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10. Now, a case of a report to a police Officer arose in In re, Kakumara Anjaneyalu, 35 Ind Cas 833 : (AIR 1917 Mad 600), and it was held that though a complaint to a Magistrate was absolutely privileged, that principle could not be extended to a complaint to a police constable, But apart from that the case contains no further reasoning.

11. Such a case also arose in Majju v. Lachman Prasad, AIR 1924 All 535, and it was held by a Full Bench that a report made at a police station was not within the rule of absolute privilege but might be covered by a qualified privilege. The judgment in this case, however, contains - very little discussion, and, with great respect, it was more or less assumed that a report made at a police station could not possibly be governed by absolute privilege.

21. Even if I were to hold for the sake of argument that the report Ex. P-1 in this case was not absolutely privileged but carried only a qualified privilege with it, (and this is indeed not denied by learned Counsel for the plaintiff appellant) I am of opinion that there is ample material on this record which has been believed by the trial Court to show that the report was warranted by the occasion which prompted it.

There is a volume of evidence in the statements of the defence witnesses D.W.1 Biharilal D.W.2 Chhaganlal, D.W. Roopchand. D.W.4 Bothlal and D.W.5 Jodhraji and D.W.6 Kaloo to show that a procession was taken out on Chait Vadi 3 and Chait Vadi 5, during which the effigies of the defendants Chhaganlal and Pyarchand were carried by a large number of people, and these were shoe beaten throughout the course of the procession, that the plaintiff was one of the important leaders of the processionists and that rioting ensued during which a shop of Mangilal Mahajan was looted with the result that the Bazar had to be closed for about three days and the police arrived, and that there was a good deal of insecurity of life and property in the village in those days.

22. It may be pointed out here that privilege is of two kinds (1) absolute privilege and (2) quali-fied privilege. I have already dealt with the plea of absolute privilege above and would content myself with repeating only this much here that no action whatsoever lies for a statement made on an occasion which is absolutely privileged.

Now, as to a qualified privilege, a communication is said to be so privileged if it is made by a person in discharge of some duty, whether public or private, of a legal, moral or social character, or having an interest to be protected to a person who has some interest in receiving it, or to a person honestly believed to have a duty to protect that interest.

Such communications where they are fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency are also protected for the common convenience and welfare of the society. It may also be pointed out that a plea of qualified privilege can always be defeated by proving malice, that is, malice actual or in fact. The law is well settled that no action for a communication made on an occasion of a qualified privilege and fairly warranted by it lies unless it is proved to have been made maliciously or with an improper motive.