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The petitioners have challenged the order dated 31.07.2014 passed by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal (henceforth referred as 'Tribunal') in Appeal No.445/2013, by which the Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the order of confirmation issued by the petitioners and remitted the case back to the concerned authority for reconsideration.

2. It is stated that the petitioners had sanctioned a building plan enabling the respondents to put up construction on a property bearing Municipal No.77, PID No.79/43/77. The petitioners allege that the respondents have undertaken construction in absolute violation of the plan and the bylaws, which compelled the petitioners to initiate proceedings under Section 321(1) of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'KMC Act' for short). The respondents did not respond to the provisional order which compelled the petitioners to pass an order of confirmation under Section 321(3) of the KMC Act. This was challenged by the respondents before the Tribunal under Section 443A of the KMC Act. It was contended before the Tribunal that the provisional order under Section 321(1) of the KMC Act was not served upon the respondents and that the petitioner No.1 could not have delegated the quasi-judicial power under Sections 321(1), 321(3) and 462 of the KMC Act to the respondent No.2. It was also contended that the office order issued by petitioner No.1 delegating the authority to the petitioner No.2 was not approved by the standing committee of the Corporation and therefore, the petitioner No.2 had no authority to initiate action against the respondents.

3. The Tribunal considered the above and held that the petitioners had failed to serve the provisional order to the respondents and also that the petitioner No.2 was not competent to initiate proceedings under Sections 321(1) and 321(3) of the KMC Act on behalf of the petitioner No.1 as the office order dated 06.05.2013 delegating power to petitioner No.2 was not approved by the standing committee. Hence, the Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the order of confirmation and remitted the case for reconsideration.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners did not dispute the fact that the respondents had furnished his address at the time of filing an application for sanction of building plan. If that be so, it was incumbent upon the petitioners to serve the provisional order not only at the site but also at the residential address that were available in the file of the petitioners. The Tribunal after going through the records had held as follows:

"14. Apart from this lacuna, it is the grievance of the appellant that no sufficient opportunity has been given to him to reply. It is his specific contention that the notice and confirmation order have been issued on the same day. There is no any believable evidence on the side of the respondents to prove that the notice under Sec.321(1) was actually served within the reasonable time from the date of its issuance and after giving sufficient opportunity the confirmation order has been passed. We would like to say that no enquiry report is filed by the respondents before passing the confirmation order. Therefore, it is clear from the available documents that the respondent authority has not taken the action by implementing the power in accordance with law. The allegation of deviation has to be proved by the authority for the purpose of taking proper action against the appellant. At this stage it is necessary to refer that the respondents have given an opportunity to the appellant in the impugned order to rectify the mistakes alleged to be committed by the appellant. In this regard the learned counsel for the appellant referred to Sec.321-A of the Act. Therefore it is clear from the above discussion that the authority has utterly failed to prove that the allegation made by it under Sec.321(1) which has been confirmed under Sec.321(3) of the Act are true one. Under such circumstances we feel that the grounds urged by the appellant regarding the authority of taking action against him by the AEE and the legality of the allegation made against the appellant have not been proved and further no sufficient opportunity has been given to the appellant either to convince the authority or to make it correct by resorting under Sec.321-A of the Act. Therefore we feel that the notice in ¸ÀPÁ¤C/ªÀ£À/¦N/40/13-14 ¢:30-03-2013 followed by confirmation order dated 6-5- 2013 are liable to be set aside and the matter has to be remitted back to the authority for reconsideration and also for proper action after satisfying about the deviation or violation of byelaw. With these observations, we answer the point No. 1 in the affirmative."

7. There is no evidence to establish that the provisional order was duly served upon the respondents and therefore, the Tribunal was right in holding that the petitioners have not taken proper and effective measures to ensure service of notice of the provisional order upon the respondents. Insofar as the contention of the petitioners that the Commissioner is authorized to delegate the powers under Sections 321(1), 321(2), 321(3) and 462 of KMC Act, 1976, a Division Bench of this Court in the case of MAHTANI VENTURES (Supra) after considering Sections 64, 66 and 67 of the KMC Act, 1976 held as follows: