comes to my mind in defence for this provision is the one of Panchapakesa Ayyar, J., of the Madras High Court, sitting singly, in Dwarka Bai v. Nainan , where the learned Judge thought that since the husband even by committing adultery "does not bear a child as a result of such adultery and make it child of his wife to be maintained by the wife", the wife by committing adultery "may bear a child as a result of such adultery and the husband will have to treat it as his legitimate child and will be liable to maintain that child under Section 488, Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act", and that "this very difference in the result of the adultery may form some ground" of justification for this differentiation. I have, thought that at least since the eleven-Judge Bench decision in the Bank Nationalisation Case R.C. Cooper v. Union of India , the effect whereof has been furtherexplained in Bennet Coleman v. Union of India, , the law must be taken to be well-settled that however laudable or otherwise justifiable the object or purpose for the differentiation may be, it is not the object or the purpose or the form, but it is the effect, the impact, the result of the law that would determine the question of infringement of fundamental right. I would like to think that even assuming that the liability to conceive as a result of adulterous inter-course may otherwise be a reasonable ground for classification between a husband and a wife permissible under Article 14, since a wife conceives and the husband does not only because of the peculiarities of their respective sex, any discrimination on such ground would be a discrimination on the ground of sex alone against the mandatory prohibition of Article 15.1 am afraid that any discrimination on the ground of any liability, inability, disability or incapacity of women resulting from the peculiarities of their sex would amount to discrimination on the ground of sex atone. In C. B, Muthamma v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1868 the validity of the relevant provisions of the Indian Foreign Service (Conduct & Discipline) Rules, 1961, providing that "no married woman shall be entitled to as of right to be appointed to the service" and that "any time after the marriage, a woman member may be required to resign from service, if the Government is satisfied that her family and domestic commitments are likely to come in the way of the due and efficient discharge of her duties", came up for consideration. And it was urged in support of those provisions that marriage with its usual domestic responsibilities and consequential motherhood affects women, at least physically and physiologically, much more than men and, therefore, married women were discriminated against, not on the ground of sex only, but on the ground of consequential impairment of their usual capacity as a result of marital life. But even then the two-Judge Bench, speaking through Krishna Iyer, J., had no hesitation in holding the impugned provisions to be violative of the equality clause of the Constitution.